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The expeditionary nature of today’s Department of Defense (DoD) demands an 
effective Defense Transportation System (DTS).  The major stakeholders within the DTS 
supply-chain including United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the 
newly appointed Distribution Process Owner (DPO), have continued to explore process 
improvement programs initiated in the 1990s, but do so now from a systems-level 
approach.  One such initiative is the pure pallet program, initially implemented in 
November 2003 by Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)-owned depots, and later by Air 
Mobility Command (AMC)-owned aerial ports in March 2004.   
In coordination with United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), 
USTRANSCOM, and the DLA, AMC implements the pure pallet program to improve 
warfighter support.  The cornerstone of the pure pallet program rests upon the 
consolidation of materiel early in the supply-chain by constructing end-user specific 
pallets.  This research utilized a web-based survey to measure the perceptions of the air 
transportation specialists and logistics readiness officers who are implementing the 
program on behalf of the Air Force.  The results indicate that the pure pallet program is 
achieving its intended results; however, there is a perception problem.  Recommendations 
center on educating personnel on the importance of suboptimization avoidance and 
making the warfighter the most important customer.  This research also serves as a 
formal source of information from which to form conclusions and make judgments on 
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Throughout the 1990s, each branch of the Department of Defense (DoD) 
embarked upon its own initiative to shorten its supply order fulfillment time.  A number 
of customer-oriented programs and initiatives were well under way at the onset of 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in October 2001 and Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM (OIF) in March 2003.   
A monumental force structure change occurred on September 9, 2003, when the 
Secretary of Defense designated the Commander, United States Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM) as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO).  “In this capacity, the DPO 
is tasked with developing efficient and effective distribution solutions to enhance 
strategic support to worldwide customers” (USTCNS, 2003).  The DPO is now the single 
entity responsible for directing and supervising the execution of the Strategic Distribution 
System as well as for improving the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution 
related activities—including deployment, sustainment, and redeployment—during peace 
and war.   
The expeditionary nature of today’s Department of Defense (DoD) demands an 
effective Defense Transportation System (DTS).  The major stakeholders within the DTS 
supply-chain, to include the newly appointed DPO, have continued to explore the process 
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improvement programs initiated in the 1990s, but do so now from a systems-level 
approach.  One such initiative is the pure pallet program, initially implemented in 
November 2003 by DLA-owned depots, and later by AMC-owned Aerial Ports in March 
2004.  In coordination with United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), 
USTRANSCOM, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and Air Mobility Command 
(AMC) implements the program to improve warfighter support.    
The overarching goal of this program is to increase the speed at which supplies 
are delivered to the warfighter while simultaneously eliminating the risk of breaking 
down pallets under conditions of today’s asymmetric combat environment.  The 
cornerstone of the pure pallet program rests upon the consolidation of materiel early in 
the supply-chain by constructing end-user specific pallets.  Doing so reduces the amount 
of non-value-added time normal break-bulk pallets traditionally incur while transiting the 
distribution pipeline.  Whereas traditional break-bulk pallets must frequently be broken 
down and re-palletized en-route, these end-user specific pallets are, in effect, able to 
move more quickly through the DTS, theoretically arriving in the hands of the end-user 
in less time.     
Since the pure pallet program’s inception, another, more recent, force structure 
change occurred on June 14, 2005, when President George W. Bush nominated 
Lieutenant General Norton Schwartz to take command of USTRANSCOM (USTCNS, 
2005a).  The General’s subsequent assumption of command on September 7, 2005 
“marked the first separation of command responsibilities between USTRANSCOM and 
Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Air Force component command of 
USTRANSCOM” (USTCNS, 2005b).  General Schwartz stated that: 
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A large portion of the separation is because of the growth and maturity 
USTRANSCOM has made in becoming the defense supply chain manager that 
the Secretary of Defense had envisioned for the command.  That supply chain is 
an end-to-end process orchestrated by the command that is developing now and is 
the future of the distribution process (USTCNS, 2005c).   
 
For more than two years, key stakeholders in the distribution pipeline have had 
the opportunity to implement the innovative pure pallet program and overcome the initial 
obstacles present in any major process change.   
 
Problem Statement 
 As the DPO, the USTRANSCOM Commander needs to know if the pure pallet 
program is working as intended.  The AMC Commander, as Commander of 
USTRANSCOM’s air component forces, needs to know if there is a perception problem 
among Air Force personnel involved in program implementation.   This research seeks to 
assist both of these key leaders in determining if the pure pallet program is working as 
intended and if there is a perception problem among USAF personnel involved in 
program implementation.  This research may also benefit anyone who may be involved in 
any way with program implementation.     
 
Research Question 
 This research will answer the following two-part question:  Is the pure pallet 
program working as intended, and is there a perception problem regarding program 
performance among the Air Force personnel involved in program implementation? 






 The two-part research question will be answered by answering the following five 
investigative questions: 
1. What were the events that led to pure pallet program implementation and 
how does it work? 
2. How effective was the pure pallet program in reducing the total time 
elapsed from customer requisition to fulfillment?   
3. Among the overall population of Air Force Air Transportation Specialists 
(AFSC 2T2X1) and Logistics Readiness Officers (AFSC 21RX), what 
percentage has been exposed to the pure pallet program? 
4. What are the perceptions of the Air Force Air Transportation Specialists 
(AFSC 2T2X1) and Logistics Readiness Officers (AFSC 21RX) involved 
in pure pallet program implementation?   
5. From the perspective of Air Force Air Transportation Specialists (AFSC 
2T2X1) and Logistics Readiness Officers (AFSC 21RX) involved in pure 
pallet program implementation, what specific recommendations do they 
have that could improve the program? 
 
Research Objectives 
 The primary goal of this research is to address the Research and Investigative 
questions in an effort to provide both USTRANSCOM and AMC Commanders, as well 
as their respective involved staff agencies, a formal source of information from which to 
form conclusions and make judgments on how well USAF personnel are implementing 
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the pure pallet program within the Air Force in support of the USCENTCOM Area of 
Responsibility (AOR).  Since this process improvement initiative lives in relative 
infancy, very little previous research has been documented from which to continue or 
depart.   
 One exception is a Graduate Research Project (GRP) published by Major Michael 
Mongold, a 2005 Advanced Study of Air Mobility (ASAM) graduate.  His findings 
indicated that “the ‘Pure’ pallet process has positively affected the ‘effectiveness’ of the 
DTS while not negatively affecting the ‘efficiency’ of the system” (Mongold, 2005: iii).  
Major Mongold’s GRP, coupled with this researcher’s experiences with initial pure pallet 
program implementation at Dover AFB, Delaware until July 2004, provided the impetus 
for this research effort.  Mongold’s 2005 GRP is the first known published research effort 
pertaining to the pure pallet program.  To that end, the research goal was to fill this 
information gap while measuring and illustrating the perceptions of the USAF personnel 
implementing this program happen at the aerial ports, which is but one node in the overall 
strategic distribution system.     
The first investigative question was answered by reviewing available literature 
pertaining to customer service in general, customer service in the DoD, and the events 
leading to pure pallet program implementation.  A descriptive analysis of how the 
program works was also conducted.   
The second investigative question was answered through a descriptive analysis of 
material provided by Mr. Marc Robbins of the RAND Corporation.  Mr. Robbins had 
previously conducted a noteworthy global analysis related to end-to-end distribution, a 
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respectable portion of which was devoted to the pure pallet program.  His report was 
unpublished at the conclusion of this research effort.   
The third investigative question was answered by analyzing the demographics of 
the web-based survey, which was sent to all 2T2s and 21Rs in all three components of the 
U.S. Air Force:  Active Duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve.  The resulting 
demographic analysis provides the reader an idea of how well the survey respondents’ 
perceptions actually compare to the representative population of interest, to which 
inferences are made.     
The fourth investigative question was answered by developing and fielding a 
web-based survey tool specifically designed to measure the perceptions among 2T2s and 
21Rs, who are collectively responsible for pure pallet program implementation within the 
USAF, specifically at aerial ports.  Hypothesis tests were then conducted to determine if, 
and in what demographic group, perception problems exist.   
The fifth investigative question was answered by building in an open-ended item 
into the survey, which allowed survey respondents an opportunity to provide candid 
feedback regarding, and specific recommendations for improvement to, pure pallet 
program implementation.     
As previously stated, the overarching research question consisted of two parts.  
The first part was answered by comparing the results of the first two investigative 
questions one to determine if the pure pallet program is working as intended.  Results 
from the remaining investigative questions were synthesized to determine if there appears 
to be a perception problem among those USAF personnel involved in pure pallet program 




 Many process improvement initiatives are implemented with great intentions; 
however, it can be argued that change of any kind requires careful oversight to prevent an 
otherwise great idea to fail due to poor implementation.  One example is the Total 
Quality Management (TQM) initiative.  Evidence of TQM-similar metrics throughout the 
USAF and greater DoD suggests that remnants of this initiative remain even today, while 
the name TQM may not.  The TQM Initiative may not necessarily have been a bad idea.  
Though not officially documented across the DoD, one can argue that the manner in 
which it was propagated left an indelible negative impression on those forced to live with 
its implementation.  In light of this possibility, and in the spirit of continuous process 
improvement, key leaders need some sort of feedback mechanism to ensure that the pure 
pallet program is working as intended and there are no perception problems.       
 The underlying intent of this research was to arm key leaders and their staffs with 
critical information from a representative group of USAF personnel so critical to the pure 
pallet program’s success or failure.  This research also validates whether or not more 
intensive program management oversight is required at this time.  Additionally, it 
provides a survey assessment tool with which to measure future perceptions of the 
program.  Armed with this information, these key logistics leaders will be able to more 
effectively implement continuous process improvement innovations in an effort to 






Scope and Limitations 
The original intent was to measure the perceptions of both builders and recipients 
of pure pallets.  There are essentially two locations or functions where pure pallets are 
built; DLA-owned facilities and AMC-owned aerial ports.  In discussing this research 
effort with personnel who oversee Defense Distribution Center (DDC) operations, they 
stated that DLA personnel were technically already building pure pallets, more or less, 
upon implementation of the pure pallet program known today.  Specifically, depot 
implementation of the program in November 2003 necessitated only a change in 
electronic database management protocol; depot personnel already had specific build 
lanes by customer (read Supply Support Activity (SSA)) in their facilities.  As such, it 
was determined that the proper focus of this research should be on the builders of pure 
pallets at AMC-owned aerial ports.   











The objective of this literature review is to build a foundation from which to 
conduct this research effort.  This chapter is divided into three main parts.  The first part 
briefly discusses the seminal literature in the realm of customer service.  The second part 
examines the literature pertaining to customer service in the DoD.  The first two parts are 
provided so the reader can better appreciate the discussion of the third part, which 
examines the circumstances leading to the creation of the pure pallet program.  A detailed 
explanation of how the program works is also examined in detail in part three of this 
chapter.       
 
Customer Service 
While the focus on different aspects of customer service appears to have been 
influenced over the years by changing U.S. and international economies, transportation 
deregulation, and advances in technology, what emerged throughout the reviewed 
literature is an underlying philosophy to which the vast majority of the authors subscribe.  
The remaining portion of this section briefly examines this philosophy in an attempt to 
provide a very broad overview of customer service from which to understand and apply a 
similar focus within the DoD.   
The seminal works pertaining to customer service were first published in the early 
1960s.  Early works “offer a novel view (for 1961) of distribution as a total operation or 
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system” by “examining the entire distribution system with emphasis throughout placed 
on the importance of customer service” (La Londe, Cooper, and Noordewier, 1988: 
Appendix H.1).  Companies focused on their distribution systems to gain a competitive 
advantage.  These actions persisted throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s when, in 
1973, “the issue of where customer service responsibility lies was addressed” and “the 
reasons why customer service has emerged as a key element within the logistics field 
were identified” (La Londe, Cooper, and Noordewier, 1988: Appendix H.1).   
“In 1976 the Council of Logistics Management sponsored what was the first 
systematic and comprehensive industry-wide study of customer service” (La Londe and 
Cooper, 1989:1).  The publication “provided an important source of information for 
focusing management attention on this key area” (La Londe & Cooper, 1989:1).  By this 
time, the customer service catchphrase was alive and well.  Why did this happen?   
“There are many reasons, beyond general consumer discontent, why quality 
service [became] a more and more important issue in the boardrooms of American 
corporations” (Denton, 1989:2).  A number of other authors submit that the U.S. lives in 
a service economy, no longer focused on agriculture and manufacturing (Albrecht, 
1988:v; Denton, 1989:2; and Hinton, 1991:1).  Still another reason offered as an 
explanation for increased emphasis on customer service was that many service industries 
were competing in a wider geographic area, some even globally (Denton, 1989:3; 
Bowersox, Closs, and Helferich, 1986:71; and Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry, 
1990:2).  Leaders in all service industries quickly recognized that “foreign competition 
nearly destroyed many manufacturing sectors; its effect on our society may be even more 
profound considering the sheer size of the service sector” (Denton, 1989:3).   
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More books were published in the 1980s (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Peters and 
Austin, 1985; Albrecht and Zemke, 1985; Lash, 1989; and Denton, 1989), “each telling 
various stories of successful service companies” (Long, 1986:1).  A number of different 
customer service models were proposed in various publications during this time; 
however, the common theme, or underlying philosophy, was organizations exist to serve 
customers.  While an argument can be made that companies are in business to make 
money, an equal, if not stronger, counter-argument can be made that without customers, 
there would be no purpose for the business to exist.   
By the end of the 1980s, customer service was more than just a buzzword.  
Customer service was, and still is, the primary means for companies in the service sector 
to differentiate themselves in order to gain a competitive advantage.  Lagging far behind 
their civilian counterparts and despite their lack of a profit motive, government agencies 
began to view customer service with just as much enthusiasm as businesses seeking 
greater profit margins.   
 
Customer Service in the DoD 
Many may argue that the origin of the customer service-oriented focus in the DoD 
is attributed to the DoD’s Total Quality Management (TQM) initiative.  While use of this 
acronym certainly gained momentum in the late 1980s and into the 1990s, this is 
certainly not the first evidence of a customer service focus within the DoD.  In fact, 
customer service-oriented process improvement changes were made prior to the advent of 




The Early Days. 
Advances in technology brought the ability to improve customer service within 
the DoD when the U.S. Army introduced the Direct Service Support (DSS) system in the 
1970s (McIntyre, 1977).   
The DSS concept envision[ed] direct delivery of shipments from CONUS 
wholesale depots to a supply support activity (SSA), reducing/eliminating the 
need for the intermediate levels of stocks.  The primary objectives include[d] 
improved supply responsiveness through reduced Order Ship Times [OST], 
reduction of inventories at the intermediate levels resulting in reduced costs, and 
improved visibility of requisitions and intransit materiel (U.S. Department of the 
Army as cited by McIntyre, 1977:2).   
 
An extensive, in-depth analysis of the OST segments contained in the system 
showed areas of concentrated effort and extensive management “in an all-out attempt to 
meet or exceed the established time segment goals” (McIntyre, 1977:ii).  What this 
author found most ironic about McIntyre’s study was that he identified the “need for 
improved packaging, containerization and subcontainerization” (McIntyre, 1977:4).  
McIntyre concluded “in retrospect, the Order Ship Time for U.S. Army units…has been 
reduced considerably when the Direct Support System is compared to CONUS supply 
responses (averaging over 100 days) prior to 1970” (McIntyre, 1977:26).  While ahead of 
its time, this study foreshadows the desired effects of the pure pallet program, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter.   
Interestingly, the contents of a 1971 study cited the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 
1970, a body of sixteen senior public servants and business leaders who submitted a 
report to the President and Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense.  “In 
regards to Defense Logistics, the Panel concluded that: 
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There is substantial room for improvement and greater integration of management 
throughout the supply, maintenance and transportation systems of the 
Department…the logistics systems of the Department of Defense, in activities 
other than procurement and the initial warehousing phase, is decentralized and 
fragmented in functional assignment.  Efforts of the Congress and the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense to improve efficiency and effectiveness of these 
activities…have achieved very limited success.  As a consequence, the current 
inventory management, distribution, maintenance and transportation systems are 
needlessly inefficient and wasteful, and…fall far short of the potential for 
effectiveness of support of combatant commanders” (Blue Ribbon Defense Panel 
as cited by Gamino, 1971:47-48).   
 
The DoD would have to live through the days of TQM and other customer service-
oriented process changes, such as the consolidation of all depot distribution operations 
under DLA (Robinson, 1993), before the USTRANSCOM commander would be 
designated as the DPO.  Interestingly, a number of studies pertaining to customer service 
were conducted before TQM was propagated throughout the DoD.   
A 1986 study “measured the Air Force Civil Engineering customers’ level of 
satisfaction with the service they receive[d] from Customer Service Units at non-TAC 
[Tactical Air Command] Air Force bases” (Long, 1986:vii).  Also in 1986, another study 
“examine[d] the effectiveness of Civil Engineering in Tactical Air Command (TAC) 
from the customer’s point of view” (Singel, 1986: vi).  A 1987 study “examine[d] and 
quantif[ied] the perceptions of USAF Civil Engineering customers” and stressed that 
“BCE [Base Civil Engineering] officers should be familiar with the factors that most 
influence their customers’ perceptions of civil engineering service” (Kirschbaum, 
1987:viii-ix).  Finally, a 1988 study “measured civil engineering customer satisfaction 
and validated a civil engineering customer satisfaction model developed by Kirschbaum 
in 1987” (Groover, 1988:vii).  The author asserted that his research “provides a clear 
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indication of which areas offer the most potential for improving customer satisfaction” as 
well as “a report card by which to measure future improvements” (Groover, 1988:viii).   
Interestingly enough, TQM did not proliferate throughout the DoD until after 
these studies were published.  Very little time passed before TQM implementation 
problems were common among DoD organizations.  A 1989 study found that “a lack of 
concise mission goals, objective performance evaluation tools, and organizational 
cohesiveness plague[d] the most recent restructuring” of two Air Force Logistics 
Command (AFLC) organizations (Taylor, 1988:vi).  The author “indicate[d] the need to 
clearly define organizational and individual roles and responsibilities, in addition to 
involving effected personnel in the change process” (Taylor, 1988:vi).     
While Air Force Civil Engineering customer service seemed to be a hot topic just 
a few years prior (Long, 1986; Singel, 1986; Kirschbaum, 1987; and Groover, 1988), Air 
Force Supply customer service got its fair share of attention in 1990.  One study 
“evaluated the perceptions of TAC [Tactical Air Command] Base Supply major 
customers”  and “provided additional evidence of the importance of customer 
service...and a benchmark for evaluating Base Supply customer satisfaction”  (Flores, 
1990:viii).   
Another 1990 study “examined the evaluation criteria for the Malcolm Baldridge 
National Quality Award as possible predictors of quality internal customer service” 
(Spies, 1990:viii).  This study is important in that it discusses internal customer service.  
Spies (1990:5) suggested that “a vast amount of research has been conducted on customer 
service, but this research is mostly limited to the general area of customer service and 
external customers.”  Selin defines internal customers, and quoted by Spies, as “all the 
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individuals within an organization who work together to provide the product or service to 
the external customer” (Spies, 1990:6-7).  The significance of this quote illustrates the 
very importance of USAF personnel involved with pure pallet program implementation.   
A 1991 study “established that the level of customer satisfaction experienced is 
greatly dependent upon good order processing.  It is very rare that such ‘tedious’ 
functions of Base Supply are actually pinned to the concept of customer service” (Jones, 
1991:59).  This study was “the first of its kind which link[ed] non-customer serving 
functions of Base Supply to the satisfaction level experienced by supply customers” 
(Jones, 1991:vii).  Jones (1991:59) concluded his study by declaring, “It is the sincere 
hope of this researcher that if no other good has become of this effort, at least some lights 
will be turned on to the fact that everything that is done in the Base Supply organization 
ultimately impacts the customer’s impression of the unit.”  
The importance of Jones’ study can be applied to this one.  The personnel who 
build pure pallets at the aerial ports (and depots) do so without the traditional face-to-face 
contact in a more traditional customer service transaction.  This is exactly the point of 
surveying the personnel who build and manage pure pallets.  If these personnel do not 
perceive their actions to be beneficial to the warfighter, there exists some degree of 
possibility that the true effects of program implementation will not resemble those effects 
which were intended.     
 
Operation Desert Storm:  Blue, Green, and Red Logistics. 
Studies conducted up to this point highlighted the importance of providing 
effective customer service.  However, it was not until Operation DESERT STORM that 
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the DoD began to understand the importance of having a single command operating an 
integrated distribution network from the factory to the foxhole.  “In response to customer 
requests, the U.S. Transportation Command created Desert Express, a daily ‘package 
express’ flight from Charleston, SC to Saudi Arabia” (Thalheim, 1991:ix).  The lift 
requirement for the war was so large that “the customer was concerned with receiving 
shipments when they were required.  Desert Express provided the customer with desired 
time and place utility” (Thalheim, 1991:103).  “While there were the difficulties that 
occur when a new system is introduced, coupled with some problems that have been in 
existence for many years, Desert Express’ success exceeded USTRANCOM planners’ 
expectations” (Thalheim, 1991:94).     
“One criticism of the Desert Express system:  the need to bypass the current airlift 
“system” in order to get the “show stoppers” quickly to the AOR” (Thalheim, 1991:105).  
Why did the owners of the airlift system have to drastically alter the normal sustainment 
infrastructure?  Why was it not working?  While Thalheim points out there were some 
problems that have been in existence for many years, he does not specifically state what 
those problems were.  However, a number of other authors did exactly that by explaining 
why such a drastic change was necessary.  The short and simple answer was doctrine. 
 
A Look at Doctrine:  A Key to The Purple Door  
The author of a 1992 Naval War College paper stated that “the operational level 
of war has been defined as the ‘link’ between the strategic and tactical level” (Redlich, 
1992:1).  He also emphasized that: 
In order to insure the effectiveness of the theater logistics system, the unified 
commander is authorized directive authority over logistics, but current doctrine 
16 
allows components to basically coordinate and administer logistics support in the 
theater.  There is no designated central authority which directs the capabilities and 
resources of all component logistics commands (Redlich, 1992:1). 
 
Ironically, at that time, “the Joint [emphasis added] Planning and Execution Community 
(JPEC) advocate[d] that the Services are responsible for logistics support of their [own] 
combat forces” (Redlich, 1992:1).   
Given the following statement, it is not surprising why logistics support 
operations are deemed successful:  “Operation Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert 
Farewell were three of the most successful logistical support operations ever carried out 
by U.S. forces” (Newman, 1993:1).  It appears Newman is suggesting that if a combat 
operation is deemed successful, then by definition, any supporting logistics operations are 
automatically successful.  While some military leaders may agree with this point, a 
number of authors have pointed out that this is not necessarily true.   
The author of a 1993 study noted that “instead of a single commander responsible 
for providing all theater logistics support, the theater army commander may have 
anywhere from three to seven or more support organizations to command and control” 
(Newman, 1993:9).  Citing a DRAFT Army Field Manual, 100-5, Operations, Newman 
concluded that: 
Full integration of supply and transportation functions into a vertically and 
horizontally integrated distribution system is critical…this provides total asset in-
transit visibility…unit-configured pre-packaging of supplies in CONUS for 
throughput prevents the need for breakbulk operations and in-theater repackaging 
(Newman, 1993:36).   
 
It is worth noting that the writers of this DRAFT 1993 Army Field Manual recognized 
the importance of preventing the need for breakbulk operations and in-theater 
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repackaging.  Ironically, this very concept was not implemented during OEF and OIF 
until the pure pallet program was devised, more than a decade after Newman’s study.   
Warren (1994:21) highlighted the importance of suboptimization avoidance.  
“Orchestrating all theater logistics functions to ensure that optimizing one function does 
not adversely [a]ffect another is what may be referred to as suboptimization avoidance.”  
Perhaps the following example from the Gulf War best articulates the lack of 
suboptimization avoidance: 
These multi-consignee containers ensured ships were sent full and allowed 
significant manpower savings at ports of embarkation [POEs].  The transportation 
function had been effectively optimized.  When the multi-consignee containers 
were received in the theater, they demanded a huge effort to sort for the numerous 
units for onward shipping.  The result was not an overall savings of manpower but 
a movement of manpower requirements from the stateside POEs to the place 
where it was least needed – the theater or operations.  Theater ports of 
debarkation [PODs] became clogged with frustrated shipments and units 
undoubtedly ordered duplicate material under high priority requisitions thus 
spreading the suboptimization to the air channels.  In this case, the Central 
Command J4 set a limit on the proportion of multiple consignee containers that 
could be shipped from CONUS and directed the components to adhere to his 
limit”  (Warren, 1994:21-22). 
 
It is worth emphasizing, once again, that Warren’s discussion regarding the problem of 
multi-consignee containers in theater surfaced again while supporting OEF and OIF, a 
decade later.   
One of the most monumental pieces of literature, which was arguably ahead of its 
time, is a monograph published in 1994 by a School of Advanced Military Studies 
graduate.  In the process of exploring the possibility of extending USTRANSCOM’s 
responsibilities beyond the ports of debarkation (PODs), Layer points out that “the 
boundary, which gives the ‘strategic’ leg to USTRANSCOM and leaves the operational 
and tactical distribution role to the theater commanders’ infrastructure, may reflect 
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tradition and institutional convention more than it reflects logistics reason” (Layer, 
1994:2).  While a number of authors’ points are congruent with Layer’s (Redlich, 1992; 
Newman, 1993; and Warren, 1994), Layer points out exactly why “two cavernous divides 
block the road to integrated logistics.” 
They are divisions between services and divisions between the three levels of 
logistics [strategic, operational, and tactical].  The former [divisions] result from 
statutory obstacles, specifically title 10 of the U.S. Code, and the latter [divisions] 
result from the natural tendency to treat the logistics apparatus at each level of 
war as a unique and isolated system.  These two conditions propel each service 
toward the development of its own logistical stovepipe which is in turn divided 
into three separate parts (Layer, 1994:14). 
 
Layer also noted that “filling a single container with goods for multiple consignees made 
good sense to the ‘strategic’ logistician.  Yet, the same act defied the logic of the 
‘operational’ logistician” (Layer, 1994:27).  It appears that Layer is suggesting the DoD 
should migrate to one integrated logistics system.   
While allowing for limited integration at that time, Joint and Service doctrine fell 
far short of creating a seamless distribution system.  Layer submits that “because its 
assets and systems play a dominant role in the operational distribution system, the 
command [USTRANSCOM] must play a more commanding role in theater design and 
forward distribution activities” (Layer, 1994:28-29).   
 Layer’s underlying proclamation is that USTRANSCOM’s role must be 
broadened in order to institutionalize a fundamental single logic that guides the process 
of physical distribution throughout the system.  More specifically, “USTRANSCOM 
should own the US operational distribution system.  Correspondingly, their 
responsibilities should expand beyond the PODs to the ‘place to act’.”  Layer concludes 
by warning that “until the logistics might of the United States is integrated from fort to 
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foxhole, the true effect of a unified transportation command will remain untapped” 
(Layer, 1994:37).  Given the review of the literature up to this point, it certainly appears 
that the DoD has a poor track record of customer service and has not adequately 
capitalized on the lessons learned, which by definition, if not learned, are mere 
observations.  Ironically, ten years would pass until Layer’s proclamation became a 
reality when USTRANSCOM was designated as the DPO.     
 
Learning the Hard Way. 
While these logistics experts and scholars continued to publish works highlighting 
the inefficiencies of the distribution system, and offering ways to improve customer 
service, their intended audience—leaders of the Armed Services—who could have 
benefited the most from these publications, were busy finding ways to bypass the system 
by creating local solutions rather than implement viable long-term global solutions.  
“Problems with the global distribution system persisted throughout the 1990s, despite 
individual service-specific successes (e.g., the Army’s Velocity Management Initiative, 
the Air Force’s Lean Logistics, and the Marine Corps’ Precision Logistics)” (Robbins, 
Boren, and Leuschner, 2004:viii).   
It is important to note why each service embarked upon its own process 
improvement initiative aimed at streamlining the distribution of supplies to their 
customers.  While each service may have achieved what might be considered success 
from individual service perspectives, it is their collective lack of suboptimization 
avoidance (recall Warren’s 1994 study) that prevented the Defense distribution system 
from effectively or efficiently meeting the needs of its customers.  “The unreliability of 
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the military service caused many customers to turn to better – and more expensive – 
distribution modes, such FedEx and Worldwide Express.” (Robbins, Boren, and 
Leuschner, 2004:viii).  Decreasing customer confidence was especially a problem for 
military air and had unintended negative effects.  “The loss of customers contributed to 
the underuse of military air cargo capacity and caused reverberations for the wartime 
readiness of air crews and ground elements, which rely on peacetime missions (and funds 
they bring in) to support their wartime training” (Robbins, Boren, and Leuschner, 
2004:viii).   
What is most fascinating about this point is that, despite the efforts of TQM, a 
customer service focus seemed to evade USTRANSCOM until a major problem surfaced, 
namely air crew readiness, which threatened the Command’s ability to perform if tasked 
to support significant airlift operations.  “It was these disturbing trends that led leaders of 
TRANSCOM and DLA to join forces in 2000 to seek improvements, with RAND’s 
assistance” (Robbins, Boren, and Leuschner, 2004:viii).  The resulting Strategic 
Distribution (SD) program (previously named Strategic Distribution Management 
Initiative, or SDMI) proved to be the foundation for a collaborative customer service-
oriented focus to provide the best possible support to combatant commanders.   
The keys to successful implementation of the SD program were the “3 S’s” of 
stock positioning, schedules, and synchronization.  As the names suggest, the vision was 
to relocate DLA-owned stocks to a location closer to global customers (stock 
positioning), to ship supplies from the depots using dedicated trucks (schedules), and to 
time the delivery of supplies to ports of embarkation to better coincide with scheduled 
channel missions (synchronization).  “Through the strategic management of resources, 
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the Defense distribution system was able to meet the challenges of OEF” (Robbins, 
Boren, and Leuschner, 2004:ix).  However, support for OIF proved to be more 
challenging.   
 
Creation and Execution of the Pure Pallet Program  
Recall that the USTRANSCOM Commander was designated as the Distribution 
Process Owner in September 2003.  Shortly thereafter, a collaborative effort to improve 
the distribution system ensued when, in January, 2004, the CENTCOM Deployment 
Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC) was established at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.  
“USCENTCOM, in partnership with USTRANSCOM, DLA and other national 
providers, [took] recent steps to transform the deployment and distribution process and 
eliminate the seams between strategic and operational logistics” (USTCNS, 2004).    
This measure was necessary as OIF was rather unique compared to other U.S. 
military engagements.  Combat forces covered great distances and placed a great strain 
on those forces providing logistics support.  “The combat forces often outran their supply 
lines in part because the logisticians used separate information and communication 
networks that were out of range of their higher headquarters” (Walden, 2006a:252-253).  
What is interesting is that “distribution performance problems began early in OIF, even 
before the start of major combat operations, and extended well into stability operations.  
Until late 2004, total distribution times were long and highly variable, and early on there 
was a high rate of shipments that never made it to their intended destination” (Robbins, 
Unpublished:xvi).   
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A large increase in volume and steady deterioration in distribution time occurred 
early in 2003 and continued until November.  “Much of the deterioration in performance 
was associated with an inability to sufficiently expand capacity and processes that were 
not robust in the face of dynamic change with respect to customers and delivery 
locations” (Robbins, Unpublished:xvii).   
While it was agreed that many of the distribution problems could be attributed to 
delays in establishing the Theater Distribution Center (TDC) and a shortage of vehicles to 
perform convoy operations, they were not the most significant sources of poor 
distribution performance.  “Rather, the majority of the distribution problems found their 
source farther upstream in the system, at the point where materiel was issued and packed 
for shipment” (Robbins, Unpublished:xviii).   
If resupplied from CONUS via air mode, deployed forces generally receive pallets 
which are built at either DLA-owned facilities or AMC-owned aerial ports as illustrated 
in Figure 1.  Materiel stocked by DLA-owned facilities is shipped to one of Defense 
Distribution Center’s (DDC) Consolidation and Containerization Points (CCP), provided 
it is not already stored there (recall the “Storage” aspect of the Strategic Distribution (SD) 
program).  The materiel is then, as the name suggests, consolidated and containerized (or 
palletized), and finally shipped to a port of embarkation, which in this case is an Aerial 
Port of Embarkation (APOE).  Pallets originating from a DLA-owned CCP are referred to 
as MILALOC pallets or ALOC for short (Military Air Lines of Communication).  The 
ALOC pallet is then shipped via AMC-owned (or contracted) airlift to the theater, where 
it is distributed to its final destination via either air or surface intratheater lift, as seen in 
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Figure 1.  The DoD Supply Chain (Robbins, Unpublished:3)  
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Materiel requiring special handling, such as hazardous materiel and oversized or 
outsized cargo, is shipped to aerial ports.  It is worth noting that aerial ports also handle 
what is called general cargo (almost all DLA-shipped items are considered general 
cargo) or cargo that does not necessarily require special handling.  For purposes of 
efficiency, DLA-owned facilities do not send loose general cargo to the aerial ports for 
palletization; however circumstances can and do occasionally arise which require 
temporary exceptions.  General cargo at the aerial ports usually represents materiel 
procured through commercial means such as the government purchase card.  In this 
capacity, aerial ports serve as the equivalent to a DLA-owned CCP, though not so 
designated.   
As mentioned previously, many of the distribution problems began at the place of 
issue (depot only as aerial ports do not even store items to be issued) and packaging for 
shipment (depot and aerial ports).  For depots, according to the Army, the standard 
peacetime practice was to build Supply Support Activity (SSA)-pure multipacks and 
pallets designated for a single SSA and its supported units (see Figure 3).  Ironically, it 
was later learned that a series of miscommunications between the Army and DLA would 
serve as the source of frustrations to be shared during OIF among both customers and 
logisticians alike.  In reality, DLA did not built MILALOC pallets in this manner (SSA-
pure multipacks) and the Army assumed that the reason for not doing so was a lack of 
sufficient cargo generation (Robbins, Unpublished:39-45).  
As for the aerial ports, the practice of building SSA-pure pallets was not 
recognized.  Aerial ports simply did not have the facility capacity to do so, nor would the 
issue have been raised since the underlying purpose of the MILALOC program is to 
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provide direct support from the depot to the Army customer (recall Gamino’s 1977 
study).  In fact, normal aerial port business operating rules require pallets to be built with 
cargo destined to the same Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD).  For example, if an Air 
Force unit located at Kuwait International Airport (KWI) requisitioned an item, it would 
be palletized with an item requisitioned by an Army unit, who may operate hundreds of 
miles from the APOD.  The rationale was that both requisitions were being shipped to the 
nearest servicing APOD.  More importantly, building pallets in this manner ensured a 
high rate of pallet utilization, which subsequently ensured high aircraft utilization rates.  
This underlying business rule exists to make the most efficient use of the country’s 
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Figure 3. Examples of a Multipack and a Pallet (Robbins, Unpublished:38) 
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It is not surprising, then, that “during OIF, multipacks and pallets often contained 
materiel intended for shipment to multiple SSAs” (Robbins, Unpublished:xviii), as shown 
in the far left illustration of Figure 4.  These mixed pallets were not identified at theater 
hubs, which created further problems downstream as pallets made their way to the end 
user.  A point of interest is that “even pallets with items for multiple SSAs within a single 
division created problems (see center illustration of Figure 4, and upper right and lower 
left illustrations of Figure 5), as no divisional organizations are designed to execute the 
mission of unpacking the pallets and boxes, and re-sorting and repackaging the materiel 
or delivery to the intended SSAs” (Robbins, Unpublished:xviii-xix).  
Figure 6 illustrates the early stages of the distribution system, during which time 
the depots built geographic specific (geo-specific) pallets.  Even though cargo generation 
certainly would have allowed the pure pallet methodology to be employed, it was the 
misunderstanding between DLA and the Army mentioned previously that precluded 
earlier program implementation. 
The consequences of this geo-specific pallet building methodology were long 
delays and lost requisitions.  Quite frequently, requisitions were made by the customer, 
issued and packed from the source of supply (SOS), and shipped through the distribution 
system, never delivered to the end user—at least according to the Radio-Frequency 
Identification (RFID) technology used to provide in-transit visibility (Robbins, 
Unpublished).  Such an example can be seen by looking at the far left of the three RFID 
tag summary boxes in Figure 7.  In this example, a pallet with RFID tag number 584796 
left the Balad Corps Distribution Center on day 9 August 2003 (Day 221).  The pallet 
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Figure 6.  Early Theater Distribution System (Robbins, Unpublished:80) 
 
separated.  The pallet was shipped via convoy to Al Asad, where the 3ACR unit was 
based.  Since the theater distribution system was not designed to subsequently move 
supplies intended for the 404GRD unit based in Tikrit, the 404GRD essentially never 
received their supplies.  This is evidenced by the blank red highlighted areas within the 
D6S column, which represents a customer receipt confirmation within RAND’s Strategic 
Distribution (SD) database (USTCJ5-SM, 2005).  What is interesting is that the supplies 
were still not received by 22 September, 2003 (Day 265), the date on which the data were 
collected for this specific example.  This is a difference of at least 44 days from when the 
3ACR received its supplies (Day 223) to when the 404GRD unit could have received its 
supplies (no earlier than Day 265)—if ever received at all.     
This created a burden for an immature theater as initial TDC operations were 
“staffed by borrowed military manpower for the first two to three weeks; this meant 
having to train the non-logistics ‘volunteers’” (Walden, 2006b).  Correspondence 
between this author and Colonel Joseph L. Walden can be found in Appendix A.  Walden 
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was instrumental in activating the TDC in Kuwait in 2003, three weeks before the ground 
war in Iraq.   
These conditions continued until the TDC, with its limited manpower, could no 
longer effectively receive and repackage the amount of supplies required to support a 
larger force, which was deployed to combat the Iraqi insurgency at the time.  These 
problems were addressed, and as time passed, improvements in the distribution system 
began to surface, as described later.   
Tag 584144, Arrived BIAP CRP 3232
TCN div unit D6S shipper





W91YZA31744039LXA 1AD 123 MSB 3235 Toby
W91YZA31744039LXB 1AD 123 MSB 3235 Toby
Tag 584148, Arrived BIAP CRP 3231
TCN div unit D6S shipper
W91V4S31780074LXX . DDSP CCP
W91THB31960091LXX 82ND 407 FSB 3242 DDSP CCP
W91THB31960092LXX 82ND 407 FSB 3242 DDSP CCP
Tag 584796, Left Balad CDC 3221
TCN div unit D6S shipper
W91X0Y31470977LXA 3ACR ACR Grd 3223 DDSP
W91X0Y31470977LXD 3ACR ACR Grd 3223 DDSP
W91X0Y31470977LXF 3ACR ACR Grd 3223 DDSP









4ID 404 GRD . D
4ID 404 GRD . D
4ID 404 GRD . D
4ID 404 GRD . D
4ID 404 GRD . D
4ID 404 GRD . D
4ID 404 GRD . D
4ID 404 GRD . D
Charleston-built pallets with mixed cargo 
shipped from DLA DCs
Sources:  RFID and RAND SD database
D6S data through Sept. 22 (3265)
 
Figure 7.  Example of Mixed APOE-Built Pallets (Robbins, Unpublished:94) 
 
The TDC then began to see service pure pallets (see upper right illustration of 
Figure 5), which still required them to be broken down into customer pure pallets—or 
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what is known today as a pure pallet (see upper left illustration of Figure 5).  “For the 
large stuff, this was not a problem.  For smaller stuff in multi-packs, this meant having to 
sort several hundred from the “service pure” multi-packs into unit boxes/pallets” 
(Walden, 2006b).   
After some time, the TDC began to see pallets that were pure by Division.  “This 
still meant breaking the multi-packs into customer (Brigade) boxes.  Eventually, in 
November 2003, the TDC convinced DLA to pick and pack requisitions by supporting 
SSA DoDAAC and to hold pallets a couple extra days in order to create ‘pure pallets’,”as 
shown in Figure 8 (Walden, 2006b).  Doing so enabled the TDC to cross dock the pure 
pallets, which led to considerably reduced processing times (Walden, 2006b)  A number 
of pure multipacks, seen in the far right illustration of Figure 4, constitute a pure pallet, 
seen in the upper right illustration of Figure 5.  
In January of 2004, the U.S. Marine Corps developed their version of the pure 
pallet plan.  The business operating rules were, and still are, to let cargo accumulate for a 
maximum of five days for Army cargo and three days for Marine Corps cargo (HQ 
AMC/A43, 2005).  In the March-April 2004 timeframe, AMC changed its normal pallet 
building methodology described earlier to the pure pallet methodology employed by 
DLA since November 2004.  The theater distribution system evolved as load 
configurations and APODs changed, as seen in Figure 9. 
Since the long pole in the tent was the theater movement segment which provided 
the greatest potential for improving overall end-to-end distribution times, the intended 
effect of the program was to reduce total time from customer requisition to fulfillment, 
commonly referred to as factory-to-foxhole.  The events just discussed and their effects  
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on theater movement and receipt times are illustrated in Figure 10.  Note that the 
MILALOC (built at DLA-owned depots) and MILAIR (built at AMC-owned Aerial 
Ports) pure pallet theater distribution and receipt times nearly converge, whereas 
MILALOC pure pallets had previously considerably outperformed the MILAIR pure 
pallets with respect to theater movement and receipt times.    
The stewards of the country’s precious airlift resources were greatly concerned 
with its efficient utilization as evidenced by a previous discussion regarding aerial port-
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weights did not decrease as a result of implementing the SSA-pure pallet policy, which 
can be seen in Figure 11.  Average MILALOC segment times from the period October 
2004 to August 2005 were compared to the period September 2005 to October 2005.  
Down from an overall 16.9 days to 12.1 days, implementation of the pure pallet program 
yielded a significant reduction of 4.8 days in end-to-end distribution times, as seen in 
Figure 12. 
 
Figure 11.  Effects of SSA-Pure Pallet Policy on Pallet Weights 
(Robbins, Unpublished:89) 
A closer examination of end-to-end distribution times for both MILALOC and the 
more expensive WWX shipments to Kuwait and Iraq during the period 2002-2005 
reveals that MILALOC times have decreased to the point where a case can be made that 
performance levels for both distribution methods converge to levels comparable to each 
other (see Figure 13). 
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Figure 12.  Average MILALOC Segment Times 
Oct ’04 – Aug ’05 Compared To Sep – Oct ’05 (Robbins, 2006) 
Figure 13.  Average WWX and MILALOC RWT for Kuwait & Iraq, Oct ‘03 – Nov ’05 
(RAND, Unpublished) 
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Given the performance indicators illustrated, it is natural to conclude that the pure 
pallet program was indeed successful as it achieved its intended effects, namely a 
reduction in end-to-end distribution times, with the greatest savings realized in the theater 
distribution and receipt segments.  However, it is very important to point out that  
there were many variables which contributed to success of the pure pallet program.  The 
reduction of end-to-end distribution times should not be attributed solely to the pure 
pallet program.  While the use of pure pallets to distribute supplies to the warfighters in 
Iraq certainly had a positive effect on end-to-end distribution times, continually evolving 
and dynamic situations required the creation of additional innovative ideas in order to 
maintain these low distribution times (Robbins, Unpublished).   
The benefits of improved end-to-end performance were further realized when the 
Convoy Mitigation Plan was implemented in February 2005 along with the establishment 
of a DLA-owned Defense Depot in Kuwait (DDKS) in April 2005 (Robbins, 
Unpublished).  The Convoy Mitigation Plan, which entailed opening up more APODs in 
theater, was implemented in response to the increased threat to intratheater convoy 
operations.  DDKS was established under the Strategic Distribution’s principle of Stock 
Positioning described earlier.  The Convoy Mitigation Plan and the establishment of 
DDKS led to a further reduction in end-to-end distribution times by 40%, which can be 
seen in Figures 14 and 15.  Finally, the timeline seen in Figure 16 is provided to recap the 
discussion on customer-oriented process improvements, including implementation of the 
pure pallet program, which further streamlined the distribution process by reducing end-




Figure 14.  MILALOC Times Associated with Improved Theater Processes and Recent 
CCP Gains (Robbins, 2006) 




Divided into three main parts, this chapter built a foundation from which to 
conduct this research effort.  The first part of the chapter briefly discussed the seminal 
literature in the realm of customer service.  The literature exposed a common philosophy 
that organizations exist to serve customers.  This part of the chapter also provided the 
reader a very broad overview of customer service from which to understand and apply a 
similar focus within the DoD.   
 
 
Figure 16.  Distribution Process Improvement Timeline (Robbins, 2006) 
 
The second part of the chapter examined the literature pertaining to customer 
service in the DoD.  Numerous studies were conducted pertaining to customer service 
before the advent of TQM.  A few distinct authors (Redlich, 1992; Newman, 1993; 
Warren, 1994; and Layer, 1994) challenged existing doctrine at the time and proposed a 
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number of solutions which took at least ten years to come to fruition.  Meanwhile, 
customer service once again became a focus in the DoD in 2000 when TRANSCOM and 
DLA partnered to champion the Strategic Distribution program, the concepts of which 
proved successful in support of OEF.   
The third part examined the circumstances leading to the creation of the pure 
pallet program, which included an examination of pallet building methodologies.  Exactly 
how the pure pallet program works was also examined in detail and evolution of the 
theater distribution system was also illustrated.  Finally, a series of figures were provided 
to illustrate improvements in the effectiveness of the distribution system, while not 
negatively affecting its efficiency.   
The first two investigative questions were addressed in this Literature Review, 
and the next chapter will focus on the methodology employed to address the remaining 












The goals of this chapter are to provide a detailed account of the methodology 
employed.  This chapter begins with a brief review of the research and investigative 
questions in order to provide focus for the methodology discussed throughout the chapter.   
The second part of the chapter focuses on the survey method used.  The survey is 
described in great detail and includes discussions on the justification for using a survey; 
the survey population; the survey frame; the actual sample used; coverage error; and 
survey instrument review.  Both parts of the survey are also discussed in great detail as 
well as the reasons for not conducting a pilot test.     
The third part of the chapter discusses data collection procedures.  Specifically, 
details regarding the initial review of the list of names and associated Air Force Specialty 
Codes (AFSCs) and reasons for deleting certain members from the sample are provided.  
The specifics of the first and second initial email waves as well as the reminder email 
wave are then discussed.   
The fourth part of the chapter takes a look at the measures developed to assess the 
perceptions of the pure pallet program.  Validity and reliability of the survey instrument 
are addressed as well.   
The fifth part of this chapter describes the data analysis techniques employed in 
this research, which include exploratory factor analysis, the Analysis of Variance 
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(ANOVA), the Tukey-HSD and Games-Howell multiple comparison tests.  The 
Statistical Program for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program was used for all data analysis 
procedures.  
The sixth, and final, part of this chapter addresses the assumptions and limitations 
of the methodology employed herein.   
 
Review of Research and Investigative Questions 
 The first part of the research question asks if the pure pallet program is working 
as intended and was addressed via two investigative questions.  The first investigative 
question asked what events led to implementation of the pure pallet program.   The 
second investigative question asks how effective was the pure pallet program in reducing 
the total time elapsed from a customer requisition to fulfillment.  Both investigative 
questions were answered through the discussion in the review of literature.        
  The second part of the research question asks if there is a perception problem 
among the Air Force personnel involved in program implementation and will be 
answered via investigative questions three, four, and five.  The third investigative 
question asks what percentage of the population of Air Force Air Transportation 
Specialists, AFSC 2T2X1, and Logistics Readiness Officers, AFSC 21RX,  has been 
exposed to the pure pallet program.  The fourth Investigative Question asks what are the 
perceptions of the 2T2s and 21Rs who are, or have been, involved in pure pallet program 
implementation.  The fifth Investigative Question asks what specific recommendations do 
2T2s and 21Rs involved in the pure pallet program have that could improve its 
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implementation.  These three Investigative Questions will be answered by administering 
a survey specifically designed to measure the perceptions of 2T2s and 21Rs.     
 
The Survey 
The remaining three investigative questions were answered by developing and 
administering a survey specifically designed to measure the perceptions of 2T2s and 
21Rs regarding pure pallet program implementation.   
 
 Justification. 
A web-based survey was selected as the primary method of data collection, due to 
the ability to economically collect large amounts of data in a short period of time.  The 
large segment of the research population permitted to be sampled economically 
outweighed possible problems of nonresponse and misinterpretation associated with 
employing a web-based data collection instrument.   
 
Survey Population.   
As defined by Dillman, “the survey population consists of all the units 
(individuals, households, organizations) to which one desires to generalize survey 
results” (Dillman, 2000:196).  In this case, all 2T2s and 21Rs in all components of the 
Air Force who have knowledge of and/or experience with the pure pallet program 
represent the survey population.  The entire population 2T2s and 21Rs were surveyed 
since it was not possible to determine which personnel had pure pallet program 
experience.  It should be understood that the data collected would include responses from 
personnel who do not have pure pallet program experience.  Therefore, only those 
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respondents who reported having pure pallet program experience would be considered for 
purposes of this research effort.         
 
Coverage Error.   
As defined by Dillman, “coverage error results from every unit in the survey 
population not having a known, non-zero chance of being included in the sample” 
(Dillman, 2000:196).  A listing of all members of the survey population was generated 
from the Air Force’s personnel data system and provided by the Air Force Surveys 
Office.  All members had an email address on file, which allowed the possibility to 
contact each one within the survey population in order to reduce coverage error.   
 
Survey Instrument Review. 
Web-based surveys, while easy and economical to use, must still meet certain 
principles (Dillman, 2000).  These design principles discussed below were implemented 
to ensure efficient use of the survey instrument in this study’s methodology.  Four of the 
five design principles listed by Dillman (2000:377-385) were used in this research.  
Specifically, the web-based survey was designed by making the questions appear 
the same for all respondents, which displayed a group of six questions at a time (with 
exceptions of screens three and four as discussed later).  Each set of questions was 
viewable on one screen without having to scroll down, thereby enhancing the look and 
feel of the survey.  Once finished with a screen, the respondent could click the ‘Next’ 
button to move on to the next screen of six questions.  When designing a web-base 
survey, it is best to keep graphics and special functions simple, which increases the 
likelihood that all respondents can view the survey.  Utilizing AFIT’s own Web Survey – 
43 
Information Retrieval System (WebSIRS), the web-based survey used for this research 
was built using the most common fonts and functions, which include hypertext markup 
language (HTML), drop-down menus, radio buttons, and unlimited space to provide 
comments for open-ended questions.  The survey was viewed on multiple computers to 
ensure it appeared the same way each time.  Actual screen shots of the survey are located 
in Appendix B. 
 
The Survey Instrument.   
A link to the two-part web-based survey, which consisted of 51 questions spread 
over eleven different screens, was included at the bottom of an email, the body of which 
was a cover letter similar to those found in traditional mail surveys.  The cover letter 
explained the purpose of the survey and that the results would be reported in aggregate 
form.  The respondent was informed that Air Mobility Command’s Air Transportation 
Division (AMC/A43) sponsored this research.  The letter also made clear that survey 
participation was strictly voluntary and completely anonymous.  Finally, the cover letter 
indicated that the survey was approved by the Air Force Surveys Office (AFPC/DPAPS) 
and assigned Survey Control Number (SCN) 06-001.  The SCN approval and 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) exemption letters can be found in Appendix C.   
After clicking the link at the bottom of the email (cover letter), an internet 
browser popped up showing screen one of the interactive web-based survey.  Screen one 
served as a welcome screen which provided essentially the same information as the cover 
letter.  Survey instructions and this researcher’s full contact information were also 
provided.  Found at the bottom of the welcome screen (screen one of eleven) was a 
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button which, when clicked, directed the respondent to screen two—the first six of nine 
demographic questions. 
While it is believed that demographic questions should be placed at the end of a 
questionnaire to reduce respondent skepticism and increase cooperation (Alreck, 
2004:155), the demographic questions were intentionally placed at the beginning of this 
questionnaire.  The purpose for doing so was to prevent respondents from spending more 
time taking the survey than absolutely necessary, as some respondents, based on their 
answers to Item 8, would only complete seven items of the survey if they reported having 
no knowledge of or experience with the pure pallet program.    
The first part of the questionnaire consisted of nine questions designed to collect 
demographic data on the survey respondents, which provided the groupings for the 
descriptive statistical analysis.  This data were collected over three screens (screens two, 
three, and four of eleven), the first of which included Age (Item 1), Gender (Item 2), 
Rank (Item 3), Air Force Component (Item 4), Air Force Specialty Code or AFSC (Item 
5), and Total Time in Service in years and months (Item 6).  The second of such screens 
(screen three of eleven) had two questions.   
The first (Item 7) was an interactive multiple response question designed to 
determine if the respondent, since January 2004, had been temporarily or permanently 
assigned to any number or combination of listed locations.  These locations were 
considered by AMC/A43 to be involved in pure pallet program implementation.  The 
second (Item 8) served as a discriminator by asking asked if the respondent had exposure 
to, or worked with, the pure pallet program, to include building, load planning, loading, 
or overseeing pure pallet program activities.  Answering ‘No’ directed the respondent to a 
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thank you screen, signifying survey completion.  Answering ‘Yes’ directed the 
respondent to the ninth demographic question on screen four of eleven, which asked the 
respondent at what functional level and for how long was exposure to pure pallet program 
gained. 
As previously mentioned, demographic questions were placed at the beginning of 
the survey to limit the amount of time required for a given respondent to participate.  This 
goal could not have been fulfilled if demographic questions were placed at the end of the 
survey.  Certainly a more important goal was to prevent skewing of the data, which may 
have otherwise occurred if respondents, whom reported having no knowledge or 
experience with the pure pallet program, were permitted to answer any of the questions in 
the second part of the questionnaire (as well as the ninth demographic question in part 
one as described at the end of the previous paragraph).       
The second part of the questionnaire, over the remaining seven screens, consisted 
of 42 items, the first 41 of which were actually statements that represent particular 
opinions.  This scale allowed the respondents’ degrees of agreement or disagreement to 
be obtained.  For these 41 items, a 7-point Likert Scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ 
(value of 1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (value of 7) was used, with a ‘Neither’ (value of 4) 
category also included for respondents who had neutral feelings toward the statement.  
The respondents’ answers were in the form of coded data that were comparable and could 
be readily manipulated.  The principle advantages of this scale include flexibility, 
economy, and ease of composition.  The major advantage to this scale format was the 
ability to obtain a summated value, which was necessary for data analysis.  Finally, 
question 42 (found on screen eleven of eleven) was an open-ended item which provided 
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the respondent an opportunity to provide feedback and specific recommendations for 
improving the pure pallet program.  This specific item was designed to answer 
Investigative Question five. 
No personally identifying information was requested in any part of the survey.  
Respondents were not required to identify themselves, however, for those that chose to 
identify themselves in the open-ended question (Section II, item 42), confidentiality was 
maintained by replacing the identifying information with ‘XXX’.  The intent was to 
maintain the authentic nature of all open-ended responses while not sacrificing 
readability.  All responses to this open-ended question can be found verbatim (except as 
noted above) in Appendix D.  Comments provided via email direct to the researcher are 
provided at the end of Appendix D as well. 
       
Pilot Test. 
As described earlier, it was not possible to determine which potential respondents 
had knowledge or experience with the pure pallet program without first asking them.  
Due to the specific nature and focus of this survey instrument, a pilot study was 
considered to not be a viable option.  Instead, the research committee, a number of 
randomly selected peers, and an AMC/A43 representative identified problems with 
survey instructions, clarity, and intended purpose.  The survey was adjusted accordingly 
prior to fielding.  Very minor grammatical and word choice modifications were 
subsequently made to the survey, the most substantial of which was the decision to use a 
7-point Likert scale for questions in part two, instead of a 5-point scale as originally 
designed.   
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Data Collection Procedures 
The comprehensive list of 2T2s and 21Rs from all Air Force components was 
provided on 5 January 2006.  The survey window was from 6 January to 15 February 
2006.   
   
Sample Review. 
The list consisted of each member’s Email Address, Organization Address, Duty 
Location, State/Country, Major Command (MAJCOM), Duty AFSC (DAFSC), Primary 
AFSC (PAFSC), Rank, and Full Name (First, Middle, Last, and Suffix).  The list was 
specifically reviewed to determine which members of the sample should be deleted and, 
therefore, not invited to participate in the survey.   
Of the 16,324 members on the list generated by the Air Force Surveys Office, 
4,851 (29.7%) were Active Duty (AD) 2T2s; 2,098 (12.9%) were AD 21Rs; 1,865 
(11.4%) were Air National Guard (ANG) 2T2s; 575 (3.5%) were ANG 21Rs; 6,274 
(38.4%) were Air Force Reserve (AFR) 2T2s; and 661 (4.0%) were AFR 21Rs.   
Criteria used to delete members from the sample were based on the member’s 
DAFSC and PAFSC as indicated in the listing provided by AFPC.  All members 
possessed a PAFSC of 2T2X1 (for enlisted) or 21RX (for officers).  While the PAFSC is 
the primary means of identifying to which career field a member belongs, the DAFSC is 
the primary means of identifying what duties the member currently performs.  While 
reviewing the sample list, it quickly became evident that a number of 2T2s and 21Rs, so 
designated by their PAFSC, were in fact performing duties in an entirely different career 
field.  Each of these members was considered to be an AFSC mis-match.   
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For 2T2 respondents, examples include paralegal (AFSC 5J0X1), dental assistant 
(AFSC 5Y0X1), and prisoner (AFSC 9J000).  However, exceptions included members 
with a Special Duty Identifiers (AFSCs beginning with an 8); these members were 
retained in the sample.  For 21Rs, examples include intelligence (AFSC 14NX), weather 
(AFSC 15WX), and manpower (AFSC 38MX).  However, exceptions also included 
members with a Special Duty Identifiers (AFSCs beginning with an 8), as well as 
executive officers above wing level (AFSC 97E0).   
A total of 310 such respondents were deleted for reasons described above.  This 
total included 69 (22.3%) AD 2T2s; 30 (9.7%) AD 21Rs; 70 (22.6%) ANG 2T2s; 0 
(0.0%) ANG 21Rs; 114 (36.8%) AFR 2T2s; and 27 (8.7%) AFR 21Rs.  In addition, this 
researcher and a member of the research committee, both of whom are 21Rs, were 
deleted from the sample to reduce potential bias.  These actions reduced the sample 
population to 16,012 members.   
Given the nature of the data listing provided by AFPC, the researcher imposed 
parameters, as identified above, to ensure the sample used for analysis was suitable to 
address the research question.  There were two initial email waves and one reminder 
email wave.   
 
First Email Wave. 
Data collection commenced on Friday, 6 January 2006 when a series of email 
messages were sent directly to the participants as described in the survey instrument 
section above.  An example of one of the initial emails can be found in Appendix E. 
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These emails sent on the first wave generated 349 returned emails from a number 
of different email servers.  These 349 emails contained information which detailed why 
the message could not be delivered to the intended recipient.  Reasons include inaccurate 
email address; mailbox was at maximum capacity; and the possibility that spam blocking 
software was activated either by the server or the recipient’s particular email account 
settings.  The total number of members who did not receive the original 6 January 2006 
email with the survey link was 3,938 which consisted of 659 (16.7%) AD 2T2s; 261 
(6.6%) AD 21Rs; 748 (19.0%) ANG 2T2s; 68 (1.7%) ANG 21Rs; 2,040 (51.8%) AFR 
2T2s; and 162 (4.1%) AFR 21Rs.   
The next eighteen days were spent trying to verify each of the 3,938 email 
addresses by using the Air Force Global Address Listing (GAL) available in Microsoft 
Outlook.  This resulted in the verification of 1,536 members which consisted of 473 
(30.8%) AD 2T2s; 191 (12.4%) AD 21Rs; 0 (0.0%) ANG 2T2s; 0 (0.0%) ANG 21Rs; 
765 (49.8%) AFR 2T2s; and 107 (7.0%) AFR 21Rs.  The remaining 2,402 members, 
which consisted of 186 (7.7%) AD 2T2s; 70 (2.9%) AD 21Rs; 748 (31.1%) ANG 2T2s; 
68 (2.8%) ANG 21Rs; 1,275 (53.1%) AFR 2T2s; and 55 (2.3) AFR 21Rs were deleted 
from the sample as their email address could not be verified.   
 
Second Email Wave.   
On 24 January 2006, a second email was sent to the 1,536 respondents whose 
email addresses were verified as described above.  Despite efforts to verify members’ 
email addresses, 64 emails again contained information which detailed why the message 
could not be delivered to the intended recipient.  Reasons were the same as those 
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described above.  The total number of recipients who did not receive this second email 
attempt with the survey link was 151, which consisted of 25 (16.6%) AD 2T2s; 15 (9.9%) 
AD 21Rs; 106 (70.2%) AFR 2T2s; and 5 (3.3%) AFR 21Rs.  Note that no ANG 2T2s and 
21Rs were returned as undeliverable since their email address could not be verified 
(ANG members not on AF GAL).  As such, no second attempt was made to contact them.  
Between the first and second email waves, a total of 13,459 potential respondents 
received an email inviting them to participate in the survey, which represents 84.1% of 
the 16,012 names on the reduced list as previously described.   
After both initial email waves, a number of members replied and stated that they 
did not want to be included in the study and requested to be removed from the 
researcher’s list of names.  These 15 members consisted of eight (53.3%) AD 2T2s; zero 
(0.0%) AD 21Rs; zero (0.0%) ANG 2T2s; two (13.3%) ANG 21Rs; three (20.0%) AFR 
2T2s; and two (13.3%) AFR 21Rs, all of whom were deleted, bringing the adjusted 
sample down from 13,459 to 13,444 members, or 84.0% of the names on the reduced list 
as previously described.   
 
Reminder Email Wave. 
On 6 February 2006, a reminder email wave was sent to the 13,444 members on 
the reduced list.  The reminder email thanked those who already participated and 
encouraged those who had not yet taken the survey to do so.  The reminder email can also 
be found in Appendix E.  After the reminder email wave, a number of members replied 
and stated they were no longer either a 2T2 or a 21R, but were assigned to some other 
career field and had been for varying periods of time.  Each of these members was also 
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considered to be an AFSC mis-match, and was therefore deleted from the sample.  These 
eight members consisted of one (12.5%) AD 2T2; five (41.7%) AD 21Rs; zero (0.0%) 
ANG 2T2s; zero (0.0%) ANG 21Rs; one (12.5%) AFR 2T2; and one (12.5%) AFR 21R, 
all of whom were deleted, bringing the final adjusted sample down from 13,444 to 
13,436.   
Data collection was terminated on Wednesday, 15 February 2006; thus the survey 
link was active for a total of 41 days.  The rate at which respondents completed the 
survey, relative to the date the survey link first became active, can be seen in Figure 17.  
Of the 16,324 members on the original listing, 13,436 were assumed to have received and 
read at least either the first or second initial email, or the reminder email.  Table 1 
















































 Validity of the Survey Instrument. 
 The validity of a survey’s measures is the extent to which the survey instrument 
measures what it is intended to measure (Leedy & Ormrod, 2000:99).  This survey 
consisted of a total of 51 items (nine demographic questions, 41 survey items, and one 
open-ended item).  Four of the 41 survey items were adapted from the four-item 
Organizational Commitment scale validated by Porter and Smith, as cited by Facteau, et 
al., 1995.  The Organizational Commitment construct was defined as the relative strength 
of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular organization (Porter 
and Smith, as cited by Facteau, et al., 1995).  Furthermore, the original organizational     
 
Table 1.  Summary of Surveyed Population
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commitment scale was not used in its entirety as the focus of this study was not on 
organizational commitment; likewise, adding additional items would only make the 
survey longer, which could potentially frustrate respondents, some of whom may skew 
their responses.  The remaining 37 survey items were developed specifically for this 
research effort.   
While the possibility existed that the validity of this survey instrument would be 
suspect, designing items to measure constructs specifically pertaining to the focus of the 
study was deemed more beneficial than adopting previously validated scales simply to 
ensure validity of the survey instrument.  It is important to note that these questions were 
not adapted from any previously validated measures, other than as previously noted 
(Organizational Commitment).  In addition to this researcher’s first-hand knowledge of 
the pure pallet program, members of the Cargo Management Branch within HQ AMC’s 
 
Reliability of the Survey Instrument.   
Reliability of a survey’s measures is the extent to which those measures yield 
consistent results (Leedy & Ormrod, 2000)  Accordingly, the purpose of evaluating the 
reliability of the survey instrument was to assess whether the measurements obtained 
with the questionnaire were free from random error.  In order to reduce potential random 
errors associated with reliability, this research relied on the internal consistency reliability 
estimate know as Cronbach’s alpha, which measures the extent to which all the items 
within a single construct yield similar results (Leedy & Ormrod, 2000).  A Cronbach’s 
Air Transportation Division (AMC/A43) reviewed the questionnaire to evaluate the
appropriateness of the elements and measurement scale used.   
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alpha value of greater than .70 is considered the acceptable standard (Nunnally and 
Bernstein, 1994).   
 
Data Analysis Techniques 
 
 Factor Analysis. 
Recall that the items listed above were not previously validated (except for the 
Organizational Commitment scale).  The use of factor analysis to identify the factors 
underlying a larger number of variables can provide valuable insight into the 
relationships occurring within a field of study; therefore it was necessary for the data to 
undergo factor analysis procedures.  Factor analysis is simply a data reduction technique.  
“It is a family of procedures for removing the redundancy from a set of correlated 
variables and representing the variables with a smaller set of ‘derived’ variables, or 
factors” (Kachigan, 1992:237).  There are two branches of factor analysis, exploratory 
and confirmatory (Kim and Mueller, 1978).   
is used for early, descriptive research, when a researcher has 
ata but no suspicions of the factors that may be contained in the data.  Confirmatory 
factor analysis should be used when the researcher has some basis for believing the data 
contains certain factors and wishes to confirm the belief (Kim and Mueller, 1978).  Given 
the fact that roughly 92% of the survey items were specifically developed for this 
research effort, it is more than appropriate to employ exploratory factor analysis.  This 
research is indeed early in the sense that no research of this kind has been previously 




What further differentiates the two branches is the decision whether to analyz
of the individual differences in the data or just a selected portion.  These differences in 
the data represent its variability.  There are thr
e all 
ee types of variability; shared (common), 
unique 
h, 
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(uncommon), and random (due to measurement error, or unreliability).  While 
confirmatory factor analysis extracts factors from differences in shared variability, 
exploratory factor analysis extracts factors from all of the individual differences in the 
data.  A more important distinction is that exploratory factor analysis procedures do not 
test hypotheses about the nature of the factors that might be detected, whereas 
confirmatory factor analysis does (Spicer, 2005).  During this research effort, no 
hypotheses were made regarding the number of factors that might be detected.  As suc
the appropriate method used to extract factors from
s (PCA).     
After collecting the data, factor analysis begins by computing a correlation 
matrix.  This matrix is nothing more than a table of the correlation coefficients that exist 
for each pair of variables (Kachigan, 1991:242).  The partial correlations among all pai
of items (the anti-image correlations) are then examined.  These values are used in 
computing the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy by comparin
them with that item’s simple correlations.  This comparison is expressed as an index with
values between zero and one.  Kaiser declares, as quoted by Spicer, that measur
0.90s as marvelous, in the 0.80s as meritorious, in the 0.70s as middling, in the 0.
mediocre, in the 0.50s as miserable, and below 0.50 as unacceptable (Spicer, 2005:186).  
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obtained of how the variables load on each factor, the researcher then assigns a label to 
ompared to the ordinary correlation coefficients.  This is desired as it is an 
indication that the variables are linearly related.     
A series of operations are then performed on the correlation matrix using matrix 
algebra to produce a factor matrix consisting of factor loadings.  These factor loadin
range in value from -1.0 to +1.0 and “represent the degree to which each of the variables 
correlates with each of the factors” (Kachigan, 1991:243). 
The next step is to judge how well the n-factor model describes the original items
by computing the proportion of each item’s variance that is explained by the n-common 
factors.  This proportion of variance is called the communality of the variable and can 
range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating that the common factors do not explain any of the 
variance, and 1 indicating that all of the variance is explained by the common facto
a successful factor analysis, the communalities for i
nough values should be considered for removal from the analysis, since they are 
not linearly related to the other items (Norušis, 2005b:410-411).   
Once the number of factors to be retained is decided, the next step is to rotate the 
axes to better distribute the variance explained among the f
ifferent methods of rotation.  For this research effort, only two were considered.  
The first, orthogonal rotation, assumes that the factors are independent.  The second 
method, varimax rotation, does not assume that the factors are independent.  This meth
is useful when there is reason to believe that the factors may be somewhat correlated 
(Norušis, 2005b).   
Once the factors have been identified and rotated so that a good understanding
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each factor that best describes it.  This step is fairly subjective and depends heavily on th
expertise and experience of the researcher.   
e 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). 
“One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to analyze the relationship 
between one categorical independent variable and one interval-level dependent variable” 
(Spicer, 2005:155).  Although the analysis revolves around variances, it is easier to think 
of ANOVA as a technique for analyzing sets of differences between mean scores on the 
dependent variable.  “Differences between means, and therefore group differences, 
always remain the focal point” (Spicer, 2005:155).   
When performing analyses of variance, three main assumptions must be made 
which include independence, normality, and equal variance (Norušis, 2005a:307).  The 
independence assumption means that there is no relationship in the different observations 
in the different groups and between observations in the same group.  The normality 
assump tograms or normal probability plots for each of 
the gro  the 
ty in the sample is divided into two 
parts:  v
 
   
tion can be checked by making his
ups.  However, in practice, the analysis of variance is not heavily dependent on
normality assumption.  The equality-of-variance assumption can be checked by 
computing the Levene test for equality of variance.  However, in practice, if the number 
of cases in each of the groups is similar, the equality-of-variance assumption is not too 
important (Norušis, 2005a:308).     
“In analysis of variance the observed variabili
ariability of observations within a group about the group mean, and variability 
between the group means” (Norušis, 2005a:309).  The conclusion that can be drawn from
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this procedure, however is only whether a statistically significant difference exists 
between two or more groups.  To investigate what groups differ and by how much, p
hoc tests, such as the Tukey-HSD (equal variances assumed) and Games-Howell (equal 
variances not assumed) multiple comparison tests were used.  These procedures identify 
what pairs of groups are different, and for this research effort, the .05 level of 
significance was used for all statistical tests.  This means that there is a one in twenty 
chance of rejecting the null hypothesis when in fact it is true.      
 
ost-
Assumptions and Limitations 
Regarding the survey, one major assumption is that all undeliverable messages 
were, in fact, undeliverable.  A few of the returned messages containing anywhere from 
one to over 90 undeliverable names indicated that the message could not be delivered, but 
attempts would be made for the next five days.  Since there was no way to determine if, 
in fact, the messages were successfully delivered, this researcher had to assume that the 
message was not deliverable.  It is theoretically possible that some number of members 
on the original list, while initially identified as undeliverable and whose email address 
could not later be verified, may actually have received the message despite being deleted 
from the list.  Recall that ANG personnel were not visible to this researcher on the AF 
global address listing in Microsoft Outlook; therefore, ANG personnel would be the most 
 
likely to fall in this category.   
Likewise, an assumption was made that lack of notice that a message was 
undeliverable meant that it must have been delivered.  A subsequent assumption is that if
a message was delivered, then it must have been read.  There certainly may exist some 
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number of personnel who may have been deployed and unable to check their home 
station email account.  Of course this is only a concern if the member’s home station 
email address matched the one on file at AFPC.   
Nonresponse error was tested by comparing early responders with the late 
responders since non-responders are likely to resemble more the late responders 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Lindner, Murphy, and Briers, 2001).  An Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) was performed to determine if there was a difference in the level of 
pure pallet program experience among early respondents (after the first two initial email 
stimuli e pallet 
ion.  




The goals of this chapter were to ensure the reader has a clear understanding of 
the rationale for each methodology decision and to enable the reader to retrace this 
researcher’s path.  This chapter reviewed the research and investigative questions; 
) and late respondents (after the reminder email stimulus).  The level of pur
program experience was computed by adding the total number of years and months 
respondents reported having at each of the functions listed in Item 9.     
Despite the use of highly appropriate tools, there are limitations to this 
methodology.  Specifically, this subject deals essentially with meaning and interpretat
Regardless of the rigor in the instrument and its ad
 the interpretation of each reader (Isaac & Michael, 1971:103; Kerlinger, 
1973:571).  Because it is impossible to quantify this inherent limitation, the assum
that all respondents interpreted all questions in a similar manner, while a lofty one, 
should not necessarily be universally accepted.      
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provide dures, d a detailed discussion of the survey; discussed the data collection proce
reliability, and validity; described the data analysis techniques employed; and addressed 












This chapter begins by presenting the demographic data of survey respondents  
Next, the factor analysis procedures used to analyze the survey responses are discussed.  
Once the factors have been identified, what follows is a discussion of the Independent 
Samples T-test and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) procedures used to determine 
whether differences in perceptions exist among different respondent subgroups.  Finally, 
this chapter concludes by discussing the outcome of the open ended question in Part II of 
the survey.  While this chapter focuses on the specific findings and analysis results, 
Chapter V focuses on the implications of these findings.   
 
Demographic Data 
This section of the chapter discusses the outcome of a series of steps taken to 
verify and cleanse the survey data set.  Explicit details of these steps can be found in 
Appendix F.  For the summary tables below, the ‘Rank’ column includes prior-enlisted 
service officers (O-1E, O-2E, O-3E), however, it was impossible to differentiate which 
members of the surveyed population are categorized as such.  Therefore, the response 
rates for O-1s, O-2s, O-3s were calculated using both O-1 and O-1E, O-2 and O-2E, and 




Active Duty Demographics 
A total of 4,562 questionnaires were sent to Active Duty (AD) air transportation 
specialists (2T2s), of whom 1,139 (24.97%) responded.  An additional 13 AD enlisted 
members completed the survey, 11 of whom did not represent the 2T2 career field and 
were assigned to the ‘Other’ category.  The remaining two additional members did not 
indicate an AFSC and were subsequently assigned to the ‘Unknown’ category.   
A total of 1,976 questionnaires were sent to AD logistics readiness officers 
(21Rs), of whom 794 (40.18%) responded.  An additional 11 AD officers completed the 
survey, nine of whom did not represent the 21R career field and were assigned to the 
‘Other’ category.  The remaining two additional members did not indicate an AFSC and 
were subsequently assigned to the ‘Unknown’ category.   
The number of questionnaires sent to AD members totaled 6,538, 1,933 of whom 
completed the survey, which represents an overall AD response rate of 29.57%.  Tables 2 
and 3 summarize the AD response rates for each rank within each Air Force Specialty 
Code (AFSC).   
 
Air National Guard Demographics 
A total of 1,047 questionnaires were sent to Air National Guard (ANG) 2T2s, of 
whom 142 (13.56%) responded.  An additional 13 ANG enlisted members completed the 
survey, 11 of whom did not represent the 2T2 career field and were assigned to the 
‘Other’ category.  The remaining two additional members did not indicate an AFSC and 
were subsequently assigned to the ‘Unknown’ category. 
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E-1 73 4 1 5.48% 25.00% 
E-2 149 11 4 7.38% 36.36% 
E-3 1146 121 38 10.56% 31.40% 
E-4 861 141 53 16.38% 37.59% 
E-5 1165 329 107 28.24% 32.52% 
E-6 702 296 92 42.17% 31.08% 
E-7 397 186 56 46.85% 30.11% 
E-8 64 33 19 51.56% 57.58% 
E-9 5 5 2 100.00% 40.00% 
Other 0 11 1 N/A N/A 
2T2 
Unknown 0 2 0 N/A N/A 
  Total 2T2 4562 1139 373 24.97% 32.75% 
 
 


























O-4 367 155 30 42.23% 19.35% 
O-5 248 103 13 41.53% 12.62% 
O-6 58 22 5 37.93% 22.73% 
Other 0 9 1 N/A N/A 
21R 
Unknown 0 2 0 N/A N/A 




A total of 505 questionnaires were sent to ANG 21Rs, of whom 119 (23.56%) 
responded.  An additional 11 ANG officers completed the survey, nine of whom did not 
represent the 21R career field and were assigned to the ‘Other’ category.  The remaining 
two additional members did not indicate an AFSC and were subsequently assigned to the 
‘Unknown’ category.   
The number of questionnaires sent to ANG members totaled 1,552, 261 of whom 
completed the survey, which represents an overall ANG response rate of 16.82%.  Tables 
4 and 5 summarize the ANG response rates for each rank within each AFSC.   
 











E-1 0 0 0 N/A N/A 
E-2 0 0 0 N/A N/A 
E-3 34 1 0 2.94% 0.00% 
E-4 325 16 3 4.92% 18.75% 
E-5 322 41 11 12.73% 26.83% 
E-6 204 34 10 16.67% 29.41% 
E-7 120 21 8 17.50% 38.10% 
E-8 38 13 5 34.21% 38.46% 
E-9 4 3 2 75.00% 66.67% 
Other 0 11 2 N/A N/A 
2T2 
Unknown 0 2 1 N/A N/A 
  Total 2T2 1047 142 42 13.56% 29.58% 
 
 
Air Force Reserve Demographics 
A total of 4775 questionnaires were sent to Air Force Reserve (AFR) 2T2s, of whom 627 
(13.13%) responded.  An additional 17 AFR enlisted members completed the survey, six 
of whom did not represent the 2T2 career field and were assigned to the ‘Other’ category.  
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The remaining 11 additional members did not indicate an AFSC and were subsequently 
assigned to the ‘Unknown’ category.   
 


























O-4 130 25 2 19.23% 8.00% 
O-5 108 21 3 19.44% 14.29% 
O-6 0 1 0 N/A 0.00% 
Other 0 9 0 N/A N/A 
21R 
Unknown 0 2 0 N/A N/A 
  Total 21R 505 119 11 23.56% 9.24% 
 
 
A total of 571 questionnaires were sent to AFR 21Rs, of whom 169 (29.60%) 
responded.  An additional 17 AFR officers completed the survey, 14 of whom did not 
represent the 21R career field and were assigned to the ‘Other’ category.  The remaining 
three additional members did not indicate an AFSC and were subsequently assigned to 
the ‘Unknown’ category.   
The number of questionnaires sent to AFR members totaled 5346, 796 of whom 
completed the survey, which represents an overall AFR response rate of 14.89%.  Tables 















E-1 3 1 0 33.33% 0.00% 
E-2 7 0 0 0.00% N/A 
E-3 170 8 1 4.71% 12.50% 
E-4 975 65 14 6.67% 21.54% 
E-5 953 107 23 11.23% 21.50% 
E-6 1590 193 63 12.14% 32.64% 
E-7 765 146 41 19.08% 28.08% 
E-8 300 87 23 29.00% 26.44% 
E-9 12 3 0 25.00% 0.00% 
Other 0 6 1 N/A N/A 
2T2 
Unknown 0 11 2 N/A N/A 
  Total 2T2 4775 627 168 13.13% 26.79% 
 
 


























O-4 186 51 3 27.42% 5.88% 
O-5 168 31 6 18.45% 19.35% 
O-6 27 14 2 51.85% 14.29% 
Other 0 14 0 N/A N/A 
21R 
Unknown 0 3 0 N/A N/A 





The sample is representative of the larger population.  Of the 13,436 deliverable 
emails containing the web-based survey link, 3,005 surveys were recorded in the 
WebSIRS database.  Fifteen of the 3005 cases were considered invalid and deleted from 
the database, which resulted in 2,990 cases representing an overall 22.25% response rate.  
Furthermore, the 82 cases assigned to the ‘Other’ category represent only 0.61% of the 
13,436 members assumed to have received and read the deliverable emails, and 2.74% of 
the completed surveys.  Tables 8 and 9 summarize the overall response rate by 
Component and AFSC respectively. 
 








Active 6538 1933 29.57% 
Guard 1552 261 16.82% 
Reserve 5346 796 14.89% 
Total Overall 13436 2990 22.25% 
 
 








2T2 10384 1865 17.96% 
  Enlisted Other 0 28 N/A 
  Enlisted Unknown 0 15 N/A 
21R 3052 1043 34.17% 
  Officer Other 0 32 N/A 
  Officer Unknown 0 7 N/A 
Total Overall 13436 2990 22.25% 
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In testing for possible nonresopnse error, the results indicated that the level of 
pure pallet program experience among early responders (n = 38 and 39) did not 
significantly differ from late responders (n = 32) (F = .69, p < .50).  However, there is a 
five percent chance that the results of this study do not reflect the results otherwise 
acquired had all members of the interested population participated in the survey.   
 
Usable Cases 
 Of the 2,990 valid surveys completed, 766 cases had the value ‘1’ for Item 8 
which asked ‘Have you had exposure to, or worked with, the pure pallet program to 
include, building, load planning, loading, or overseeing pure pallet program activities?’  
Respondents answering ‘Yes’ to this question received the value ‘1’ and respondents 
answering ‘No’ to this question received the value ‘2’.  As mentioned earlier in Chapter 
III, Methodology, this question served as a discriminator by identifying those personnel 
with knowledge and/or experience of the pure pallet program—the true population of 
interest.  With respect to investigative question three, of the entire population of 2T2s and 
21Rs, 25.62% (766 out of 2,990) had experience with the pure pallet program.   
Of the 766 cases with the value ‘1’ for Item 8, 62 had the value ‘999’ for at least 
one of the 39 survey items.  These cases were deleted using a process known as listwise 
deletion, which is considered more conservative despite the slight reduction in statistical 
power associated with a reduction in the number of cases.   
Upon closer examination of the remaining 704 cases, seven were found to have 
been assigned the value ‘Other’ or ‘Unknown’ for the ‘AFSC’ field.  The reader is 
directed to Appendix F (specifically Step 7) for a detailed review of the procedures taken 
69 
to verify and cleanse the survey data set, which include the rationale for assigning values 
to a newly created ‘AFSC’ field (known as the ‘SPECIALTY_ CODE’ field in the 
original survey database).  These seven cases were deleted resulting in an adjusted data 
set of 697 usable cases, all of which were used during the statistical analyses as described 
throughout the remainder of this chapter.  Again, the reader is directed to Appendix F 
where a number of various frequency and demographic summary tables are provided.   
 
Analyzing Survey Responses 
Due presumably to some sort of recording malfunction with the WebSIRS 
database, 100% of the cases had the value ‘999’ for Items 9 and 10.  Therefore, both 
items were deleted for all cases, leaving a total of 39 7-point scale questionnaire items.   
The survey responses were analyzed using the factor analysis procedures detailed 
in Chapter III, Methodology.  The first step of creating an R x V matrix was conducted 
during the data collection stage.  A correlation matrix was then computed.  Of 741 
possible unique item combinations of correlation coefficients, 602 (81.24%) were found 
to be significantly correlated at the .05 level of significance.  The remaining 139 
(18.76%) were not significantly correlated at the .05 level of significance.  Due to the 
very large size of the correlation matrix, only the insignificant correlation coefficients 
and respective p-values are provided in Table 32 of Appendix G.   
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was computed, 
resulting in a value of .92.  This value was considered “marvelous” and a very good 
indicator there was a strong multivariate structure available for analysis (Spicer, 
2005:186).  Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was used to extract factors with 
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eigenvalues over one, resulting in seven unique underlying factors in the data.  The total 
variance explained was 61% with each of the seven factors explaining 27.31%, 13.37%, 
5.74%, 4.72%, 3.89%, 3.20%, and 2.76% of the variance respectively.  This information 
can be found in Table 33 in Appendix G.   
The communalities of the items were then examined to determine if any items 
were not linearly related to the other items.  All values were relatively high to very high, 
indicating all items were linearly related.  As such, all 39 items (recall that Items 9 and 10 
did not properly record into the survey database and were deleted) were considered 
during the exploratory factor analysis procedure.  The communalities can be seen in 
Table 34 of Appendix G.   
Mathematically speaking, all items will load at some level on each factor.  In 
order to differentiate which factor(s) upon which an item significantly loads, a minimum 
factor loading value must be specified a priori.  Stevens states, as quoted by Spicer, that 
“a practice has developed of using .30 as a minimum loading mainly on the grounds that 
such a variable would be accounting for nearly 10% (.32) of the variance in a factor.  But 
this has been criticized as ignoring the effect of sample size” (Spicer, 2005:189).  As 
quoted by Spicer, Stevens “has reviewed these arguments and provided a useful table that 
allows the analyst to determine a minimum value reflecting both stringent statistical 
significance (p<.01) and size of contribution.  On this basis, a loading would need to be at 
least .42 to be worthy of interpretation” (Spicer, 2005:189).   
This research utilized a more conservative approach by performing factor analysis 
procedures suppressing the coefficients with absolute values less than .42, meaning that 
the factor loadings for any given item below this value would not be reflected in the 
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factor matrix.  If nothing else, specifying a conservative minimum factor loading level 
makes the task of interpreting the factor matrix much easier.   
The reader should note that the following discussion of the extraction and rotation 
procedures does not include specific items among each of the factors.  Instead, a general 
discussion regarding this researcher’s decisions is provided, while all supporting SPSS 
output is provided in Appendix G.  The discussion regarding the final factors used for 
statistical analysis is provided when appropriate.    
The initial unrotated extraction of the seven factors resulted in five items cross-
loading on two factors and one item cross-loading on three factors.  The resulting 
component matrix indicated that Factors 1 through 7 consisted of 28, ten, three, one, two, 
one, and one item respectively.  The unrotated component matrix can be found Table 35 
in Appendix G, 
The varimax (orthogonal) rotation method was employed in order to make the 
data more interpretable. This orthogonal rotation only allows the axes on which the items 
are loaded to be rotated at right angles.  The varimax-rotated matrix was much easier to 
interpret than the simple component matrix.  All 39 items, again, loaded against at least 
one factor and this time five items cross-loaded on two factors, while no items cross-
loaded on more than two factors.  In terms of the number of items, the factor loadings 
were distributed more evenly.  Factors 1 through 7 consisted of 16, six, five, seven, four, 
five, and one factor loading respectively (totaling 44 factor loadings, five of which were 
cross-loaded as specified above).  The varimax-rotated component matrix can be found at 
Table 36 in Appendix G.   
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To be sure the varimax-rotated matrix reflected the best fitting model, the matrix 
was instead rotated using the direct oblimin (oblique) rotation method.  This oblique 
rotation relaxes the requirement that the factors must be uncorrelated and allows the axes 
on which the items are loaded to be rotated at any angle.  The direct oblimin-rotated 
matrix was more difficult to interpret than the matrix using the varimax rotation method.  
While, again, all 39 items loaded against at least one factor, there was a considerable 
increase in the number of items that cross-loaded; 18 cross-loaded on two factors and five 
items cross-loaded on three factors.  Factors 1 through 7 consisted of 20, nine, seven, 13, 
12, one, and six items respectively.  This rotated structure matrix can be found at Table 
37 in Appendix G.   
Given the results of the direct oblimin rotation, it was determined that the factors 
extracted from the data using the varimax rotation method were more interpretable.  From 
this point forward, all factor references will be made to the varimax-rotated (orthogonal) 
component matrix (again, found in Table 36 of Appendix G) with coefficients suppressed 
at absolute values less than .42.   
It is now appropriate to discuss the seven extracted factors.  All factor summary 
tables below include each item’s number in the survey, verbiage, mean (M), and standard 
deviation (SD), as well as the number of cases (N) used to compute the Cronbach’s alpha 
(α).  Recall from Chapter III, Methodology that the Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of a 
factor’s internal consistency, which measures the extent to which all the items within a 
single construct yield similar results.  This is also referred to as the scale’s reliability.  
Also, item numbers followed by ‘R’ indicate the item was reverse coded prior to any 
calculations.   
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Factor 1 
Sixteen items loaded against Factor 1.  Item 7 had a factor loading of .494 but also 
cross-loaded on Factor 2 with a value of .496.  Since this item loaded higher on Factor 2, 
it was deleted from Factor 1 resulting in a 15-item factor.  Deleting any more items did 
not improve the factor’s internal reliability.  This final 15-item factor was labeled 
‘Overall View’ (n = 697, M = 4.97, SD = .93, α = .92).  The items in this factor appear to 
relate to the pure pallet program in a very general sense.  This contrasts with the other 
factors described below, which all appear to relate to specific aspects of the pure pallet 
program.  Lower response values for this factor indicate that perceptions of the pure 
pallet program as a whole are poor, while higher response values indicate that perceptions 
of the pure pallet program as a whole are good.  Table 10 provides descriptive item 
statistics for Factor 1.   
 
Factor 2 
Six items loaded against Factor 2.  Item 27 had a factor loading of .454 but also 
cross-loaded on Factor 1 with a value of .476.  Since this item loaded higher on Factor 1, 
it was deleted from Factor 2 resulting in a 5-item factor.  Deleting Item 29 increased the 
factor’s internal reliability from .82 to .83, however the item was retained as it was 
determined that the marginal increase in reliability was not worth losing the relevance the 
item had on the factor.  This final 5-item factor was labeled ‘Efficiency’ (n = 697, M = 
4.43, SD = .96, α = .82).  The items in this factor appear to specifically relate to how 
efficient the pure pallet program is.  Lower response values for this factor indicate that 
perceptions of the pure pallet program’s efficiency are poor, while higher response values 
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indicate that perceptions of the pure pallet program’s efficiency are good.  Table 11 
provides descriptive item statistics for Factor 2.   
 
Table 10. Factor 1 - ‘Overall View’ Item Statistics 
 
Item ‘Overall View’ Items, α = .92 Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 I am familiar with the goals of the pure pallet program. 5.43 1.56 697
2 The pure pallet program is a good concept. 5.52 1.23 697
3 Less cargo is lost in the distribution pipeline under the pure pallet program. 5.22 1.30 697
4 My supervisor supports the pure pallet program. 5.19 1.33 697
6 Standards under the pure pallet program are clearly defined. 4.63 1.38 697
8 Standards under the pure pallet program are attainable. 5.01 1.20 697
16 My unit has the necessary resources to do the pure pallet program effectively. 4.62 1.51 697
23 My supervisor feels the pure pallet program is important. 4.93 1.27 697
24 Standards under the pure pallet program are reasonable. 4.94 1.18 697
25 The pure pallet program is working as it was intended. 4.73 1.20 697
27 Moving pallets within the CENTCOM AOR is easier due to the pure pallet program. 4.81 1.38 697
36 I think the pure pallet program is beneficial to the warfighter. 5.35 1.31 697
38 The pure pallet program works as it was initially described to me. 4.67 1.23 697
40 I am very familiar with the pure pallet program. 4.55 1.66 697
41R I think the pure pallet program should be abandoned. 4.93 1.51 697
 
Factor 3 
Five items loaded against Factor 3.  Item 23 had a factor loading of .435 but also 
cross-loaded on Factor 1 with a value of .569.  Since this item loaded higher on Factor 1,  
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Table 11 Factor 2 - ‘Efficiency’ Item Statistics 
 
Item ‘Efficiency’ Items, α = .82 Mean Std. Deviation N 
7 Pallets move through the distribution pipeline faster under the pure pallet program. 4.80 1.39 697
20 My unit is more efficient under the pure pallet program. 4.26 1.19 697
21 Duplicate ordering has decreased under the pure pallet program. 4.32 .98 697
28 My job is easier with the pure pallet program. 4.34 1.40 697
29 The pure pallet program has benefited my unit’s operations. 4.45 1.31 697
 
it was deleted from Factor 3 resulting in a 4-item factor.  Deleting any more items did not 
improve the factor’s internal reliability.  This final 4-item factor was labeled ‘Training 
and Feedback’ (n = 697, M = 3.99, SD = 1.25, α = .81).  The items in this factor appear to 
specifically relate to the training and feedback aspects of the pure pallet program.  Lower 
response values for this factor indicate that perceptions of training and feedback for the 
pure pallet program are poor, while higher response values indicate that perceptions of 
training and feedback for the pure pallet program are good.  Table 12 provides 
descriptive item statistics for Factor 3.   
 
Table 12. Factor 3 - ‘Training and Feedback’ Item Statistics 
 
Item ‘Training and Feedback’ Items, α = .81 Mean Std. Deviation N 
15 I received adequate training for pure pallet program implementation. 4.26 1.61 697
30 My supervisor asks me for feedback regarding the pure pallet program. 3.82 1.52 697
31 I feel that mostly everyone in my unit is adequately familiar with the pure pallet program. 3.95 1.66 697
33 My supervisor provides good feedback to me regarding the pure pallet program. 3.92 1.49 697
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Factor 4 
Seven items loaded against Factor 4.  Item 26 had a factor loading of .427 but also 
cross-loaded on Factor 6 with a value of .631.  Since this item loaded higher on Factor 6, 
it was deleted from Factor 4.  Item 41 had a factor loading of .439 but also cross-loaded 
on Factor 1 with a value of .631.  Since this item loaded higher on Factor 1, it was deleted 
from Factor 4.  Deleting any more items did not improve the factor’s internal reliability.  
This final 5-item factor was labeled ‘Resources Required’ (n = 697, M = 3.80, SD = .96, 
α = .75).  The items in this factor appear to specifically relate to the resources required for 
the pure pallet program.  Lower response values for this factor indicate that perceptions 
of the resources provided to implement the pure pallet program are poor, while higher 
response values indicate that perceptions of the resources provided to implement the pure 
pallet program are goodt.  Table 13 provides descriptive item statistics for Factor 4.   
 
Factor 5 
All four items loading against Factor 5 did not cross-load on any other factor.  
These four items coincidentally represent the four items adapted from the Organizational 
Commitment scale as described in Chapter III, Methodology.  Deleting Item 11 increased 
the factor’s internal reliability from .86 to .90, however the item was retained as it was 
determined that the overall factor variance would drastically increase.  Also, the marginal 
increase in reliability was not worth compromising the relevance of these four items in 
their entirety.  This final 4-item factor was appropriately labeled ‘Organizational 
Commitment’ (n = 697, M = 5.30, SD = 1.33, α = .86).  The items in this factor relate to 
each respondent’s level of organizational commitment.  Lower response values for this  
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Table 13. Factor 4 - ‘Resources Required’ Item Statistics 
 
Item ‘Resources Required’ Items, α = .75 Mean Std. Deviation N 
17R More pallets, nets, and/or tie-down equipment are required under the pure pallet program. 3.37 1.548 697
22R The pure pallet program increased manpower requirements. 3.94 1.268 697
34R More equipment is needed under the pure pallet program. 3.80 1.325 697
35R The pure pallet program has made my job harder. 4.16 1.382 697
37R The pure pallet program is more costly to implement. 3.74 1.237 697
 
factor indicate that respondents have low organizational commitment, while higher 
response values indicate that respondents have high organizational commitment.  Table 
14 provides descriptive item statistics for Factor 5.   
 
Table 14. Factor 5 - ‘Organizational Commitment’ Item Statistics 
 
Item ‘Organizational Commitment’ Items, α = .86 Mean Std. Deviation N 
11 
I am willing to put in a great deal of effort 
beyond that normally expected in order to help 
make my unit be successful. 
5.98 1.196 697
12 I “talk up” my unit to my friends as a great organization to work for.   5.27 1.651 697
13 I find that my values and my unit’s values are very similar. 5.19 1.566 697
14 For me, my unit is the best of all possible organizations to work for. 4.76 1.820 697
 
Factor 6 
All five items loading against Factor 6 did not cross-load on any other factor.  
Deleting any items did not improve the factor’s internal reliability.  This final 5-item 
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factor was labeled ‘Performance’ (n = 697, M = 3.78, SD = .14, α = .74).  The items in 
this factor appear to specifically relate to the performance of the pure pallet program.  
Lower response values for this factor indicate that perceptions of pure pallet program 
performance are poor, while higher response values indicate that perceptions of pure 
pallet program performance are great.  Table 15 provides descriptive item statistics for 
Factor 6.  
 
Table 15. Factor 6 - ‘Performance’ Item Statistics 
 
Item ‘Performance’ Items, α = .74 Mean Std. Deviation N 
5R The pure pallet program has increased overall congestion in the distribution pipeline. 3.80 1.483 697
18R Port-hold-time (PHT) has increased under the pure pallet program. 3.53 1.416 697
19R Aircraft utilization has decreased under the pure pallet program. 3.88 1.362 697
26R Cargo backlog has increased under the pure pallet program. 3.85 1.270 697
32R Pallet utilization has decreased under the pure pallet program. 3.84 1.394 697
 
Factor 7 
Item 39, ‘I see ways in which the pure pallet program could be improved’, with a 
factor loading score of .693 (n = 697, M = 3.32 SD = 1.17), was the only item that loaded 
against what SPSS extracted as a seventh factor.  As such, the internal reliability could 
not be calculated since there was only one item.  Therefore, there really is no Factor 7 
and no further reference will be made to any such factor.  The reason for discussing here 




Factor Analysis Summary 
On the average, 2T2s and 21Rs:  ‘slightly agree’ that the general concept of the 
pure pallet program is good (Factor 1:  n = 697, M = 4.97, SD = .93); ‘slightly agree’ that 
efficiency of the pure pallet program is good (Factor 2:  n = 697, M = 4.43, SD = .96); 
‘slightly agree’ that training and feedback for the pure pallet program is good (Factor 3:  
n = 697, M = 3.99, SD = 1.25); ‘neither agree nor disagree’ that resources provided for 
pure pallet program are good (Factor 4:  n = 697, M = 3.8, SD = .96); ‘agree’ that their 
organizational commitment is high (Factor 5:  n = 697, M = 5.30, SD = 1.33); and 
‘neither agree nor disagree’ that performance of the pure pallet program is good (Factor 
6:  n = 697, M = 3.78, SD = .97).  Table 16 provides summary statistics on all extracted 
factors.   
 




Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
A number of statistical tests were performed to determine if perceptions of 
various aspects of the pure pallet program vary across different subgroups.  In addition, 
self-reported levels of organizational commitment were also compared across these same 
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subgroups.  Except where specifically noted, all tests were performed using the SPSS 
One-Way ANOVA procedure.  This procedure requires a dependent variable to be 
compared to an independent variable, which must have at least three possible values, or 
else the procedure is not otherwise possible.  When there are not at least three possible 
values for a given subgroup, an Independent Samples T-test was performed.     
Recall from Chapter III, Methodology that the independence assumption is met 
when observations from the same individual do not appear in each of the subgroups.  
Such is the case for all of the following statistical analyses since it is impossible for one 
respondent to be assigned to the active duty component and the reserve component, etc.  
Again, recall that the normality assumption can be met for sample sizes that are not 
small.  Such is the case for all of the following statistical analyses which follow since N > 
30 for all comparisons.  Once again, recall that the equality-of-variance assumption can 
be checked by computing the Levene test for equality of variance.  However, in practice, 
if the number of cases in each of the groups is similar, the equality-of-variance 
assumption is not too important.  To be more conservative, the Levene test for equality of 
variance was conducted for all statistical analyses, whether or not the number of cases in 
each group was similar.  All tests assume independence and normality as discussed 
previously.   
The factor scores for each of the six factors extracted during the factor analysis 
procedures discussed earlier in this chapter served as dependent variables, while the each 
of the following three different subgroups served as independent variables for the 




 Subgroup 1:  Component 
The first test was performed to determine if perceptions among respondents in the 
active, guard, and reserve components differed with respect to each of the six factor 
scores—the dependent variables.  Since the number of usable cases assigned to each of 
the components was 491 (70.0%), 44 (6.3%), and 162 (23.2%) respectively, it was 
necessary to adjust the number of cases used to perform this particular test in order to 
maintain some degree of validity.  While 44 cases was the minimum number of these 
three subgroups, which offered an appropriate level of statistical power, this researcher 
decided to be more conservative by combining both guard and reserve cases into one 
‘non-active duty’ subgroup.  Doing so enabled a larger number of cases (206, or 30.0%) 
to be compared with the active duty cases (491, 70.0%).  This also ensured the normality 
assumption remained satisfied.     
Since only two possible values now existed for this subgroup, namely ‘active’ 
(AD) and ‘non-active’ (Non-AD), the One-Way ANOVA procedure was no longer an 
option.  An Independent Samples T-test was conducted instead to determine if there were 
differences in perceptions of each of the six factors between active duty personnel and 
non-active duty personnel.  For each of the factors compared, the only significant 
differences between the two groups were found in the following factors: 
• Factor 2:  The perceptions of the ‘Efficiency’ of the pure pallet program 
between Active Duty and Non-Active Duty 2T2s and 21Rs who reported having 
experience with the program differ significantly from one another.  Specifically, 
Non-Active Duty personnel believe the pure pallet program is more efficient 
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than do Active Duty personnel (AD n = 491, M = 4.34, SD = .98;    Non-AD n = 
206, M = 4.64, SD = .90; t = -3.70, df = 695, p < .001).   
• Factor 5:  The level of ‘Organizational Commitment’ between Active Duty and 
Non-Active Duty 2T2s and 21Rs who reported having experience with the 
program differs significantly from one another.  Specifically, Non-Active Duty 
personnel appear to have higher levels of organizational commitment than do 
Active Duty personnel (AD n = 491, M = 5.14, SD = 1.39; Non-AD n = 206,    
M = 5.67, SD = 1.08; t = -5.33, df = 490, p < .001).  
Tables 17 and 18 were used to interpret the findings as described above.   
 




Subgroup 2:  Time in Service (TIS) 
A second test was performed to determine if perceptions among respondents with 
zero to four years, four to ten years, ten to 15 years, 15 to 20 years, and 20 or more years 
time in service (TIS) differed with respect to each of the six factor scores.  The number of 
usable cases assigned to each of these categories was 94 (13.5%), 144 (20.7%), 159 
83 
(22.8%), 145 (20.8%), and 155 (22.2%) respectively.  The size of each category ensured 
that the normality assumption was satisfied.     
 
Table 18. Independent Samples T-Test Results, Subgroup 1 - Component 




Respondents in this subgroup were assigned to one of five possible categories as 
listed above.  Therefore, the One-Way ANOVA procedure was conducted to determine if 
the mean factor scores in all subgroup categories were equal.  The results of the 
procedures indicated the variances were equal for the mean responses in each of the five 
TIS categories for Factor 1 (F = 2.20, p < .07), Factor 2 (F = 1.35, p < .25), Factor 4      
(F = 1.41, p < .23), and Factor 6 (F = 2.13, p < .08); and that the variances were not equal 
for the mean responses in each of the five TIS categories for Factor 3 (F = 4.23, p < .002) 
and Factor 5 (F = 10.96, p < .000).  These results can be seen in Table 19.   
These results required further analysis since the ANOVA indicated that the mean 
responses were not equal for Factors 3 and 5.  Post-hoc tests were required in order to 
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determine which mean responses differed among the five TIS categories.  Since the 
variances among the mean responses for Factor 3 were considered equal (Levene        
Stat. = .37, df1 = 4, df2 = 692, p < .83), Tukey HSD post-hoc tests were performed; and 
since the variances among the mean responses for Factor 5 were not considered equal 
(Levene Stat. = 7.66, df1 = 4, df2 = 692, p < .000), Games-Howell post-hoc tests were 
performed.   
The Tukey HSD multiple comparison post-hoc test results for Factor 3, ‘Training 
and Feedback’ indicated there was a significant difference in mean factor scores between 
respondents with between four and ten years TIS and respondents with between 15 and 
20 years TIS (MD = -.49, p < .007).  Perceptions of the pure pallet program’s feedback 
and training aspects were higher among respondents with between 15 and 20 years TIS 
than respondents with between four and ten years TIS.   
The Tukey HSD multiple comparison post-hoc test results also indicated that 
there was a significant difference in mean factor scores between respondents with 
between four and ten years TIS and respondents with 20 or more years TIS (MD = -.47,   
p < .009).  Perceptions of the pure pallet program’s feedback and training aspects were 
higher among respondents with 20 or more years TIS than respondents with between 
fours and ten years TIS.  The results of the Tukey HSD post-hoc tests can be seen in 
Table 20 and the Factor 3 mean values for all subgroup categories are plotted in Figure 
18. 
The Games-Howell multiple comparison post-hoc test results for Factor 5, 
‘Organizational Commitment’ indicated a number of significant differences in mean 
factor scores: 
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Figure 18. Factor 3 Means Plot, Subgroup 2 – TIS 
 
• Respondents with between zero and four years TIS had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents with between 15 and 20 
years TIS (MD = -.64, p < .006).  
• Respondents with between zero and four years TIS had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents with 20 or more years 
TIS (MD = -.81, p < .000).   
• Respondents with between four and ten years TIS had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents with between 15 and 20 
years TIS (MD = -.60, p < .001). 
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• Respondents with between four and ten years TIS had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents with 20 or more years 
TIS (MD = -.78, p < .000). 
• Respondents with between ten and 15 years TIS had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents with between 15 and 20 
years TIS (MD = -.40, p < .04). 
• Respondents with between ten and 15 years TIS had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents with between 20 or more 
years TIS (MD = -.58, p < .000). 
The results of the Games-Howell post-hoc tests can be seen in Table 21 while the Factor 
5 means are plotted in Figure 19. 
 
Subgroup 3:  Rank 
A third test was performed to determine if perceptions among respondents 
between the grade of E-1 to E-4, O-1 and O-2; E-5 and E-6; E-7 to E-9, O-1E, O-2E, O-
3, and O-3E; and O-4 to O-6 differed with respect to each of the six factor scores.  The 
number of usable cases assigned to each of these categories was 122 (17.5%), 281 
(40.3%), 146 (20.9%), 88 (12.6%), and 60 (8.6%) respectively.  The size of each category 
ensured that the normality assumption was satisfied.   
Respondents in this subgroup were assigned to one of five possible categories as 
listed above.  Therefore, the One-Way ANOVA procedure was conducted to determine if 
the mean factor scores in all subgroup categories were equal.  The results of the 
procedures indicated the variances were equal for the mean responses in each of the five  
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Figure 19. Factor 5 Means Plot, Subgroup 2 – TIS 
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rank categories for Factor 2 (F = 1.20, p < .31) and Factor 6 (F = 1.59, p < .18); and that 
the variances were not equal for the responses in each of the five rank categories for 
Factor 1 (F = 3.36, p < .01), Factor 3 (F = 5.41, p < .000), Factor 4 (F = 2.96, p < .02), 
and Factor 5 (F = 22.37, p < .000).  These results can be seen in Table 22.   
 
Table 22. ANOVA Results, Subgroup 3 – Rank 
 
 
Further analysis was required since the ANOVA results indicated that the mean 
responses were not equal for Factors 1, 3, 4, and 5 as indicated above.  Post-hoc tests 
were required in order to determine which mean responses differed among the five 
categories.  Since the variances among the mean responses were considered equal for 
Factor 1 (Levene Stat. = 1.46, df1 = 4, df2 = 692, p < .21), Factor 3 (Levene Stat. = 1.27, 
df1 = 4, df2 = 692, p < .28), and Factor 4 (Levene Stat. = 1.00, df1 = 4, df2 = 692,            
p < .41),  Tukey HSD post-hoc tests were performed; and since the variances among the 
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mean responses were not considered equal for Factor 5 (Levene Stat. = 11.48, df1 = 4,  
df2 = 692, p < .000), Games-Howell post-hoc tests were performed.   
The Tukey HSD multiple comparison post-hoc test results for Factor 1, ‘Overall 
View’ indicated there was a significant difference in mean factor scores between 
respondents in the grade of E-5 and E-6 and respondents in the grade of E-7 to E-9    (MD 
= -.28, p < .03).  Respondents in the grade of E-5 and E-6 had lower perceptions of the 
general concept of the pure pallet program than did respondents in the grade of E-7 to E-
9.  The results of the Tukey HSD post-hoc tests can be seen in Table 23 and the Factor 1 
mean values for all subgroup categories are plotted in Figure 20.  
  




The Tukey HSD multiple comparison post-hoc test results for Factor 3, ‘Training 
and Feedback’ indicated there was a significant difference in mean factor scores between 
respondents in the grade of E-5 and E-6 and respondents in the grade of E-7 to E-9     
(MD = -.50, p < .001).  Respondents in the grade of E-5 and E-6 had lower perceptions of 
training and feedback for the pure pallet program than did respondents in the grade of E-7 
to E-9.  The results also indicated there was a significant difference in mean factor scores 
 
 
Figure 20. Factor 1 Means Plot, Subgroup 3 – Rank 
 
between respondents in the grade of E-5 and E-6 and respondents in the grade of O-4 to 
O-6 (MD = -.58, p < .01).  Respondents in the grade of E-5 and E-6 had lower 
perceptions of the general concept of the pure pallet program than did respondents in the 
grade of O-4 to O-6.  The results of the Tukey HSD post-hoc tests can be seen in Table 
24 and the Factor 3 mean values for all subgroup categories are plotted in Figure 21.  
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 The Tukey HSD multiple comparison post-hoc test results for Factor 4, ‘Resources 
Required’ indicated there was no significant difference in mean factor scores between 
any categories of respondents in Subgroup 3 – Rank.  This contradicts the ANOVA 
results for Subgroup 3 as described and displayed above.  Nonetheless the results of the 
Tukey HSD post-hoc tests are provided in Table 25 so the reader can verify the results as 
well.  The Factor 4 mean values for all subgroup categories are also plotted in Figure 22.   
 
Table 24. Factor 3 Tukey HSD Results, Subgroup 3 – Rank 
 
 
The Games-Howell multiple comparison post-hoc test results for Factor 5, 
‘Organizational Commitment’ indicated a number of significant differences in mean 
factor scores between: 
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Figure 21. Factor 3 Means Plot, Subgroup 3 – Rank  
 
• Respondents in the grade of E-1 to E-4, O-1, and O-2 had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents in the grade of E-7 to E-
9 (MD = -.85, p < .000).   
• Respondents in the grade of E-1 to E-4, O-1, and O-2 had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents in the grade of O-1E,   
O-2E, O-3, and O-3E (MD = -.81, p < .000). 
• Respondents in the grade of E-1 to E-4, O-1, and O-2 had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents in the grade of O-4 to   








Figure 22. Factor 4 Means Plot, Subgroup 3 – Rank  
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• Respondents in the grade of E-5 and E-6 had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents in the grade of E-7 to E-
9 (MD = -.81, p < .000). 
• Respondents in the grade of E-5 and E-6 had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents in the grade of O-1E,   
O-2E, O-3, and O-3E (MD = -.77, p < .04). 
• Respondents in the grade of E-5 and E-6 had lower levels of 
organizational commitment than did respondents in the grade of O-4 to O-
6 (MD = -1.18, p < .000). 
The results of the Games-Howell post-hoc tests can be seen in Table 26 while the Factor 
5 means are plotted in Figure 23. 
 
Additional Comments  
A total of 217 respondents provided additional comments which are included in 
Appendix D.  Also included are the comments provided by eight separate respondents 
and received directly via email; these were not recorded to the data set by the interactive 
WebSIRS program as provided by the other 217 respondents.   
Summary 
This chapter began by presenting the demographic data of survey respondents, 
which serve as indicators of the external validity of the research effort.  The factor 
analysis procedures used to analyze the survey responses were then discussed in detail.  
After the factors were identified, a detailed discussion of the Independent Samples T-Test  
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Figure 23. Factor 5 Means Plot, Subgroup 3 – Rank  
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and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) procedures used to determine whether differences in 
perceptions exist among different subgroups of the respondents was presented.  Finally, 
this chapter concluded by stating that the 217 responses to the open-ended survey item 
(Item 42) could found in Appendix D.  While this chapter focused on the specific 











The objective of this research was to answer the following two-part question:  Is 
the pure pallet program working as intended and is there a perception problem among the 
Air Force personnel involved in program implementation at the aerial ports?  This 
chapter presents the major conclusions drawn from the results and analysis of this 
research effort.  Recommendations for educating all air transportation specialists and 
logistics readiness officers in all Air Force components and recommendations for further 
research are also provided.  Finally, limitations of this research are discussed.   
 
Conclusions  
During this research process, one thing has been made very clear; there are 
literally hundreds, if not thousands, of journal articles, monographs, technical reports, 
studies, and books published pertaining to customer service in some fashion or another.  
Probably the most interesting findings were the issues discussed by McIntyre (1977), 
Warren (1994), and Gamino (1971).  McIntyre discussed the need for improved 
packaging, containerization, and sub-containerization; Warren stressed the importance of 
suboptimzation avoidance; and Gamino pointed out that logistics support systems were 
not designed to provide effective support to combatant commanders.  Despite the passing 
of nearly three decades, improved packaging, containerization, and sub-containerization; 
suboptimization avoidance; and effective support to combatant commanders have become 
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the main focus of a single organization—USTRANSCOM as the Distribution Process 
Owner (DPO).  Now that the appropriate structure is in place, it is important to focus now 
on the personnel who actually provide effective support to combatant commanders.   
After examining the events which led to the implementation of the pure pallet 
program, it appears that the Commander of United States Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM), as the newly appointed Distribution Process Owner (DPO), is well on 
track to improving warfighter support through improvements in the Defense 
Transportation System (DTS).  While yet unpublished, RAND’s in-depth study on end-
to-end distribution, a significant portion of which is devoted to the pure pallet program, 
validates that the pure pallet program is working as intended.  The program has been 
effective in that both end-to-end distribution times to the warfighter and the number of 
lost shipments were reduced.  Furthermore, these improvements in effectiveness were not 
realized at the expense of efficiency within the DTS.     
This thesis yielded a number of interesting insights when comparing the 
perceptions of key Air Force personnel making the pure pallet program work with the 
program’s actual performance.   
The percentage of air transportation specialists (2T2s) and logistics readiness 
officers (21Rs) who have knowledge of the pure pallet program is small (25.62%) 
relative to the potential pool of personnel available from all three Air Force components 
who could potentially be involved in implementing the program.  Even smaller is the 
percentage of those personnel having knowledge of the program, but who also understand 
the larger goals of end-to-end distribution, namely sub-optimization avoidance.     
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Of importance is the fact that perceptions of the pure pallet program are 
significantly different across various demographic subgroups.  Non-Active Duty 
personnel believe the pure pallet program is more efficient than do Active Duty 
personnel.  Also, Non-Active Duty personnel appear to have higher levels of 
organizational commitment than do Active Duty personnel.  It is impossible to explain 
through this research exactly why such a disparity exists between these two demographic 
groups with respect to their perceptions of the program’s efficiency and their level of 
organizational commitment.  One possible explanation may be that Guard and Reserve 
personnel, usually volunteers, are typically called to active duty for at most one year at a 
time, whereas active duty personnel in these two career fields have been subjected to very 
high levels of operations tempo, especially over the past four years.         
The significant differences between various categories of personnel grouped by 
Total Time in Service (TIS) are also important.  It appears that all of the significant 
differences among these various categories suggest that those with more TIS, and 
presumably hold a higher rank, would naturally understand the bigger picture despite any 
such lack of pure pallet program feedback and training.  It may also be possible that those 
who have been associated with the U.S. Air Force longer, and hence closer to retirement-
eligible, would have higher levels of organizational commitment than those with less TIS.  
The significant differences between various categories grouped by rank are also 
important.  It appears that all of the significant differences among these various 
categories suggest that those who hold higher rank perceive the general concept of the 
pure pallet program to be better, perceive that pure pallet program training and feedback 
are more sufficient, and have higher levels of organizational commitment, than those who 
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hold a lower rank.  As mentioned previously, it may be possible that those who hold a 
higher rank have simply been associated with the U.S. Air Force longer are more 
committed to the organization and generally understand the bigger picture than to those 
with lower rank.  
While this research does not explain exactly why the aforementioned differences 
were significant, it does provide feedback to senior leaders that special consideration 
should be made to this fact when managing the pure pallet program.   
After a cursory review of the written responses, it appears that there is a lack of 
common perceptions among personnel even within a given rank subgroup.  Several of the 
responses identified concerns that personnel out in the field are not familiar with the 
program.  Other respondents indicated that traditional metrics used to monitor the flow of 
cargo through aerial ports, such as Port-Hold-Time (PHT) and pallet and aircraft 
utilization, need to be adjusted to reflect the unique aspects of the pure pallet program.  
There is no clear distinction among any demographic.  While this research does not 
utilize a content analysis methodology to analyze the written responses, the perceptions 
of these respondents, through their written responses, vary from one end of the spectrum 
to the other, with no demographic clustering.   
For example, a number of E-4s indicated they were adequately familiar with the 
program and offered suggestions for its improvement (Case #s 151 and 237), while other 
E-4s appeared disgruntled for “making our job harder” (Case # 719).  Another example is 
an O-6 who appeared to understand the purpose of the program and strongly supported it 
(Case #s 340 and 1508), while another O-6 (Case # 907) claimed that creation of the pure 
pallet program was a result of too many pilots in logistics billets who “don’t know how to 
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say ‘No’ to the Army”.  This wide range of comments clearly indicates the lack of 
convergence of the perceptions among all who are involved with pure pallet program 
implementation.   
While it may seem reasonable to conclude that respondents whose perceptions of 
the program are congruent with the actual effects of the program are correct, this research 
does not attempt to assert which position is right or wrong.  It is simply not appropriate to 
make that determination herein.  Instead, this research simply determined that there is, in 
fact, a perception problem, the existence of which should be considered by leaders and 
managers who oversee pure pallet program activities.     
 
Recommendations 
First, all personnel in the air transportation and logistics readiness career fields 
should be educated on the general concept of the pure pallet program, which should 
include a general understanding of how the program works.  Emphasis should be placed 
on the importance of suboptimization avoidance and warfighter support as the number 
one priority.  This recommendation can be accomplished in a number of ways including 
outreach teams, training videos, or even as simple a method as unit Commander’s Calls 
or equivalent, assuming the unit commander understands the concept first.     
Second, the successes and failures of logistics support operations over the last few 
years should be incorporated into applicable formal training and technical training 
schools.  Again, emphasis should be placed on the importance of suboptimization 
avoidance and warfighter support as the number one priority.     
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Finally, a follow-up survey should be administered again to all personnel in the 
air transportation and logistics readiness officer career fields at a reasonable amount of 
time following execution of recommendations one and two above.  Should the results of 
this follow-up survey yield identical or similar results as found herein, further research 
may be required to properly ascertain the root cause of the differences in perceptions.  
Assuming that people in general are resistant to change, there may exist a problem 
more detrimental to the pure pallet program, or any process improvement initiative for 
that matter.  Specifically, older NCOs and officers, who may be more prone to resist 
change simply because “that’s not the way they were raised,” may be the root cause of 
the perception problems.  At first glance, this does not seem likely given the mean 
differences in perceptions discovered and highlighted in this research.  Instead, the 
differences may simply be attributable to the reasons discussed above, namely that 
younger personnel naturally have lower levels of organizational commitment and a more 
narrow understanding of the bigger picture.   
The author does not recommend a solution for the former; to effect change with 
respect to something as complex as organizational commitment requires a very deep 
understanding of organizational behavior, as well as other factors such as the motives for 
joining the military.  This author does, however, recommend a solution for the latter.  
Intense education of the more junior members will broaden their understanding of the 
bigger picture, which will in turn create a more customer-oriented workforce to provide 




Recommendations for Future Research 
In addition to administering a follow-up survey as described above, the survey 
developed for this research effort may prove useful in measuring the perceptions of those 
involved in an entirely different process improvement initiative.  Furthermore, studies 
could be conducted which investigate possible root causes for such a perception gap.  
This type of research may identify additional latent variables which hinder effective 
implementation of any major process change such as this one.   
A longitudinal study may also provide useful information in determining whether 
or not pure pallet program education and training intervention led to a convergence of 
pure pallet program perceptions.  The focus would of course not be to effect perceptions 
or otherwise convince everyone of the merits and/or limitations of the program, but to 
determine if perceptions were affected as a result of said intervention.  The importance of 
such research lies in the following frequently spoken phrase:  “Perceptions are reality.”  
From the perspective of each individual, this phrase is a fact.  However, it is the 
collective human effort that ultimately leads to success or failure of any process 
improvement initiative. 
   
Limitations  
There are several limitations to this study.  First, all data collected was self-
reported by participating air transportation specialists and the logistics readiness officers.  
Self-reported data relies on the accuracy of the perceptions of those surveyed (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979).  These perceptions might contain what is referred to as self-serving 
bias, the results of which could have been biased through respondents’ personal 
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experiences.  It is also possible that a common method bias is present since the survey 
items all pertained to the pure pallet program (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).  Specifically, 
common method bias could be a problem since these results came only from one source.  
However, quantifying this potential bias is near impossible given that all but four items 
were developed specifically for this research effort.   
Another possible limitation is that of acquiescence, which describes the 
possibility that respondents want to provide socially acceptable responses to survey 
questions (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).  An attempt was made to mitigate this possibility 
by providing as little detail in the cover letter as possible as to the purpose the survey or 
the nature of the questions within the survey.  While respondents knew that this research 
was sponsored by Air Mobility Command (AMC), the survey was designed with strict 
anonymity and confidentiality in mind.  The intent was to prevent respondents from 
staging their answers for fear of reprisal, thereby measuring their true perceptions of the 
pure pallet program.  
Another limitation was the relatively short time the pure pallet program has been 
in existence.  While the concept of pure pallets dates back to the Air Lines of 
Communication (ALOC) program established in the 1970s, the context of the pure pallet 
program as known today by Air Force personnel is relatively new.  As such, this study 
should be repeated within the next five years or so to determine if the perceptions of the 
pure pallet program have changed over time, as recommended earlier.    
Additionally, all survey questions (aside from demographics) were measured on a 
7-point Likert scale which did not include an option for Not Applicable (N/A).  One or 
two survey respondents provided feedback to that effect and would have preferred the 
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option to check ‘N/A’.  This option was not used in this study to ensure that a sufficient 
number of respondents could be used to adequately provide statistical power during the 
data analysis stage.   
Sample error is defined as the result of collecting data from only a subset, rather 
than all, of the members of the sample frame (Alreck, 2004).  Of the 13,436 members 
assumed to have received and read the email invitation to participate in the survey, only 
2,990 (22.3%) actually participated in the survey.  The remaining 10,431 members 
(excluding the 15 invalid cases) fall into the category of nonresponse error.   
Measurement error represents any questions that were misunderstood.  A slight 
problem with measurement error was evident when determining the level of nonresponse 
error.  Specifically, the variable of comparison was the level of pure pallet program 
experience, which was computed by adding up the total number of months of pure pallet 
program experience reported in response to Item 9 in Part I of the survey.  Interestingly 
enough, a number of respondents indicated they had more than 24 months experience 
with the pure pallet program.  This clearly could not have been true since the program 
wasn’t implemented at select aerial ports until early 2004.  Respondents selected to 
determine nonresponse error who also indicated greater than 24 months experience with 
the pure pallet program (n = 12, 11, and 18 respectively) were excluded from 
nonresponse analysis.  The specific extent to which other instances of measurement error 
existed was unable to be determined.   
A fundamental question pertaining to coverage error is:  Does the list contain 
everyone in the survey population?  For this study the answer was yes.  Members in the 
personnel system made it on the original list provided by AFPC; even prisoners were 
107 
included.  The list contained only names of people who are in the study population.  A 
source of potential bias is the name itself is maintained by the Air Force in the personnel 
data system, but the email address used is updated by the member.  A positive point, 
however, is that each name was only included on the list once, and every name on the list 
had an associated email address.  Theoretically, all members could have received the 
email invitation to participate in the survey.  Even though the list indicated that all 
members were somehow connected to the 2T2 or 21R career field, the possibility that 
some members were no longer in the 2T2 or 21R career field any longer was addressed.  
The members who could be identified as no longer in the interested career fields were 
deleted from the list.  Most importantly, however, is that each member has a known same 
chance of being selected to receive the email invitation.   
While some studies attempt to determine the sample size necessary to establish 
and maintain a certain degree of confidence and statistical power, a more limited 
constraint existed in this study.  While it could have been easy to determine how many 
responses were required in order to have a certain level of confidence, doing so would not 
guarantee such a response rate.  Remember that the focus was on gaining the perceptions 
of the members who reported having knowledge of and/or experience with the pure pallet 
program.  The final decision was to err on the conservative side and survey everyone in 
the sample frame—all members on the list provided by AFPC; one could argue that a 
census was conducted.     
The effects of computer literacy might have been slight during this study.  One 
assumption made in this study was that all military personnel know how to use the 
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internet, which was evidenced by the fact that all members on the list had an email 
address.   
During the data collection process, a number of members complained that they 
could not get the survey to work correctly or could not get the web-based server to 
properly record the data submitted.  This problem was addressed and resolved early 
(within the first three days) in the data collection phase while the survey link was active.  
Another problem cited was a respondent (case # 2004) who had criticism of the survey 
design, specifically that “this survey should be more step-based ... meaning if you choose 
one option, your next options should be predicated upon that previous response. To be 
honest, I have no idea what the pure pallet program is or does.”  As previously noted, this 
comment, along with all others is provided in Appendix D.   
Due to the very large number of questionnaires required to be transmitted, there 
was no way to prevent the appearance that the members were on a massive email list.  
This was deemed an acceptable limitation given the time constraints. 
Upon completion of this research, the pure pallet program with which Air Force 
personnel are familiar will be roughly two years old.  The perceptions measured for this 
research effort represent only a snapshot in time.  One must remember that the personnel 
who volunteered to participate in the survey are not necessarily the same as those who 
experienced initial program implementation.  The reverse is also true; those personnel 
who happened to be involved in the program’s initial implementation may not have been 
since involved (due to retirement, reassigned to a location not involved in the pure pallet 
program, etc.)     
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 Those respondents who actually elected to participate in the survey may not have 
had experience building pallets prior to program implementation to even perceive a 
difference of any kind—good, bad, or indifferent.  Though the survey was developed to 
mitigate this inevitability, it is impossible to quantify the effect of this inherent limitation.  
Furthermore, the survey data were collected with an element of human behavior naturally 
exhibiting some degree of variability.  This is simply the nature of behavioral research 
data and should be kept in mind.  The same survey administered one year, two years, or 
five years from now may very well each yield significantly different results.  While 
considered a limitation on one hand, on the other the potential insight gained from a 
reusable and flexible assessment tool may be considered by pure pallet program 
managers and future researchers to be quite beneficial. 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented the major conclusions drawn from the results and analysis 
of this research effort.  The results indicate that the pure pallet program is working as 
intended but that there is a perception problem among personnel involved with pure 
pallet program implementation within the Air Force.  The author recommends educating 
all air transportation specialists and logistics readiness officers in all Air Force 
components about the suboptimization avoidance in general and the pure pallet program 
in particular.  The author also made recommendations for future research and discussed 
the limitations of this research effort. 
110 












































Appendix C:  Human Subjects Exemption and Survey Approval Letters 






































Appendix D:  Responses to Open-Ended Question 
 
An appendix containing 117 pages of open-ended comments may seem ludicrous 
to some.  Yet, these comments were self-initiated by 2T2s and 21Rs who felt they had 
something to say.  A central theme in any process improvement effort is the need to know 
the perceptions of the people actually performing the process.  For whatever reason, if the 
people performing the process do not agree with what they are doing, or are not otherwise 
on board, successful implementation of the process change will arguably be low.  There 
is likely no other source where anyone can find as complete a collection of comments as 
is presented here, and these comments cover the full range of attitudes toward the specific 
pure pallet program process improvement initiative.   
It is important to note that this is not a random sample.  The individuals who 
responded to these questions were self-selected.  It is reasonable to expect that some bias 
was introduced.  On the other hand, these individuals felt strongly enough to voice their 
opinions.  There are lessons here for anyone motivated to improve the way the Air Force 
air cargo transportation community conducts its business, as well as any distribution 
entity for that matter. 
The responses to the open-ended question (Part II, Item 42) are presented by case 
number (chronological order).  The case numbers do not identify respondents; they were 
intended to allow these open-ended responses to be compared with and easily referenced 
to the responses collected by future researchers.  The respondents’ component assignment 
(Active, Guard, or Reserve), Rank, AFSC, and Time in Service (TIS) are provided to 
better inform the reader of the experiences from which these comments were made.  To 
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that end, the time spent at locations considered to be involved with the pure pallet 
program (Part I, Item 7) and time spent involved with the pure pallet program at various 
functions (Part I, Item 9) are provided as well.   
Comments with any identifying personal information were edited appropriately.  
All comments are otherwise free from alteration and provided as submitted to this 
researcher through the WebSIRS program, except where specifically noted, and are not 
necessarily free from natural grammar and spelling errors.   
 
Case #: 54 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   10.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   24.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   96.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   12.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I think pure pallets are a good idea if there is enough cargo to do so. I do not think it is 
a good idea to send a pallet in this matter...example DOV-RMS with only RMS cargo 
on the pallet when there is AVB or MHZ cargo in the port at DOV. 
 
Case #: 69 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   19.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   26.00 
137 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   24.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
ATSEV and other metrics used should be discounted when considering Pure pallets 
 
Case #: 122 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   8.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   6.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I worked at Charleston AFB, shortly after Dovers building collapsed and the war 
began. I ran the Cargo floor. Being a small terminal it wasn't easy having all the excess 
cargo from Dover. As far as the Pure Pallet program I believe its easier to track the 
cargo but in the warehouse its not as efficient because if you can put two or three 
destinations on a pallet its easier to build. If you have to build pure pallets you either 
have to wait til you get enough for a pallet or under utilize the pallet. I am sure its more 
efficient on the WAR fighting side of the house because they get their supplies faster 
without having to look thru endless pallets to get what they need. So if thats the intent 
then its a good program 
 
Case #: 137 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-2 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   3.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   24.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
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Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I think some areas could be combined. The biggest issue with the pure pallet program is 
the PHT and waste of pallet use. You wait until the last minute with the cargo and then 
there can be only one item on a pallet. Just need to find more use of pallet and a/c 
space. 
 
Case #: 150 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   Other 
TIS (Years):   12.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   6.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
More education for everyone, not just for the logisticians involved in the program, but 
concentrated on them. 
 
Case #: 151 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   3.75 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   36.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The Pure Pallet Program helps lessen workload on cargo processing, but the only 
downfall is that there is less space used on each pallet. The biggest clear program flaw 
is that you must frustrate the entire pallet if a problem since there is only one TCN. 
 
Case #: 210 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   Other 
TIS (Years):   7.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Loss of Pallet utilization and PHT increase are my concerns. Cargo and aircraft 
utilization is lost as well when you put 3,000 lbs on one pallet and 1500 lbs of cargo on 
the other, when instead you could combine these pallets and save nets pallets and 
space. In concept this is great idea, in reality this will hurt productivity and increase 
costs of airlift and manpower. 
 
Case #: 220 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   9.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   12.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
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Recommended Improvements: 
If the main goal is to get the warfighter the piece quicker, then I think the Pure Pallet 
program is working. But it is sacrificing aircraft utilization when port hold times are 
implemented correctly. If the port still holds the shipments past the 72/120 hrs to 
ensure a reasonable utilization rate, then no, it's not faster. I don't know the total 
logistics/cost behind this recommendation, but here goes: As far as AMC losing pallet 
assets to the AOR's, have the unit's provide their own equipment (ISU 90s for example) 
to the DDC's, where they would have a working knowledge of the current route plans. 
The DDC would build up the ISU 90s according to the route plans and then send to the 
ports shipment ready. They currently generate pure pallets anyway, but they tend to get 
re-worked once arriving the port.(re-weighed, shipment settling, inadequate tie-down, 
etc.) If the DDC runs into a problem (like the ports) of not enough cargo for certain 
lanes, send it out on low-profile pallets to the ports, where they can finish building it up 
with their low volume lanes. Aircraft utilization is more important than truck 
utilization, and cheaper. 
 
Case #: 232 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   13.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   40.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   1.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I have not heard very much at alll about the program at McGuire AFB 
 
Case #: 237 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   2.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   1.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   3.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Utilize the Pure PAllet program ONLY for shipments within or to USCENTCOM 
APODs (waivering the requirements for 999 MICAP and highest priority cargo). That 
way, AMC doesn't waste money for normal en routes and CONUS Aerial Ports by 
increasing the PHT (subsequently causing significant backlog, customer dissatisfaction, 
and loss of airlift contracts with agencies; loosing money), increasing the amount of 
individual resources needed (Pallets and net sets beuing sent out 1/2 empty due to 
failure to utilize complete pallet capeabilities), and increase the amount of cargo on 
hand, causing cargo processors a more challenging job to inventory. I do however, feel 
the Pure Pallet program is a good idea for the war fighters, and those operating from 
the USCENTCOM AOR. It reduces personal risk, and time spent on jobs. That's great, 
but could we minimize the negative impact felt AMC-wide as a result of a broad 
program. It's like using a cannon to kill a mosquito when we create a new way of 
processing and transporting cargo to aleviate a moderate personal risk factor toward 
deployed personnel. But this is all just my opinion. What do I know... I'm just a Senior 
Airman. 
 
Case #: 257 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-2E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   14.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   3.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   3.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Changes need to be applied to the culture/thought process - people don't like change. 
 
Case #: 270 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-2 
AFSC:   2T2 
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TIS (Years):   2.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
8 hour shift and lunch breaks 
 
Case #: 277 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   31.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   6.00 
Time at APS (Months):   20.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   6.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Since I became aware of the pure pallet program, I have noticed a dramatic decrtease in 
the re-handling and re-constructing pallets. I have to read other material to obtain 
information on how the Pure Pallet program works and is supposed to work - and then 
hear contradictory statements from others in my career field. I believe it would benefit 
everyone if wew had a Web Based Training and/or ATSEV program devoted to the 
PURE pallet program. Supervisors and managers need to be on the same page of music 
when we work with subordinates on implementing and sustaining the spirit and intent 
of this program, and right now, differences remain with no clear direction or guidance. 
 
Case #: 313 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-3 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   1.75 
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Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   13.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
It is better to be able to take things out of the bay and put it onto a pallet; than to stop 
and make sure they baggage or regular cargo and can go together. It is suposed to work 
to make less braking but it don,t work because the JXX is is a bunch of differnt 
compeneys so we brake them eneyways. 
 
Case #: 317 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   15.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   48.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   6.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Distributions centers are required to fully take advantage of the intention of the Pure 
Pallet Program. Aerial Port/AMSs and TMOs should merge location in order to break 
pallets and get them distributed to the War Fighter 
 
Case #: 329 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   12.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
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Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   39.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Yes, I do have experience working with parting cargo for deployments but I don't know 
exactly what the pure pallet program is all about. I know how to load cargo, prepare 
cargo in the marshalling yard, etc...but I have never heard of the pure pallet program. 
Unless this is a new concept and has just been developed over the past few years. Even 
when doing my exportable course work I don't recall reading or testing on pure pallet 
program. 
 
Case #: 334 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   2.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   23.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
What is the pure pallet program? 
 
Case #: 340 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-6 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   26.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   24.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 1.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   8.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
First, it is not clear the intent of this survey. However, the intent of the pure pallet 
program was to reduce handling, reduce break-bulk requirements, reduce manpower 
requirements in the AOR. There is a better velocity in the AOR by the increased 
preparation prior to shipment to the AOR. Are there ways to improve the pure pallet 
concept is not the correct question, the correct question is are their ways to improve the 
Logistics Response Time of requisitions to the receipt in the fox hole or flight line. The 
easy response is Yes if you keep the cargo moving from requisition to receipt. But, the 
overall answer includes being able to move the cargo quickly with reduced handling 
and continual break-bulk operations. Pure pallet does this in the AOR with a time cost 
of preparation before reaching the AOR. 
 
Case #: 350 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-3 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   1.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I don't work in a freight section. At XXX I work fleet services and while deployed I 
worked in passenger services. Therefore I am completely ubfamiliar with the Pure 
Pallet Program besides what I have read online. I would recommend informing more 
transportation specialists about the program. 
 
Case #: 366 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   4.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   6.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   4.00 
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Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   2.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
While I was TDY to Kuwait International Airport (KWI), under the 5 EAMS, I worked 
as a load planner. I worked in close conjunction with the Theater Distribution Center 
(TDC) on Camp Arifjan. One the problems I experienced with the pure pallet program 
was that we would have B747's full of pure, ALOC, and "Do Not Break" pallets that 
showed the placard destination of KWI but were marked for locations in Iraq. We were 
instructed that these pallets were to be turned over to the TDC for processing. Myself 
and a couple otherof the loadplanners conducted a small experiment. We marked 
certain peices of cargo on some of these pallets in an inconspicuous way before they 
were turned over to the TDC. The reason we did this was that on a daily basis, we 
would recieve anywhere from 17-80 pallets from the TDC. Most of these pallets were 
2-3 skids, 45 inches tall, and 2500 pounds or less. We wanted to see where this cargo 
came from. As it turned out, the pallets that we sent the TDC (averaging 6000-8000 
pounds apiece) were being broken down and rebuilt as these low-profile, light weight, 
low cube pallets all destined for air shipment to Balad (they were being called "convoy 
avoidance" cargo). I fought and fought with the TDC/CC about building bigger pallets 
but they refused, citing that the pallets they were building were broken down per unit. I 
checked the shipping documentation on the cargo that we had marked. The cargo on 
the pallets we recieved from the states (CHS or DOV) were almost always "pure" with 
all the cargo on each going to the same DODAAC. Yet we were getting the same cargo 
back from one pallet, that we turned over to the TDC, on an average of 4-6 pallets. Just 
to give you an example, at one point I was recieving calls from TACC asking why we 
were only utilizing 36,000 pounds of the ACL on a C-5 (max ACL 150,000). I had to 
explain that the aircraft in question had 34 pallets on it (all we had for Balad at the 
time) and that was what we were recieving from the TDC. I would check into this 
process, if possible, to see if the TDC really needs to be going through all these pallets, 
rebuilding them on 4 times the assets and taking 4 times the airlift, to get the same 
amount of cargo downrange. 
 
Case #: 373 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   16.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   29.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   2.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I really feel our big problem is still trackin cargo. We need a way to recognize where 
everything we have ordered is located at. Once we fix our tracking it will help priority 
which will in turn reduce the load on the airlift logistics pipeline 
 
Case #: 404 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   15.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   1.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
pure pallet s should be built only for cosignor for the aor 
 
Case #: 411 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   14.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   2.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
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Establishing a priority of movement for pallets coded 999 and priority one. Example. 
B-747 arrives with 33 pallets on the upper deck. All 33 pallets are 999, a C-17 is on the 
deck waiting for an 18 pallet upload. The port uploads the aircraft with 18 pallets and 
the C-17 departs. On occasion, higher priority cargo on the aircraft is not moved. There 
needs to be a step higher than 999 to reduce user to port contact trying to locate pallets. 
Sounds trivial, but very time consuming to get a call from the user trying to locate their 
"important" pallets. 
 
Case #: 448 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   2.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   22.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   22.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
In the AOR utilizing the pure pallet program we are losing 30-40% of our materials. 
This is mainly from other organizations. The other organization picks up the pallet and 
trucks it away. That organization breaks the pallet down and leaves the straps, nets and 
the pallet on the ground and the mobility squadron never sees it again. When we get 
our pallets back they are extremely damaged. We have also seen Civil Engineering use 
our pallets to grade the roads with a 10k AT to level the road. Rarly does tie down ever 
return back to the origional sender. 
 
Case #: 452 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   17.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   23.00 
Time at APS (Months):   36.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   12.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
MAKE THE ARMY BECOME MORE EFFICIENT. GIVE US THE MANNING 
THAT THE ARMY WOULD USE FOR THE SAME JOB WE PERFORM, OR LET 
THE AIR FORCE TAKE OVER THE ARMY DISTRIBUTION POINTS WITH 
HALF THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS THEY USE. DREAM ABOUT IT...NO 
MORE TDC 
 
Case #: 462 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-3 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   1.75 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   2.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   16.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I have never heard of the pure pallet program. When is the briefing? 
 
Case #: 467 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   8.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   12.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   12.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
My perspective of the PPP was from the trans-load APOD in CENTCOM. We would 
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download PP from strat air and were able to more effectively move these pallets with 
reduced port hold times b/c we did not have to breakdown the pallets, sort the cargo for 
final end destination, process the cargo for those locations, build the cargo back up onto 
new pallets, forecast the mission, loadplan and manifest on the mission (with a full 
plane load, i.e., that pallet may have to wait in the backlog if there isn't anything else 
destined for the final location), then load and launch. Although these are typical Aerial 
Port processes, locations in CENTCOM are challenged with limited equipment, limited 
manpower, and, for the period that I was there, more aircraft on the ground than we 
could handle simultaneously. The priority is to download terminating cargo and clear 
the ramp of the jets so that Dips, crew days, quiet hours, slot times, etc. didn't delay the 
aircraft and further congest the ramp and put the port further behind in cargo handling. 
Cargo processing became a number 2 priority to what was happening on the ramp. The 
longer cargo processing is delayed, the longer your port hold times on cargo. With PP, 
virtually no rehandling was involved. We downloaded, re-loadplanned and manifested 
often full plane loads in less than 12 hours, easily. With the rehandling that mixed 
pallets required, sometimes it took us up to 24 hours to MAP out the cargo in the 
system, then hopefully we had a full plane load to justify a requirements-based run or 
there was a frequency mission already on the books. We very rarely received low-
profile PP that created inefficient use of intra-theater jets. When we did, we loaded 
loose cargo on top of it, annotated the addition on the loadplan, and phoned the 
downrange ATOC to let them know where those TCNs were. I understand that this 
may create extra work and some increased port hold times at the APOEs, but 
realistically, if this work wasn't done there, then we would be doing it in the field 
where we have less manpower, limited resources, and often more MOG. I'm sure the 
program could use some fine-tuning to help the APOEs but I cannot offer any 
suggestions without knowing what the standards are. I never heard of the PPP until we 
started receiving pallets marked PURE in the field. We thought that they were similar 
to ALOC pallets but quickly realized the difference when we started receiving full strat 
air loads marked this way. 
 
Case #: 474 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-2E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   12.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   14.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
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Recommended Improvements: 
RFID tag funding AF wide would help in addition to better Hand-held terminals for 
cargo processing and increased authorizations/funding for MHE. As a thru-put handler, 
pure pallet means more hands on--breaking pallets down and sorting to achieve pure 
pallets. With more funding we can obtain necessary cargo management equipment. 
With the right equipment we can achieve the pure pallet and RFID tag vision. 
 
Case #: 482 
Component:   Guard 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   21.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   16.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
There needs to be more commuinication at the supervisor level between the ports hubs 
and the AOR. I would be glad to discuss this further I have been on both sides. It is an 
excellent idea IT DOES SAVE LIVES!!!!!!!!! I would be glad to communicate further 
about it. 
 
Case #: 502 
Component:   Guard 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   30.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   14.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
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When part of a shipment is missing the whole pallet is put to the side and goes off to 
the side, it may continue or may not. It may be delayed or may not. It should never be 
delayed. The warfighter may need something that is still left on the remainder of the 
pallet at the time that he is expecting it. We should let the receiver decide not Aerial 
Port. It is better to receive 9 boxes out of ten then zero. Who the hell are we to decide 
what the unit on the battle line needs. We forget that they are priorty. They get what 
they need. As the song goes 2 out of 3 ain't bad. But zero is worse. Don't delay the 
shipment just continue the shipment and make note at what point the item/box was 
missing. We should use more airlift then have our service members die in convoys. If it 
requires placing 2T2x1 on the aircraft with a forklift to offload the aircraft at a forward 
location then so be it. Just like the forklifts on the back of flat bed trucks that are 
hauling sod/concrete/stone/etc going down the road at construction sites we could do 
the same. Well so much for my 2 cents. Good luck on your survey. 
 
Case #: 515 
Component:   Guard 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   4.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   12.00 
Time at APS (Months):   19.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
more man power needed at charleston afb 
 
Case #: 522 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   4.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   28.00 
Time at APS (Months):   48.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   16.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I don't know what pure pallet program is. It would be helpful if units have a briefing 
explaining what pure pallet program is, its advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Case #: 544 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   20.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   9.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   24.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   6.00 
Time at Other (Months):   12.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Pure pallet program will work if the deploying units builds a complete pallet and 
delivers that pallet to a single location. If the pallet has to be broken down and wait for 
additional items to fill the pallet, the labor, management and time outweight the cost 
benefit. 
 
Case #: 551 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   21.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I was deployed to XXXXXXX in 2005 as the Aerial Port Superintendent. The pure 
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pallet program is a good idea in concept, however, aircraft underutilization and pallet 
backlog was my biggest frustration. An example. Two pure pallets came in, one 
weighed 800 lbs, the other weighed 1000 lbs. One contained empty cardboard boxes 
and the other contained the box tops. They came in on the same truck. Why couldn't 
they be combined? This is a waste of aircraft. I feel that DDKS and TDC should have 
held cargo in their posession longer and built larger/heavier pallets which would reduce 
aircraft underutilization, fuel, labor, MHE and backlog numbers. The increased backlog 
slowed cargo movement significantly during my tour in Kuwait. I voiced this concern 
several times to TDC and DDKS but my understanding is that there was a civilian labor 
contract involved which stated these contract employees had to build a quota of pallets 
per day. Otherwise, why are we wasting our assets trying to move cargo only to 
bottleneck the flow at aerial ports? 
 
Case #: 557 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   5.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   25.00 
Time at APS (Months):   23.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   2.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
As a little background, i implemented the Pure Pallet Program at XXX AFB in 2004... i 
have a lot of knowledge and can still get my hands on a lot fo data if you need it for 
your project. I also did a LEAN event on the PPP at XXX in May 2005 which i have 
data on. i am no longer stationed at XXX, but have PCS to XXX. DSN XXX if you 
have questions. Too many folks get their fingers into this program who do not have an 
adequate grasp of the initial and primary goals. this is not a "fix all" for every 
location... but it is a damn good one for the current CENTAF AOR... key word being 
current. Recommend this be at the forefront before implementation in other areas, such 
as PACAF. PPP requires a large generation of cargo, otherwise a/c utilization will be 
extremely low, as well as 463L assets will be diminished. Improvements: 1. First and 
Foremost!!! Upgrade GATES to actually be used with the PPP... i could go on and on 
with this topic! 2. Develop an AMC-wide standardized process flow (currently handled 
differently at all locations) 3. Improve feedback within GTN and GATES during Route 
Plan changes 4. Implement a help desk at Scott of PPP issues with the systems ... that 
is, a 24 hours help desk! 5. Streamline the acceptance of cargo at the ports by 
consolidating the inbound TMO function with the APS function (we were very 
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successful at XXX after we did this) 6. Get all the Damn Generals and Staff officers 
who think they need inputs into this program out of it! :) Hope this helps... call or 
email! Captain XXX 
 
Case #: 559 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   16.75 
Time at PPP (Months):   114.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Since most of the pure pallets have been ALOCs some of the questions here are not 
exactly above-board. The program itself is a fantastic idea that was implemented as 
needed, but we could've been doing this my whole career. It's not always feasible, but it 
does make work easier when done properly. 
 
Case #: 560 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   14.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   81.00 
Time at APS (Months):   81.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Implementing the pure pallet concept is a great idea I really think that it causes 
significantly increased PHT on certain APODs that don't receive much cargo. What is 
the purpose of intransit HUBs such as RMS, IUD or FRU if we're building all pallets 
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pure to the ultimate destination? Utilize the HUBs as they were originally designed and 
press forward! 
 
Case #: 582 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-2E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   15.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   31.00 
Time at APS (Months):   31.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
We should continue to monitor the amount of flow to a consignee. If it's not being 
properly utilized, then combine the lane with another Pure lane in the same region. 
 
Case #: 596 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   21.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   259.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Advertise the program more. I have no knowledge of the program. I don't know what's 
expected or if my unit is meeting the goals of the program. 
 
Case #: 607 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3E 
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AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   13.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   18.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I worked as a TACC Cargo Bookie in the West Cell. Aircraft were grossly under ACL 
but, full of pallets averaging about 600LBS (prepacked fromDLA) out of SUU and 
1500LBS (prepacked from DLA) out of CHS. I feel that port hold times increased and 
there was no better utilization of pallets, ACLs or TWCF goals due to PP. Before PP, 
CHS was able to regularly exceed 37 S.T. ACL on C-17s and 90 S.T. on 747s. The 
problem lies with the Army controlling the MCTs and JMCs and their lack of 
knowledge on how to process cargo. It is like a water balloon, squeeze it hard and it 
buldges on the other end. PPTs decreased on the APOD while increasing on the APOE. 
What is needed is education, enforcement and accountability on the Army side--a few 
more LROs (Field Grade) would improve the JMCs. 
 
Case #: 645 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   16.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   24.00 
Time at APS (Months):   21.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
incorporate a GATES checks and balances to alleviate all impure pallets, human error 
is too great. 
 
Case #: 655 
Component:   Active 
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Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   2.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   18.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
make big easy to read labels of consignees to hasten the sorting process. ensure labels 
are in place on cargo prior to entering the dts. 
 
Case #: 665 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   16.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   192.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Develope better method to replace damaged materials. Like a maitenance and 
repleshishment system that would assure quality. 
 
Case #: 689 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   8.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AMS (Months):   96.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I think that we should implement the Pure pallet Program with more carriers and not 
limit it to certain types of cargo. I believe that it would improve our PHT if most of the 
cargo coming into us was already palletized. It would only need an inspection to verify 
that it is airworthy. 
 
Case #: 695 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   15.75 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   31.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   7.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I feel that more training is needed for the Defense Logistic Agencys who are building 
pure pallets, to ensure the pallets are being build to Air Force Standards. 
 
Case #: 705 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   19.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   6.00 
Time at APS (Months):   1.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   36.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   4.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   1.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The pure pallet program does not work. If we rely Army/KBR to diliver cargo to the 
final destination they will lose it every time. We (AMC) have never had a problem 
getting the cargo to the fight (AOR) the folks in the AOR are the ones who can't keep 
from losing the cargo. It's only a Band Aid to a bigger problem. 
 
Case #: 717 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-3 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   2.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   8.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I think it would be better if the pallets were built to the max hight, i see a lot of pallets 
that are around 60in to 72in in hight. 
 
Case #: 719 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   7.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   92.00 
Time at APS (Months):   92.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
GET RID OF IT!!!!!! You are making our job HARDER! 
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Case #: 730 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   12.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   9.00 
Time at APS (Months):   12.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The pallet placard should have a PURE or NON-PURE indicator. 
 
Case #: 733 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   6.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   36.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The program has greatly helped within CENTCOM AOR. Provide more resources to 
move pallets intratheater using the program. Also educate units within CENTCOM 
about the program, many deployed personnel are not familiar with the program unless 
they have been stationed at a major aerial port. 
 
Case #: 740 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-3 
AFSC:   2T2 
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TIS (Years):   0.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   10.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   10.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
as the pure pallet is good, i think the major downfall on it is that the port hold time is to 
long, especially for the warfighter 
 
Case #: 754 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-1E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   13.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   12.00 
Time at APS (Months):   12.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I've talked with Army Transportation Officers who benefit greatly from the pure pallet 
system when they are down range. Even if it may decrease pallet utilization and port 
hold time, if it make the job of those troops who are fighting down range easier - it is 
worth keeping. This system helps ensure that the correct pallets and cargo get to the 
right people in the AOR in a more efficient manner. Certainly this survey needs to be 
directed to those who actually benefit from it (Army etc...) before the AF even 
considers abolishing it. 
 
Case #: 755 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   3.92 
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Time at PPP (Months):   24.00 
Time at APS (Months):   20.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   24.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   8.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Better for downrange- less confusion as to destination. Although many pallets go out 
very small due to this, and much of the plane acl is wasted. Makes my job more easly 
down range, but frustrates me at home station due to the sight of cargo building up and 
more work in sight for future on top of your shoulders. Either way- good or bad. I 
would stick with the pure pallet standard. 
 
Case #: 795 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   13.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   5.00 
Time at APS (Months):   74.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   74.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
PHT will be increased waiting for airlift to AOR locations. Reg. Mail Pure Pallets are a 
plus to decrease lost or misdirected mail and siq serve pieces also. Large quanity 
pallets(piece count)should always be pure pallet. breaking these type pallets to find one 
or 2 pieces that might terminate is very time consuming. Loose loading on AC to 
increase inventory at large bases would help some. I've seen a lot of AC space wasted 
that could be used for smaller items the rule "if it's not on a pallet it does not go" seems 
to be the norm. 
 
Case #: 803 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
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TIS (Years):   4.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   2.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   24.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   1.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
the pure pallet program is good if you have the trucks to back it up if you do not the 
program should be abandoned! It takes 3 min to intrans a pallet and put it on a truck. If 
not and the pallet has to be broken and the program is a wash and all of the work done 
by the other bases is for nothing!!!!! 
 
Case #: 812 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   8.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   24.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   12.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Please provide your users (builders/breakers) with the tools and lessions needed to 
utilize this program at the bottom level. At XXX I worked for at least a year with this 
program and only got the knowledge that if it wasnt all the same consignee we could 
not move it for (120 hrs for Army and 72 hrs for marines). There were many planes we 
could have sent the stuff on if we would have been able to send it together. Maybe if 
we could mix a couple consignees it would make it more practile for us. Or if we were 
able to split the pallets by pallet covers, then we would be able to get the items down to 
the warfighter quicker. For now waiting the 120 or 72 hrs so that a pallet can be mixed 
together seems to be time wasted when our guys/gals need it the most. V/R SSgt XXX, 
DSN XXX 
 
Case #: 902 
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Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   13.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   81.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
In order to ensure maximum pallet utelization, the pure pallet program should be 
flexible enough to allow cargo of different destinations but geographically close 
locations should occasionally be allowed to be put on the same pallet. 
 
Case #: 904 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   13.75 
Time at PPP (Months):   52.00 
Time at APS (Months):   30.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   8.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The pipeline to the AOR is working great, however within the AOR is another story. 
AMD controls all routes based on cargo backlogs. We have sent many planes out of 
stations empty becuase of AMD rules. I suggest going back to the hub and spoke to 
streamline the flow of cargo within the AOR. 
 
Case #: 907 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-6 
AFSC:   21R 
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TIS (Years):   23.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   12.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   12.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   48.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Another dumb idea developed because we cannot articulate No to the US Army. 
TRANSCOM has put pilots in critical leadership positions in logistics and trans 
positions that have no background or experience other than flying cargo planes. they 
have never built a pallet or experienced the wharehouse sorting operations...Dumb 
Dumb Dumb 
 
Case #: 932 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   17.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   6.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I really am not familiar with this program. 
 
Case #: 964 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   16.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   127.00 
Time at APS (Months):   53.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   12.00 
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Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The concern for Pure Pallet Desintations that only have a few small items. Example of 
5 pieces, 1 cube each. This is a complete waste of a pallet position. Pallets of this 
nature are being moved on a daily basis just because Port Hold Time (PHT) hours are 
exceding the limit. This is not a cost effective movment and should be reviewed if the 
channel is required as a pure channel more than what it is now. I would have to 
reccomend Monthly review. ThanX, TSgt XXX 
 
Case #: 989 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   11.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   13.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Better communication of goals/intent/procedures of pure pallet program to Army 
A/DACGs 
 
Case #: 1003 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   24.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   105.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   12.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
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Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Breakbulk pallets in a TDC/RDC in the AOR. This would increase surface node 
capability to carry more cargo to warfighter. It also reduces dramatically the loss of 
463L assets. 
 
Case #: 1004 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   35.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   5.00 
Time at APS (Months):   312.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
1. I SEE THE ADVANTAGES OF AMC RECIEVING PURE PALLETS FROM 
CONSOLIDATION POINTS THIS PROCESS DOSE ENTER THE PALLET INTO 
THE LOADPLANNING PROCESS MUCH QUICKER AND LESS TIME IN 
INVANTORY. 2. CREATING A PURE PALLET AT THE AMC PORT LOCATION 
WOULD CAUSE A DELAY DUE TO ACUMULATING CARGO TO BUILD A 
WORTHY PALLET BEFORE CLOSEING IT OUT. THIS CAUSES A LONGER ON 
HAND INVANTORY. 3. PURE PALLET SHOULD NOT BE USED WHEN 
SHIPPING VALID ( 999 ) OR GREEN SHEET CARGO THIS SHOULD BE 
PROCESSED ASAP AND NOT WAIT FOR SAME DODAAC CARGO TO SHOW 
UP BEFORE LOAD PLANNING. THESE TYPES OF CARGO SHOULD ALSO BE 
SENT DIRECTLY TO THE PORT WITH THE CHANNEL AND SHIPPED FIFO 
ACCORDING TO COMMODITY,AND NOT SENT TO A CCP SOME TIMES THE 
SHIPMENT PASSES THE PORT ON THE WAY TO THE CCP AND THAT'S NOT 
GOOD PLANNING. 4. FEEL FREE TO E-MAIL XXX, XXX - TRAFFIC 
MANAGEMENT SECIALIST ALSO USAFR XXX AERIAL PORT SQ. 35 YRS 
TRANSPORTATION EXP "THANKS FOR TRYING TO MAKE THINGS BETTER 
FOR THE WAR FIGHTER" MSGT XXX 
 
Case #: 1019 
Component:   Active 
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Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   3.75 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   12.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The Pure Pallet program is a very efficient program for destinaitons with high 
inbound/outbound rates. It saves the warehouse employee time in breaking pallets 
down and redistributing pieces, because all of the pieces are either terminating or in-
transit. At smaller destinations that do not have a high inbound/outbound rate it is 
harder for them to recieve their cargo, because most of the time the bigger ports will 
wait to build a pallet until there is enough cargo to fully utilize a pallet. They also 
HAVE to wait until there is an aircraft headed to their destination, wich could take days 
depending on the saturation of the airlift system. Overall i think the program is good, 
but the redistribution process from BIG ports needs to be tweeked. With the RF tag 
system, customers want to know why their pieces are sitting in a big port. Sometimes it 
all comes down to not having an aircraft going to that destinatoin. That would be the 
area that i would try and improve the most, leveling out the aircraft inbound and 
outbound of big and small ports. Utilizing the airlift system to get the parts to the 
people when they need it. Not making a pure pallet wait at one destination, for an 
aircraft to take it to its destination. 
 
Case #: 1029 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   5.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
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Recommended Improvements: 
I have not dealt with the pure pallet program, so I am unable to give a fair analysis of 
this program. 
 
Case #: 1042 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   21.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   1.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Everyone neets to be working on the same page with this program. If the 2T2s building 
the pallet do not fully understand then the program will faultier. 
 
Case #: 1050 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   9.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   19.00 
Time at APS (Months):   19.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I was at XXX during the beginning of our involvement in this initiative. It was one of 
several that we were executing on behalf of HQ AMC and USTRANSCOM (active 
RFID and IDCs being two others). Every time you add a "non-standard" initiative to 
the units, management attention increases. The pure pallet program isn't covered in the 
DTR or AMC Vol 11 of Vol 9, so we had to invent procedures locally to ensure 
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compliance. Due to low volumes, the standards given to us by HQ AMC were very 
difficult to meet. We had to "perfect", because we could not get 90% since we didn't do 
enough pallets. We eventually got enough of the DoDAACS we serviced added to the 
pure pallet listing so that we could be in compliance. Initially, the OPR for the program 
in the CONUS didn't know we were shipping the volume of cargo we were to Iraq, and 
the so we had to do a lot of work to get lanes built that worked for us. My 
recommendations are to incorportate these procedures into applicable DoD and AF-
level guidance at the next re-write, and to ensure that lanes are built that work for the 
warfighter as well as the ports. Providing feedback from downrange on the success of 
the program is also helpful. I couldn't answer with certainty if the program was 
working downrange, since I haven't seen the program from the other end. Building the 
pallets pure earlier in the process is also good, as started happening with DDSP and 
some of our other high-volume shippers. Thanks. 
 
Case #: 1052 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   24.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   25.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I am the Unit Training Manager for the XX APS, XXX. I am very involved in the 
training program for all of our personnel, and I never received any info regarding the 
Pure Pallet Program. Perhaps it does not pertain to the AFRES. 
 
Case #: 1059 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   15.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   2.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   2.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I was forward deployed to Baghdad and also Manas. We saw pure pallets coming 
through, but just kept them moving through the system to the final destination. 
 
Case #: 1060 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   14.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   46.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   24.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I think the cargo has to be moved as soon as it gets to the ports, instead of holding it 
until there is enough cargo for any given consignee. If the cargo moves as soon as it 
arrives to the ports, the receiver would get it sooner. 
 
Case #: 1075 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-2 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   3.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   24.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
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I worked at an Arial Port in ACC that only had a few AMC Flights each month, so I 
don't have much feedback to give to this survey. One thing that upsets the "sender" 
about the pure pallet program is that it usually minimizes the amount of cargo we can 
deploy on one aircraft. 
 
Case #: 1085 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   6.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   1.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   6.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
We should try to make as many pure pallets as posible but you should also make mixed 
pallets to insure max utilization of the aircraft 
 
Case #: 1095 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   4.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   13.00 
Time at APS (Months):   13.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   3.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
An area to consider is for pure pallets that move to outlying FOBs within the AOR. 
Once the cargo hits the theater, the Army takes responsibility for its movement and 
goes through either the Theater Distribution Center or the Corps Distribution Center. 
Depending on the working relationship with the leadership of these locations, cargo 
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moves on the first thing smoking or it sits for a couple weeks until there isn't enough 
cargo to fill a convoy. Additionally, the personnel working with the Theater 
Distribution Center at Camp Doha have to deal with WWX cargo (as of a year ago) and 
have to transport it to Ali Al Salem and then arrange movement from there to its 
destination. While this isn't directly related to pure pallets, surely there is a method to 
include cargo like this in the packing from the depot. One issue we were having while I 
was at Charleston is that if there isn't enough cargo to build a pure pallet, the PHT 
would go up tremendously (in some cases 200+ hours) until there was enough cargo to 
make a pallet and then it would go into the cargo backlog. While working at the TDC, I 
would see pure pallets coming from Dover or Charleston that had been placarded a 
week or two earlier than the day it arrived. If the goal is to get supplies to the 
warfighter in the shortest possible time, we're failing in this respect. Perhaps the ports 
can get lists of geographically collocated FOBs and mixed pallets can be built to ensure 
units are getting what they need in a reasonable amount of time. 
 
Case #: 1103 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   21.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   48.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   36.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   12.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I thought the Army was utilizing the pure pallet system but they called it ALOC. I was 
TDY to Balad during the intial build up as a channel msn. CHS would build ARMY 
pallets and stick one AF piece on the pallet. We would have to break the pallet to find 
the one piece. Pure pallets are the way to go. 
 
Case #: 1120 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   12.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   36.00 
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Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
CONUS TMO / LRS need to move pure pallets to consignee as intended, instead of 
breaking pallets down into loose cargo and loose loading onto trucks, just to save 
money. When we incheck a pure pallet, TMOs occassionally have us break the pallets 
in order to fit more cargo loose onto a truck. 
 
Case #: 1124 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   22.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   16.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
AMC must get fully onboard with the program. Port Hold Time should no longer be the 
sole metric for Aerial Port Operations Officers. Service to the Warfighter exceeds the 
benefit of the PHT measure. As a Centcom staff officer, and the lead on the Pure Pallet 
Initiative within the CENTCOM AOR the program has benefits to the Warfighter 
beyond the issues of PHT. Aircraft utilization has not dropped below acceptable levels 
and the program should be expanded beyond the CENTCOM AOR. Times have 
changed and our customers needs should drive our service levels. 
 
Case #: 1139 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-2E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   13.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
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Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   48.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I spent 134 days at Manas AB and this topic was never discussed. My folks were from 
Dover and again this program was not discussed. If there is a hard push then it needs to 
be advertised. Everyone needs to know about it and understand the intentions. 
 
Case #: 1150 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   22.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Increase Pacific locations serviced via pure pallet. 
 
Case #: 1167 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   5.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   65.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I think that there needs to be more training on the pure pallet program 
 
Case #: 1178 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   14.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   4.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The intentions of the program were never explained to anyone. The little I do know 
seems to be a good concept. When in the AOR, I saw pallets being under-utilized cube-
wise and frequently, there was no visibility of certain TCNs on these pallets. 
 
Case #: 1206 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   11.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   1.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   6.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I am currently at XXX AFB. We've had pure pallets coming through here which would 
make it a lot easier to get cargo to the base. The only problem we are having here is 
TNO is contracted and they usually do not pick up pure pallets if it is going to different 
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cosignees regardless if its on the base or not. Thier only concern is cargo going to the 
host unit supply. Maybe a look into thier system would allow us to see more benifits of 
the pure pallet system. 
 
Case #: 1220 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   4.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   44.00 
Time at APS (Months):   13.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   4.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The 120 Hour PHT limit on Pure consignees sometimes makes it difficult to build full 
pallets of pure cargo. Often we do not accumulate enough of a certain consignee to 
require a pallet, but due to the standards, we are forced to waste pallets on the minimal 
pieces anyway. (2 5lb boxes or a 1lb envelope in a tri-wall, strapped to a pallet for 
example) I understand that the TCN needs to be palletized and or manifested to stop the 
PHT from adding up, but there has to be a better way. We need these to be monitored 
by load planning and manifested as loose cargo if the time limit is reached, but a 
feasible amount of cargo has not accumulated. 
 
Case #: 1242 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   19.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   30.00 
Time at APS (Months):   26.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
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Recommended Improvements: 
Pallets coming out of CCP need to be 100% airlift able. About 10 percent of the pure 
pallets have to be fixed by us 2T2, slow down the pallets onward movement. Find ways 
to decrease light pallet. Meaning, once cargo reached 120 hours no matter one box or 
two it must be palletized to elevate it going over 120 hr. 
 
Case #: 1244 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   13.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   96.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   24.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The recommendations are to have better equipment given to the units. Trying to 
implement "pure" pallets with insufficient tiedown is difficult. When these pallets are 
coming to the "Ports" with BAD nets/warped pallets, it makes everyone's job more 
difficult. However, if the pallets are good to go, then very simple process. Also, the 
ports don't have the resources anymore to supply every unit on base. Each unit needs to 
purchase their "own" pallets/nets. When cargo goes out, the pallets go with, when it 
comes back, the units must, must, must verify they have their tiedown also... 
 
Case #: 1248 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   17.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   24.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
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Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The Pure Pallet program is a good concept except when a unit shifts in the AOR the 
pallet has to be broken and rebuilt. Not all pieces have TCN's so one could be left 
guessing. When a pallet is looked at as a pure pallet for war fighters and their is HHG's 
for personnel PCS's to a location or new furniture for an officier how is that helping the 
war fighters. Equipment is equipment to help keep the war fighter moving, food, 
rations ammo, tents, vehicle parts. Sure morale is a positive thing but bumping cargo 
from a A/C for someones desk and file seems wrong. Taking off up armor for humvees 
so someone can have chairs? Which one of those might save a life a chair or armor. I 
think that the pure pallet should have it's limits when the users dictate what is on the 
pallet. Also the AMD folks should use track and trace in the GATES system to get a 
pallet ID under the pure pallet and not a TCN that is put in the system because have of 
the TCN's they pass are messed up. 
 
Case #: 1258 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   19.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   159.00 
Time at APS (Months):   12.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   12.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
For originating station, the need for straps has increased greatly due to small pallets 
because of port hold time. We have built 5 lbs boxes on 463L wasting the pallet. The 
benifit to the hostile area is evident at OR5, but when plts are mis-directed from CHS 
via ADA to OR5 airlift to correct was hard. 
 
Case #: 1263 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   14.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   72.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
181 
Time at AMS (Months):   72.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
More education and message traffic concerning the program such as goals, met goals, 
and outlook. 
 
Case #: 1278 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   10.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   31.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   8.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   6.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   16.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
When using the term "Pure Pallet", I'm not sure I understand if this is a new spin on 
"Pallets and Nets" as was/is known, so I answered accordingly to the "P/N" program 
that I am familiar with. If the "Pure Pallet" program is something different, then neither 
I nor my tropps have ever heard about it. 
 
Case #: 1287 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   10.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   3.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
We have put too much on the AIR portion of the pure pallet process. The air lines of 
comm have been established to move cargo from APOE to the Warfighter. More 
surface mvt needs to happen instead of airlift moving cargo. Especially with limited 
Airlift assets available to EUCOM and CENTCOM. 
 
Case #: 1308 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-6 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   25.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   25.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   8.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I spent 8 months in MultiNational Forces Iraq (Baghdad). The pure pallet program 
appears to work well to most APODs, howewer, there are still problems with visibility 
to the final destination (Army forces do not process their receipts in SARSS) and you 
still find abuse of 463Ls (including stacks at Arifjan that may or may not be serviceable 
and may or may not be awaiting immediate use). To get most efficient implementation 
of the pure pallet initiative, we need to get control of all the nets and pallets. 
 
Case #: 1347 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   20.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   12.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   24.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   24.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   36.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I don't know where we are and what the "desired" direction is. While the program 
works in a clean world, I'm uncertain really whether it added value or detracted 
particularly from what realistically a short deployment phase without a great deal of 
disruptions. 
 
Case #: 1356 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   12.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   15.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 4.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Apologies for all of the "neither" responses. I've been joint for the last 14 months, and 
have no idea about the facts of how pure pallet initiativie is working. I believe in the 
concept, but can't weigh in with informed perceptions. 
 
Case #: 1362 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   17.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   18.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   48.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   24.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 4.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   18.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
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Remember that it's not a band-aid....it's not the best program for ALL End to End (E2E) 
situations. For example, it works well in CENTCOM due to the rougher logistic 
infrastructure and the hostile (literally) environment. However, it may not have the 
same overall efficiencies in EUCOM or PACOM, where the distribution systems are 
very mature/robust and no one's shooting at anyone. My opinion: it's a tool in the 
toolkit for USTC/AMC to provide better service, but should only be one of many tools 
in the toolkit. Thus endeth the lesson.....cheers! 
 
Case #: 1368 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   3.75 
Time at PPP (Months):   46.00 
Time at APS (Months):   36.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
To reduce the PHT on some cargo you should allow units that have the airlift. For 
example you have RMS as an in transit port. When Dover gets some cargo that is left 
over after the pure pallet is built, these little pcs of cargo just sit and build up PHT and 
the war fighter is not get the supplies, why not build a mixed pallet to RMS and then 
can break it down and rebuild so it can still flow through the airlift system. At least the 
cargo is half way there. On occasion special may build a mixed cargo pallet to RMS 
which accepts many different destinations, but this is not happening nor is it allowed at 
DOV for the general cargo side of the house. 
 
Case #: 1379 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   18.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   28.00 
Time at APS (Months):   18.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
185 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Pure pallet and TDD's are conflicting programs. If there isn't enough cargo for that 
specific pure lane don't send the pallet out with just one or two peices on it; consolidate 
with another lane or allow for loose loading of cargo. 
 
Case #: 1388 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   3.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   8.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I've learned how to build pallets through OJT. 
 
Case #: 1396 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   11.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   36.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   36.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   6.00 
Time at Other (Months):   6.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
We must continue to educate everyone in the process as to the intent and process of the 
pure pallet program. There have been problems, increased costs, and in some cases, 
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increased wait times but that is not as much of a reflection of the program as it is the 
implementation and management of the program. 
 
Case #: 1398 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-3 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   1.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   19.00 
Time at APS (Months):   15.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The program works well for high volume consignee's. However there are many 
consignees that recieve minimal cargo and the mixing of pallets is needed for pallet 
utilization and quicker delivery into the AOR. 
 
Case #: 1403 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-6 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   22.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   36.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 4.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I am currently XXX CC at XXX and do not deal will Pure pallets here. My dealings 
with it was at USTRANSCOM as Air Ops Chief and I was on the first CDDOC at 
Arifjan when Pure pallests started. Seemed like a good idea. I answered a lot of "4" 
above; just not as close to it anymore. vr XXX 
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Case #: 1407 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   29.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   42.00 
Time at APS (Months):   12.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   7.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Roll out to Res components 
 
Case #: 1423 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-2E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   16.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   48.00 
Time at APS (Months):   18.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
First and foremost implement the Slave Pallet initiative. Current 463L pallet 
supplies are in high demand and hard to retrieve from the AOR. The slave pallet would 
establish a significant cost savings while meeting the tenants of the Pure Pallet 
program. Secondly, solidify DODAACs and only update on set intervals. This will 
allow for more predictability in the program and its updates. Thirdly, only allow the 
DODAACs with the heaviest of cargo flow to the most remote areas utilize the pure 
pallet program. This would maximize pallet utilization while giving those warfighters 
in danger the support they require. Finally, increase manning at applicable aggregate 
APOEs to offset this increased effort. 
 
188 
Case #: 1424 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-9 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   22.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   20.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   20.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
There is an increased workload and cost by the shippers and ports, but it is work the 
benefits to the warfighter. None of the questions matter near as much as two: Is the 
warfighter getting their cargo in a timely matter and are duplicate ordering decreased? 
 
Case #: 1430 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   18.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   4.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Ensure bases that have Supply or trans under civilian contract are aware this is the way 
of the future. At my present base, we have discussions daily on what the disposition 
procedures are for pure pallets. PACAF is about 1 month from completing the "test" 
period. I think the pure pallet program should be enforced Air Force wide. it is a huge 
benefit not only to the war fighter but day to day ops also. 
 
Case #: 1437 
Component:   Active 
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Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   13.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   94.00 
Time at APS (Months):   84.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   10.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   4.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Change the 120 hour PHT standard down to 96 or 72. The current 120 hour standard is 
absurd. Do not make little pieces of cargo wait so long for a ride. Allow small pieces 
that have greater than 72 or 96 hours to be loaded loose. The program is working as it 
is intended. the benifets outweigh the costs in the long run. Do not abandon the 
program, it just needs a little improvement. 
 
Case #: 1448 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   23.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   175.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
There should be a hands on training course for the program. 
 
Case #: 1494 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   9.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
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Time at APS (Months):   48.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   30.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   6.00 
Time at Other (Months):   29.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I have never even heard of the pure pallet concept untill this survey was sent to me. 
 
Case #: 1500 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   8.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   8.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   8.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
This survey is the first mention I have heard of the Pure Pallet Program. Since Jan 2004 
(the date mentioned in the survey) I have been stationed at Ramstein and currently 
stationed at Incirlik and see pure destination pallets daily destined for various points in 
the AOR. Incirlik is currently operating a "Cargo Hub" delivering pure pallets all over 
Iraq direct to the destination where the cargo is required and reducing the number of 
convoys required to deliver the cargo. But there has been no prior mention by 
Squadron, Group or higher leadership about the "Pure Pallet Program". Therefore my 
responses are "Neither" and "Strongly Disagree". I cannot accurately respond to this 
survey without more knowledge of this program. 
 
Case #: 1505 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   12.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   24.00 
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Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   12.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   12.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   24.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Outstanding program with lots of potential. Keep the warfighter as the focus as the 
program is refined. More improvement is need with Info systems to help with 
synchronization and pallet management. Look at better integration of info system 
outside the airlift system (e.g. GATES and CMOS) 
 
Case #: 1508 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   O-6 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   24.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   6.00 
Time at APS (Months):   282.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   6.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I am a strong supporter of the pure pallet program. However, I beleive that pure pallets 
should be held longer to make maximum utilization of the airframe aviability. 
Additionally, getting the pallets back from the end user seems to be the biggest issue 
with the program. My recommendation is to utilized more skids in palletizing cargo or 
disposable pallets to allow the volocity to continue while keeping the 463L assets in the 
Aerial Port control. 
 
Case #: 1524 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   20.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   49.00 
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Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   1.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
It's a great benefit to the warfighter and I believe it allows the cargo to transistion 
through supply/cargo hubs quicker. It reduces aircraft utilization rates, reduces average 
pallet weight, and increases number of aircraft required to get the job done. If contracts 
were written better it could be eliminated at major downrange hubs, and consolidation 
points need to be better utilized. KWI, for example...sends trucks forward with a full 5 
pallets, but only 1/4th of the truck capacity which causes another truck to be generated 
for the next pallets. This increases trucks...convoys..personel in grave danger..etc. Pure 
pallets should be utilized for small sites or areas where loads must move quickly due to 
force protection, but for large hubs like KWI/RMS etc., it costs us some bang for the 
buck. 
 
Case #: 1535 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   22.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   72.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   9.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
This survey seems to really be biased. From an arieal port point of view, I wouldn't 
have access to the entire pipeline data, that is info that would most likely be visable to 
DLA and briefed at MAJCOM level. Recently TACC placed some security measures 
on their web-sites which had this data (weekly) and annual compliations, so now if I 
am curious, I need my squadron commander's permission to access it now. It doesn't 
address the issues/problems we experienced in the field when some of the DEPOTS 
only built pallets for commercial aircraft, and we needed them to be configured for C-
130 aircraft in order to expidite movement to end destination. We experienced this 
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problem Jan 2005 to May 2005 with cargo coming from CHS to OR9. 
 
Case #: 1540 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-5 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   15.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 4.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
While working in the CDDOC the largest problem we had with the pure pallet was the 
small units who couldn't fullfill a complete pallet immediately and had to wait for 
additional or mixed assets. As the program matures units should be familiar enough 
with requirements and that should eliminate this issue. 
 
Case #: 1549 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   21.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   30.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Include color coded placards for quick identification. 
 
Case #: 1565 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
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AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   13.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   2.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   2.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I think it is a good program. Information needs to be distributed to more people to be 
more effective. 
 
Case #: 1575 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   14.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Just one point to make. My only exposure to the Pure Pallet program was as leader of 
an aerial port team off-loading pure pallets at Al Asad. The issue for me, at that level, 
was "what is a pure pallet?" Is it all cargo destined for a particular base? Service? At Al 
Asad what would happen is we would get a pure pallet from the DLA distribution ctr at 
New Cumberland. It might have an Army TCN on it (because it is mostly Army stuff). 
It took us about 2 1/2 months to realize that there is often other cargo on the pallet 
belonging to civilian contractors, Marine Aviation, Marine ground, Army, Navy 
Seabees, etc. The reason that is a problem is that at Al Asad we would not break down 
the cargo and call the units. What we did is call the Army to come get their cargo, they 
would come get it, take it down to the Army movement control area and then break it 
down and call the appropriate unit to come get it. Same with the Marines. So, what 
would happen when the Army Specialist broke down a pallet and saw that it was NOT 
for an Army unit? Many times it was lost. Not a good thing. I finally got to the point 
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where I gave feedback to the CDDOC that, to us at Al Asad, a pure pallet was all 
Army, all Marine aviation, or all Marine "other." The point is that if DLA puts an 
Army TCN on a pallet (lead TCN) the field will assume it is all Army cargo. 
 
Case #: 1579 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   23.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   23.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   23.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I have been involved with this program from the start. As for sorting by consignor 
codes/destinations great idea. What seems a waste is having several aerial ports holding 
cargo for the same destinations for 120 hours. My two cents is we should have had an 
RDC in Iraq/Stans from the beginning, manned with 2T2/2T0's to sort consolidate 
cargo to max pallet capacity when trucked to customers in the fields. All they do now is 
load whatever pallet arrives from CONUS/Europe on a truck, most being low profile or 
below 70 inches high. It would make sence for aerial ports to follow the plan as far as 
sorting the cargo in lanes but not hold over 24 hours if airlift is available. If you have 
enough mixed cargo to fill a pallet, send it to Iraq or Stans and have them break, 
consolidate with other pallets to max the trucks to destination. Why wait 72 hours? 
Can't believe we send aircraft/crew in harms way with low ACL's/low profile pallets 
instead of putting 10-20 more bodies on the ground and have them run a distribution 
hub, sorting/consolidating and maxing the trucks out with cargo to destination. With 
low profile pallets the trucks have to make more trips (in harms way). 
 
Case #: 1603 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   17.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   60.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
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Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   12.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Here at XXX, Pallets have been built with a 1 Lbs piece of cargo due to the pure 
system. It cannot be mixted with anything going to the same area. It sits here fo 120 
hours before it can be buit. This is a waste of money and not very customer orientated. 
We should concentrate on getting the customer their cargo no matter how small in the 
least amount of time. But because being pure, we have to leave it sit for 120 hours 
before it can be built on a pallet. These pallet have gone because it is older than other 
pallets. This pallet get put on an aircraft and a pallet that weights 5000 and has 20 to 30 
pieces on it sits because the a/c is full. This is not a one time instance. It happens atleast 
once a week. The pure pallet system is good but I think that if you have less than 50 
pounds of cargo, you should mix it with another pallet and then identify that it is a 
mixed pallet. Most of the time it is less than 5 pieces of cargo that takes up room for 
someone elses cargo. Thank You. 
 
Case #: 1607 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   16.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   4.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
While I was at Bagram it was "nice" to have pure pallets that could be loaded directly 
onto onward movement transportation to the outlying locations...made the system work 
really good...reduced the time required to get cargo into the customers hands... (note - 
the Army was responsable for the coord on onward movement of cargo - the USAF 
only offloaded the cargo) 
 
Case #: 1630 
Component:   Reserve 
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Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   27.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   10.00 
Time at APS (Months):   10.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I have only slight familiarity with the pure pallet program but not ONE of my TDY 
supervisors or supervisors in my Reserve Unit has given me the slightest bit of 
information on this program. I just received some working knowledge of the program, 
mostly when I was at IUD/Al Udeid for an AEF rotation. In order for me to give more 
accurate answers I would feel it necessary to actually have been given an orientation in 
to the pure pallet program. Thank you. 
 
Case #: 1635 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   23.75 
Time at PPP (Months):   2.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   4.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The pure pallet pgm is a great initiative. It gets the cargo to the warfighters quicker 
during the normal duty week, but we keep busting our PHT on weekends and holidays. 
We're having difficulty with the Supply Support Activities in Korea staying open 
during the non-duty week. We are currently working this issue with USFK Theater 
Distribution Group. 
 
Case #: 1640 
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Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   21.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   51.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   17.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Update/re-educate the aerial ports leadership and workers on this initiative... that way 
you'll have buy-in and a more motivated workforce knowing what this initative is all 
about. 
 
Case #: 1650 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   22.75 
Time at PPP (Months):   6.00 
Time at APS (Months):   48.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   144.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Now that the AOR is drawing down the personnel in the field should REALLY assess 
their needs and prevent redundant supplies from being sent and ordered for the AOR. 
The pure pallet program is great for initial influx to a theater of operation. Supply 
inventory is critical to maintain control of the assets that are sent so the PPP is not over 
stressed and can be of benifit to the areas that have the most need. Efficent use of 
aircraft and pallets/cargo distribution is vital in sustaining the warfighter. 
 
Case #: 1653 
Component:   Reserve 
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Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   7.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   15.00 
Time at APS (Months):   15.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
There should be a monthly report of product that that hasn't moved since arrival in port. 
Often, product will arrive for locations that few product is heading:therefore, pure 
pallets can't be utilized. The pure pallet program has no plan "B". There should be a 
monthly report that ports must submit showing product that has more than 30 port hold 
days. Also for special handling they should list number of products, weight, and class. 
There have been times where product will sit in the bays because we don't have enough 
product or the product isn't compatible to send a pure pallet. 
 
Case #: 1671 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-5 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   23.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   5.00 
Time at APS (Months):   5.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   5.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Have it built at CCP (DLA centers NOT at APS) Give APS "teeth" to turn cargo away 
if it is not correctly labeled Hold DLA accountable for correctly built pallets Do not 
allow DVD (direct vender delivery) to APS, make it go through DLA Have measurable 
standards for trucks to drive to APOD -- not at truckers convience Contract for trucks 
to deliver to APOD 24/7 and insistant on it! Allow direct communications between 
DLA Distribution centers and APS to make improvements. 
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Case #: 1672 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   19.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   24.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The Pure Pallet Program should only be used during war-time to support the needs of 
the war-fighter as determined by the COCOM. 
 
Case #: 1674 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   20.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I don't have any comments for improving this program because I am not familiar with 
how it works. 
 
Case #: 1681 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   12.33 
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Time at PPP (Months):   24.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The pure pallet program is a good concept, except it is causing a lot of low profile 
pallets to be sent through the airlift system. This is causing us to have to utilize more 
aircraft and costing more money. 
 
Case #: 1701 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   3.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   40.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I did not know what the pure pallet program was until I started this survey. I have an 
idea of what the pure pallet program is although I still am not sure what the program 
actually consists of. 
 
Case #: 1703 
Component:   Guard 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   38.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   14.00 
Time at APS (Months):   4.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AOC (Months):   10.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Pure pallets should NOT be built from CONUS unless a pallet can be bulked out for 
movement. Pure pallets create an increase to Intra-theater airlift due to short 
weight/non-bulked pallets reducing the utilization of airlift. I received pallets from 
Dover with a net weight of as low as 150 lbs and pallets from the TDC with a net 
weight as low as 5 lbs going to CONUS. Receiving pallets with these weights causes a 
need for increased airlift. The AMC ports and the TDC are equipped and manned to 
provide cargo processing to allow pallets to be broken down for onward movement 
allowing for airlift to be loaded to the ACL instead of bulking out. Short weight pallets 
at times can also create difficulties in loadplanning for weight and ballance although 
this issue is minimal. If cargo is held at the AMC port in CONUS until a reasonable net 
weight or bulk is attained, port holds will increase for locations with minimum cargo 
movement, sending mixed pallets to the AOR and on to the TDC for break down and 
forward surface movement move the cargo more effectively and efficiently. I do 
believe we need to support the warfighter with needed supplies as soon as reasonably 
posible but if we increase the number of pallets for airlift in the AOR that has limited 
resources and strained now this can only increase port hold times and slow down the 
process. If CONUS sends pure, pallets validated for airlift, those pallets will stay at 
KCIA, Balad or Bagram for airlift instead of moving on to the TDC and move by 
surface. Currently most cargo into KCIA moves to the TDC and moves surface to the 
AOR. If a large percentage of that comes as pure it will continue by air. The other 
current issue is pallets, nets and straps. Currently the TDC build pure pallets to move to 
the AOR by surface on 463L pallets. A large percentage of these go to forward 
deployed units with no asset recovery plan. The troops receiving the cargo don't know 
how to handle the assets and do not have the dunnage to handle properly. It's my 
opinion that all surface cargo out of the TDC should move on skids and shrinkwrapped. 
All pallets, nets, straps and chains should be recovered at the TDC and returned to 
CONUS. They should maintain a minimal supply to build their airlift pallets only. At 
KCIA I developed an asset recovery plan which recovers a substancial number of 
assets but that is only the tip of the iceburg. The TDC recovery would also reduce the 
number of damaged pallets by not allowing them to move forward and be set on the 
geound in stone and being handled by untrained personnel. 
 
Case #: 1712 
Component:   Guard 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   7.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   15.00 
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Time at APS (Months):   15.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Since I work in Special Handling the improvement would be to have a monthly report 
that list the port hold time, items, weight of items, and hazard class. There were times 
where you couldn't biuld a pure pallet because of compatiblity issues and lack of 
quantity of items going to some of the areas in the AOR. 
 
Case #: 1713 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   13.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   3.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   36.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I was unaware that the "Pure Pallet" had a program. I know when I was stationed at 
Ramstein, we were trying to build pure pallets and we were happy to see them come in. 
It took more time to build but we knew it was going to be easier for the troops down 
range and it was. Thay was back in 1997. 
 
Case #: 1723 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   13.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   32.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
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Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   4.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I would eliminate the pure lanes going to the KWI TDC. One of the programs stated 
goals is to save lives. The less pallets we have to break and rebuild in areas we are 
getting shot at and mortared at the better. I have yet to read about anyone getting shot at 
or mortared in Kuwait. There's no reason why the Kuwait TDC can't break the pallets 
down there and rebuild for direct missions into Iraq. 
 
Case #: 1737 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   3.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   24.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I think is should be taught at more itransit bases to reduce the lost cargo logs and also a 
lot of intransit ports deal a lot with other services that would also benifit from the 
program where we can release a pallet as a whole instead of having to break through all 
the cargo for one peace. 
 
Case #: 1740 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   2.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   14.00 
Time at APS (Months):   8.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
There needs to be more structured training on the pure pallet program so every aspect is 
understood by all airmen. 
 
Case #: 1766 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   15.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   180.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I am not familiar with the pure pallet program 
 
Case #: 1776 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   27.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   180.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
More information needs to be diseminated to the Reserve Units to properly 
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comprehend this program and infrastructure support to make it work. The Pure pallet 
program may not apply to reserve units due to mission requirements differing from AD 
forces in regards to AOR applicability. 
 
Case #: 1806 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   23.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   71.00 
Time at APS (Months):   71.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The largest problems by far are, ALOC pallets being either improperly built (heavy 
items on top of crushable items) or the nets being unservicable(rusted hooks, cut 
webbing)/improperly installed. This causes the aerial ports to breakdown and 
repalletize cargo. The other area that impedes cargo movement is improper 
documentation, IMPAC purchses arriving at the port with imcompleteor no consignee 
information. These issues truly impede cargo movement. Processing and building a 
Pure Pallet isn't any different from building and proceesing by POD. It eliminates or at 
least reduces the breakdown, seperation and handling of cargo by the war fighter. It is 
better for us in the Strategic Ports to take the extra time to build pure pallets vs. the 
deployed person having to teardown and seperate cargo. It gets the cargo to the rightful 
ower quickly when it enters the AOR. 
 
Case #: 1812 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-1E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   11.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   144.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
21R1 should have familirization training at intial LRO course in S.A. Texas. 
 
Case #: 1813 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   14.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   5.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I am unfimilar with the pure pallet program. I only speak from expericence in the field. 
We received numerious pallets marked "PURE PALLET". We still had to break the 
pallets down the same ammount of pallets. The pallets came in all marked for the 
Marines or Army, but we still had to break them down since they had numerous TCN. 
If the pallets would come in under one TCN. That would help out. 
 
Case #: 1830 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   19.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   18.00 
Time at APS (Months):   18.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Quality control, we recieve pure pallets not properly palletize. Cargo is crushed. we 
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have to spend several manhors rebuilding these pallets to make them air worthy 
 
Case #: 1838 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   6.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   49.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   49.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I would like to know what the PPP is. Other than seeing pallets with stickers labeled 
"PURE", I don't know what difference it's made. If it's moving assets directly through 
ports like Ramstein, I think it's a great idea and it's probably reduced manpower 
requirements for pallet buildup. I worked in the ramp section at Ramstein, I just know I 
loaded a lot of cargo in the 4 years I was there. I never recieved any info on the PPP, 
the statistics of what cargo has been shipped, or seen any direct impact on my duty 
section. 
 
Case #: 1859 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   26.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   185.00 
Time at APS (Months):   14.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   5.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The lower ranking airmen need a little more training to understand why we must do 
this. During peak work load periods, more people are needed to meet the time 
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constraints imposed by builting pure pallets. 
 
Case #: 1886 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   21.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   24.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Constant monitoring needs to take place to ensure updates are recieved in a timely 
manner. 
 
Case #: 1887 
Component:   Guard 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   8.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   5.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I would suggest that the pure pallet program not be pushed so hard leaving small misc 
shipments to difficult locations in the port to build up longer port hold times. I think the 
pure pallets are great for downrange. The is a need for more nets, however. 
 
Case #: 1892 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
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AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   16.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   25.00 
Time at APS (Months):   25.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   36.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   24.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Educate people, get out in the field and ask them all of these and LISTEN/ACT on the 
feedback they give you. These ideas should be vollied with the workers not just the 
"Desk Jokeys" at HQ level. 
 
Case #: 1893 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   8.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   8.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I think the pure pallet program is more costly but is worth the work, time and money. It 
moves cargo more precisly with less work for the men on the front line. They should be 
able to just grab and go rather than take valuable time to sort through miscellaneous 
cargo, and 10 different pallets that are thru load and have nothing to do with the 
mission in mind. 
 
Case #: 1905 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   17.83 
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Time at PPP (Months):   134.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Hazards materials for low density locations seam to have more hold time especially if 
incompatibles are present. The conception I have is sealift is not being used for 
mass/large amount like items..ie armor kits/tires/vehicles. Conex/20ft/40ft sealift vans 
are improperly used in airlift(haz/tiedown) increasing frustration/port time 
 
Case #: 1926 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   19.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   8.00 
Time at APS (Months):   42.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   12.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Just like anything else, when there are an adequet number of trained personell....then 
you should have enough toget a more accurate "Feedback" from. While I was 
deployed, whatever we had and was ready went on the a/c that came in. Some of the 
the pallets were at capacity and some were not. We sent what we had because it was 
needed by someone a bit closer to the action. 
 
Case #: 1931 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   24.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
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Time at APS (Months):   36.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The increase of the amout of cargo loaded onto a pallet should be maximized for every 
pallet in order to move an increased amount of cargo. 
 
Case #: 1932 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-6 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   28.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   24.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I wouldn't build the pure pallets at the APOE, I would make them pure at the receiving 
APOD in the AOR. USE the FEDEX/DHL example. Flights departing CONUS would 
be carrying mixed freight. Closer to delivery the cargo becomes pure for specific 
customers. 
 
Case #: 1958 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-2E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   10.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
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Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Staging locations to build the pallets that will be designated as pure pallets. This will 
help all bases identify and send cargo to be built with decated airlift not on channel and 
waiting on TACC to schedule aircraft with preceived cargo waiting. The AF scheduling 
system is based on what we may have or show from previous years instead of what we 
actually have on hand. we are running off of the past/history to build a new lean 
initiative for the future. We need to start all over with a clean slate to help the pure 
pallet concept develop to help not only the AF but also the DOD. 
 
Case #: 1961 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   20.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   12.00 
Time at APS (Months):   6.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The pure pallet program is a logical process for expediting cargo to one location. Less 
effort is needed and a more proficient shift results. the pure pallet program should 
remain with us to aid the warfighters. 
 
Case #: 1968 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   19.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   18.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   84.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
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Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The biggest issue is education and ensuring that all nodes along the way understand the 
concept. Once folks understand why they are doing it then the support of the program 
improves. Discipline from the requisitioner to the transporter and everyone in between 
needs to improve in order to make the system most efficient. Data integrity is 
paramount to success. 
 
Case #: 1981 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   12.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   17.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   12.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   3.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Difficulty has always been commicating the AF MICAP requirements to Joint (Army) 
through ports; i.e. other port operators have held AF MICAPs until enough arrive to 
build a pure pallet. Pure pallet concept must stress Green sheet or Purple sheet 
exceptions to include AF MICAPs so as to avoid delays. 
 
Case #: 1988 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   21.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   4.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   12.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Possibly this has already been addressed, but a better plan to return the empty 463L 
assets needs to be implemented. Currently, it seems as if pallets w/cargo are sent to the 
ultimate consignee and it takes lengthy time for them to get the empties returned for re-
use, if returned at all. 
 
Case #: 1990 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   17.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   9.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
In AEF 7/8, Balad AB Iraq, we experienced difficulties with our Army brethren 
sending us pure pallets. Unfortunately, the pallet would have one item on it...total pallet 
weight 300-400 lbs! Not very efficient use of a pallet position. Our pallet positions 
increased, but our total tonnage took a drastic nosedive, leading AMD to direct less 
airflow our way. Less airflow is not a good thing in the AOR...it leads to more 
convoys. 
 
Case #: 1992 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   21.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   24.00 
Time at APS (Months):   9.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   5.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
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Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   10.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Distribute the positive effects of the PPP from the DLA builder to the end user. Let 
more folks know this program is working! 
 
Case #: 2001 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-5 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   18.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   24.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Need to implement within our existing and future IT systems so that the pure pallet 
program doesn't require as much manual oversight and intervention. The warfighter 
needs to ensure that DoDAACs and route plans are update as soon as possible so cargo 
isn't routed to the wrong locations and that changes can be implemented quickly. 
 
Case #: 2004 
Component:   Guard 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   5.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   56.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   12.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
This survey should be more step-based ... meaning if you choose one option, your next 
217 
options should be predicated upon that previous response. To be honest, I have no idea 
what the pure pallet program is or does. 
 
Case #: 2018 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   19.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   120.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Provide more pallization assets, MHE and manning to process pure pallet cargo more 
efficiently. 
 
Case #: 2035 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   8.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   18.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I have been out of AMC for a few years but have read articles and briefings on this 
program. Without having direct involvement on the program it sounds like it could 
work in cases where a lot of cargo moves to a specific location on a regular basis. It 
would seem that there are some locations where this may not work quite as well and it 
actually may take longer to receive cargo. I can't back that up with any facts but that 
would be my perception without actually being involved with the program. 
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Case #: 2062 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   28.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   134.00 
Time at APS (Months):   1.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The only problem I see with the program is that if one piece of equipment is going to a 
destination and has a long hold time, pallet under utilization will result. For the person 
on the destination, it is a great program because they don't have to worry about 
breaking the pallet down and distributing the equipment. 
 
Case #: 2067 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   O-5 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   30.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   2.00 
Time at APS (Months):   1.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Explanation and oversight. 
 
Case #: 2068 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
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TIS (Years):   5.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   60.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Neither myself, or anyone in my shop right now (ATOC, XXX AFB), have any idea 
what the pure pallet program is. A little clarification would probabaly be best. 
 
Case #: 2069 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   15.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   18.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   18.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Fewer convoys means fewer lives at risk; worth it! We're meeting the 1.5T/plt average 
so I'll take the PHT hit and the extra processing time anyday to help downrange 
warfighters. Great program making a real impact. 
 
Case #: 2075 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   O-3E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   19.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   12.00 
Time at APS (Months):   12.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 7.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Better refinement of DoDACs assigned to the pure pallet will help when it gets to the 
theater.. mixing Army and Air Force cargo on a pure pallet for Balad doesn't work... 
 
Case #: 2083 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   7.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   21.00 
Time at APS (Months):   12.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   4.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
More training should be available to all levels. Understanding why you do your job the 
way that you do makes it easier for supervisors to achieve urgency from their troops 
and attention to the task at hand. The end results of this program are very rewarding but 
not communicated often or effectively enough to the lower ranks. 
 
Case #: 2125 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   12.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   48.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
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Recommended Improvements: 
Channel commercial planes are already in place for CONUS-CENTCOM, these are 
wonderful assets freeing the mil planes for contingencies. Problem is over utilization of 
the c-17 fleet (not front-page news) and specifically the lack of spares. Tailswaps are 
the norm and it shouldn't have to be that way. Part of the effort saved by the PPP on the 
Aerial port ramp service section is used in tailswaps. Overall PPP is an awesome idea 
and its workin well for Ramstein. 
 
Case #: 2159 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   16.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   96.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Have not heard about it! 
 
Case #: 2193 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   22.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   18.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
nothing, i think it's working just fine. 
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Case #: 2210 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   8.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   29.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   56.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   11.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Information concerning the pure pallet program needs to be easily accessable for 
everyone. If there is a place or site where this information can be found it needs to be 
known for all to have access. Also, a WBT(Web Based Training) containing everything 
there is to know about the pure pallet progam and what its intended to do would be a 
great way to get everyone trained and on the same page. I also recommend that the 
civilian companies building the pure pallets be trained on how to properly build and 
document all pallets to decrease and in time eliminate all discrepancies so we could 
actually croos dock the pallets and then simply wait on aircraft to move them. Training 
and getting the information out to everyone, even the 2T2's outside of AMC and our 
ANG/AR memebers, is the key!!! 
 
Case #: 2211 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-5 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   16.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
When I arrived Tallil, we did not have a pure pallet program and we had cargo lost all 
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over the AOR. When other units would break down the pallets, it seems our cargo 
always "came up missing". Garnted the Port hold time may rise for certain 
pallets/locations, but without a doubt we rcd our cargo sooner with the pure pallet 
program in-place. It is a good idea and should be continued...however even good ideas 
can be improved. Maybe pallet segmenting? We could create a device that seperates a 
pallet into two or more portions and incapcilates the cargo for quick breakdown and 
consolidation onto another pallet at the ISB. Just an idea.  
 
Case #: 2212 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   15.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   36.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   36.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The program does what it was designed to do (get the cargo to the war fighter). 
Unfortunately, it does so at the expense of the workers (pallet builders, load planners) 
outside the AOR. Granted the manning and equipment are not as adequate in the AOR 
at all locations, you have people already working 14hr days now playing a continuous 
game of catch-up because of the backlog of cargo to AOR destinations. The truth is, 
only those war fighters who ship BULK benefit from the system. There are a lot of 
units who are trying to get small parts, equipment they desperately need only to wait 
while it sits gaining PHT until there is enough for a pure pallet. Then when there is 
enough for a pallet, it's a 4,000lb pallet. So now we are underutilizing our aircraft 
(which are already stretched pretty thin). The whole process is disheartening from a 
load planner/pallet builder prospective. Get the cargo to the AOR slower so that it gets 
to the war fighter faster? Doesn't sound right does it? I would like to know how much 
research was done on improving the logistics in the AOR before we went with the 
"Pure Pallet" concept. The system works, because someone complained that sorting out 
"their" cargo took too long, and now they don't have to (Aerial Porters are doing it for 
them). I'm sure that the higher ups (E8< enlisted and O4< officer) are saying it's great, 
but the truth is, it's a band aid not a legitimate fix. 
 
Case #: 2249 
Component:   Active 
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Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   14.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   24.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I don't think the Pure Pallet progam should be abandoned but I do think it needs some 
modification to increase the effective use of equipment and to better utilize the aircraft 
weights. I see pallets move sometimes weighting about 400lbs just the pallet and net 
weight 355lbs so the net weight on the cargo is about 45lbs. Pure Pallet program is a 
good one but needs to be improved and use alittle differently. 
 
Case #: 2276 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   10.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   24.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   24.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   6.00 
Time at Other (Months):   6.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Increase the ability for APOE/APOd's to have enough manning/equipment to support 
such a great program. The pure pallet program will work with time and the will to do 
more with less. 
 
Case #: 2281 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
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TIS (Years):   6.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   7.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   4.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
If you are going to build a pure pallet make sure it is for one branch of service instead 
of inner mixing. At several bases there are certain DODDACs for certain branches but 
they still seem to get intermixed. 
 
Case #: 2301 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   19.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   6.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   6.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Closer coordination between suppliers (e.g. DLA) and operational organizations would 
result in a more effective/efficient stream of materiel to the warfighter. Movement of 
organizations in theater without sufficient notification to suppiers can/does result in 
mis-shipped materiel. 
 
Case #: 2333 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   5.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   4.00 
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Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
An example that I have is a 300lbs piece on a pallet that is taking up a pallet position 
on an aircraft that could have been placed onto another pallet getting more pallets to the 
war fighter. We have sent out planes full of pallets with an acl of 25,000lbs, where we 
could have maximized the acl on 90,000lbs by not having pure pallets. We continually 
have a backlog of cargo that needs to get to the war fighter. It is great concept, but 
needs some improvements within the utilization of aircraft. If more than one item is 
going to the same location and same unit then the pallets should be consolidated into 
one instead of having two pure pallets. 
 
Case #: 2369 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-4 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   5.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   34.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   24.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I have never been briefed on the pure pallet program. 
 
Case #: 2440 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   17.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   7.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
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Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   7.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
A lot of pallets are held waiting for enough cargo to cap it out. There should be a time 
drawn when the pallet (even though small) could be finished and shipped. Multiple 
partical pallets take up a lot of room, especially in deployed areas where the Aerial Port 
does not own a lot of land. 
 
Case #: 2445 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   7.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   24.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Never have been explained the finer details of the pure pallet program, however I 
would assume the obvious commitment to alleviate problems downrange when it 
comes to final distribution amoungst the various units. Secondly, I don't understand 
why this survey had to ask the same questions over and over and over and over and 
over again with different wording, did I say over. Over and out. 
 
Case #: 2462 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   9.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   5.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Pure Pallet has a different meaning to the AF than it does to the Army. Pure Pallet to 
the AF means same final destination. Pure Pallet to the Army means same unit, same 
destination. If the cargo is not high enough in the Army system to warrant going on a 
plane in the AOR, it will go by ground. (Army is dictating cargo priority in AOR) If it 
goes by ground, it will be moved by the Army/Army contractor system. I think the 
biggest problem comes from the disconnet in Army and AF defination of pure pallet 
and the difference between AF and Army logistical thought. The AF works off the 
Spoke and Hub model, we get it to one unit at a central location that knows its job to to 
get the cargo to the final user. The Army uses the train track model where HQ equips 
the train and as the train goes along the track it kicks off the cargo. But the track is 
defined through the chain of command rather than geography. So their system (using 
AF lingo) goes like this: Cargo goes first to the Air Staff From the Air Staff it goes the 
Majcom From the Majcom it goes to the Wing From the Wing it goes to the Group 
From the Group it goes to the Squadron From the Squadron it goes to the Flight. From 
the Flight it goes to the Element. Neither is better, but you can see why a pure pallet by 
AF standards gets so slowed down in an army system. In contrast, when using the AF 
system, it means our planes aren't as efficient because they are using 100% of their 
space, but only half of the actual capacity. According to Kuwait City Aerial Port 
roughly 98% of all cargo hauled by the AF in the AOR is army cargo. (March 04) 
According to the Army roughly 2% of all of their cargo is hauled by the AF (March 
04). So their 2% cargo is their most vital stuff, which takes up almost 98% of our in 
theater capacity. The long term consequences is that our system was not designed to 
handle current operations. We do not have a method of getting pallets back under the 
pure pallet program (or at least we didn't in Apr 04). A pure pallet by Army definition 
will go all the way to the FOB before the cargo is taken off. Once at the FOB, there is 
no one to make sure the pallet comes back. End result, pallets make good floors, walls, 
foxhole covers. Or if the pallet stays at the TDC, AMC expects the army to gather, 
clean and deliver the pallets. End result if AMC doesn't break first: pallets make good 
floors, walls and foxhole covers. Second, pure pallet by AF definition, once given to 
the Army is no longer pure by defintion, so it will add 24-72 hours (optimal conditions) 
before it moves on (Roughly estimated pipeline moved 200K per day, just on the price 
of the objects, didn't include transportation, manpower or overhead cost). I had seen 
cargo stay a long as week, though in my stint we got the majority of cargo from the 
TDC at Doha to Kirkuk in about 7-10 days. XXX, DSN XXX 
 
Case #: 2478 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
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TIS (Years):   16.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   60.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   36.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   48.00 
Time at Other (Months):   48.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
try to return empty pallets back to a unit either as 1 for 1 or 1 for 2 as a direct flight 
from the west coast. The assets never get back to the port that has send them out in the 
first place. 
 
Case #: 2492 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   8.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   5.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Attention to detail, where I was located we had numerous occasions where pallets came 
in marked pure, but infact were mixed pallets. 
 
Case #: 2509 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   28.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   5.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   8.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The problem I can see is there is no tracking of individual pieces I understand the 
process however like Free Flow Cargo from the Log Air Days cargo was always 
getting lost and reordered costing the government more money in the long run. Also 
Valuable Aircraft Assests such as Pallets/nets and straps chains devices are being lost 
and stolen misused in the AOR by the Army and other Units using the Pure pallet 
program. I understand the need to get their equipment and materials fast and quick 
however I feel this is system is being abused and the Military are losing more money 
than they are saving. 
 
Case #: 2514 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   17.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   28.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Only war fighting materials need to be in the pure pallet, not office furniture or 
Household goods. 
 
Case #: 2524 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   13.83 
Time at PPP (Months):   50.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   48.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   2.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The pure pallet program should be used for those major distributers and they should 
hold onto the cargo until they have enough to build a pallet. Also, we need to figure out 
a way to aquire the assets back from the downrange sites. The loss of pallets and nets 
have increased since starting the pure pallet program. The users we are delivering these 
pallets to are not returning the assets for us to use again. 
 
Case #: 2528 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   7.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   13.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Once TACC has visibility of the cargo leaving the CONUS, they should schedule the 
aircraft to meet the needs of the destinations at that point. This will allow the backlog at 
downline stations to crossflow to the final destinations easier. Currently, the backlog at 
intransit stations increases awaiting airlift for the proper destinations. 
 
Case #: 2536 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   5.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   37.00 
Time at APS (Months):   36.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   24.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
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Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   6.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Not everyone seems to know the basics of this program. 
 
Case #: 2548 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   16.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   5.00 
Time at APS (Months):   72.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   72.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   48.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I spent 5 months at Q-West Iraq. During that time I seen the pure pallet program 
working for the warfighter as it is put in this survey. During my 16 years as a 2T2 I 
have seen it work just fine, end product is not really seen from my position. Concerns I 
do have for this program is the Army portion of the equation. While in Iraq I seen over 
20 pallets severly damaged by loading pure pallets onto trailers with rocks and debris 
not being swept away. I also seen many pallets routed to wrong locations due to Army 
education of how the program works. I am also concerned with the fact that cargo 
would be sent from Turkey to Q-West destined for Anaconda and other locations that 
would have to be convoyed by the Army. Now if this pure pallet program is designed 
to help the warfighter, then why are we making them convoy to locations farther than 
one hour away. If we are loosing most of the warfighters to road side IED's then the 
pure pallet program should be designed with more of a scope for intra theater airlift 
availability. This is what I saw while I was at Iraq. 
 
Case #: 2592 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   20.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
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Time at AMS (Months):   30.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   30.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
All Transportation Functions for my current location are contracted out services. I do 
not have any 2T2's assigned here. Very little aspects of the Pure Pallet Program are 
resident here. 
 
Case #: 2612 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   12.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   20.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
First off what do questions 11-14 have to do with the Pure Pallet program. I was the 
Cargo/ Loadplanning supervisor at an enroute station. I had to do my own research on 
this program as I did not receive any training or see any messages when it started up. 
the pallets counts are way down, since we, the Air force, use our own assets to build 
pure pallet for other services I don't believe we are receiving these assets back. We 
need a way to identify Air Force 463L equipment so we can receive them back. 
 
Case #: 2634 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   36.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   13.00 
Time at APS (Months):   8.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
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Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
keep the people informed at all times.I was never trained for utilization of the pure 
pallet program except told about pure pallets coming in from the outside for shipment. 
 
Case #: 2643 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-5 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   11.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   32.00 
Time at APS (Months):   24.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
make sure to have more supplies going in the same direction. 
 
Case #: 2649 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   11.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   36.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
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Great concept, works well for most in the logistics chain. Can seem slow to the end 
user/customer, but it is statistically faster (DLA has great stats on this). The program 
just needs a little worker bee level salesmanship. Maybe publish some statistical 
comparisons? 
 
Case #: 2691 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   19.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   233.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Ranstien air foece base,cargo (pure pallets)for centcom, sit for as many as five days 
until there is enough to build a pure pallet. Also load planners multiply problems by not 
walking there loads properly and/or bumping cargo in ADS or LOGISTIC modes 
especially 2 or more pallets trains (increasing rebuilding of pallet trains). Load Masters 
refusing loads for no GOOD appearent reasons other than they won't take it. And 
Lastly, Civillan workers ( mostly the retired military) Who insist on doing the dumbest 
things. An example loading a 55 gallon drum through the l/rear cargo door. 
 
Case #: 2705 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   30.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   300.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 





Case #: 2708 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   18.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   12.00 
Time at APS (Months):   4.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   8.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
At the reserve level, the pure pallet program is a foreign concept. The only exposure 
that may be given is from those few members that have deployed and shared their 
experiences when they return. The reserve and/or guard units, for the most part, are 
unaware of this program. 
 
Case #: 2750 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-4 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   13.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   7.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   12.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   12.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Challenge is to build lower-volume pure pallets and still utilize aircraft effectively. 
Would love to see innovations that allow for smaller pallets, stacked pallets or the like 




Case #: 2752 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   11.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   122.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I am a reservist in the XXX aerial port squardron and I have never heard of this 
program 
 
Case #: 2780 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   16.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   3.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Letting the troops know what is the Pure Pallet Program. I have inquired of every 
member involved with pallets in this unit and no one has any idea of what the program 
is. Perhaps a column for 'I do not know' should have been added. I used 'Neither' 
instead. Now that you have piqued my curiosity, please share with this community 
what is the Pure Pallet Program. It might be a good thing. Thanks! 
 
Case #: 2791 
Component:   Reserve 
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Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   22.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   5.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   4.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
In special handling in XXX; we had trouble getting more then 1,000 lbs. for certain 
destinations; so it would be more beneficial if the troops had a little more lee-way in 
being able to mix some pallets; so as to prevent long pht for some cargoes that get left 
behind; due to small amount of cargo for that destination. ; regards; msgt XXX 
 
Case #: 2816 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   7.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   7.00 
Time at APS (Months):   38.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Good concept BUT PHT has increased and TDD has been hit hard. Need to combine 
more DODAACs to increase pallet weight and in-turn increase aircraft utilization. I 
love the concept BUT needs to be tweaked to ensure AMC is getting more bang for its 
buck. 
 
Case #: 2828 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
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TIS (Years):   16.17 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   24.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Further guidance is needed and it needs to implimented AF Wide with further guidance 
given to the shipper. 
 
Case #: 2831 
Component:   Guard 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   14.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   13.00 
Time at APS (Months):   8.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Develop a training / familiarization program for the guard and reserve (airmen and 
supervisors like) I never heard of the program until I was activated. Stress key points 
around the goals and objectives of the program. Familiarize folks with the 
environments at places like Balad Iraq. In war zones, we have army contractors 
handling army cargo and they want that cargo yesterday. We tried to pull manifests 
from GATES prior to aircraft arrival in order to identify pallets and their destinations 
prior to arrival (some army DODACS did not go to those contractors  If the 
contractor takes the pallet and then realizes it doesnt belong to them, then they return 
it to the air force and they get paid to handle the pallet twice). In other words, the 
contractors like to sign for all Army cargo then break the pallets or identify pure pallets 
that are to be moved onward and re-enter that cargo into the system. This is how the 
contractor gets paid for handleing the cargo (evan if they only physically move the 
pallet once) We need to find a way to get informed when units move from one location 
to another more efficiently. We identify specific DODACS and their locations, but 
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when the unit moves to another location, their cargo tends to terminate at their old 
locations and re- enter the system to move on to the actual location. Slows us down, 
uses excess man hours, ad makes for unhappy customers. 
 
Case #: 2846 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-7 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   33.42 
Time at PPP (Months):   10.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   5.00 
Time at Other (Months):   6.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I believe more airman should be aware of the program. I dont believe every airman has 
been exposed to this unless they were doing mandays at the right locations at the right 
time. Maybe train this at UTA'S 
 
Case #: 2857 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   19.58 
Time at PPP (Months):   10.00 
Time at APS (Months):   5.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   36.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Ensure pallets reaching the APOD or Hub are actually "Pure". Much time is lost when 
having to break down and redistribute cargo into the correct holding area to rebuild. 
Additionally, w/Airflow schedules heavily in favor of larger more common 
destinations, pht increases for the smaller less common destinations. All in all a good 
241 
concept, but we need to continue to push the concept so that pure becomes the norm 
rather than mixed. 
 
Case #: 2866 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   14.50 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   12.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I have had very little involvement with pure pallets in the last year. All my info was 
based on a year ago. 
 
Case #: 2878 
Component:   Guard 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   22.00 
Time at PPP (Months):   28.00 
Time at APS (Months):   264.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   264.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   42.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Still configuring the overall system to find bugs that maybe needed to be tweaked to 
smooth out the operation. 
 
Case #: 2879 
Component:   Guard 
Rank:   E-7 
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AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   26.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   12.00 
Time at APS (Months):   12.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I was activated for 1 year and assigned to XXX AFB from Jan 03 to Jan 04. I saw the 
implementation of the pure pallet program after returning from Kandahar AF, 
Afghanistan. The concept is well founded provided that the amount of cargo supports 
the program. On several occasions I saw cargo sit for up to 40 days for some 
destinations. An example of this would be about 500 lbs or less for a particular 
destination and there were a dozen channels in this condition. It took a lot of wrangling 
and lot of coordination with the parent service and the receiving station to move the 
small amounts of cargo to the AOR. I worked Load Planning at XXX. 
 
Case #: 2883 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3E 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   16.92 
Time at PPP (Months):   26.00 
Time at APS (Months):   21.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
We should be able to move a single piece of cargo the has accumulated hours as loose 
cargo (if in weight standards) w/RFID attached to the piece instead of taking up one 
entire pallet position on an aircraft. 
 
Case #: 2894 
Component:   Guard 
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Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   14.08 
Time at PPP (Months):   9.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   8.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
The 2T2x1 job is not hard, but we still need to hire good people and train good people 
and also develope them in the AF ways. There are Airmen in this Air Force that are 
affraid to do thier job because the way the leadership has presented the Pure Pallet 
Program. There is ways to get Airmen to eat a Shit Sandwich and ask for more, but the 
common theam of today's Airforce is training topics like Sexual Harasment, and 
Homosexual Awareness and that is just two things that came to mind. With that in 
mind, the Pure Pallet Program could have been sold better. It has not, therefore it has 
failed. 
 
Case #: 2910 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   17.33 
Time at PPP (Months):   0.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   2.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Pure pallets need to be built by being fully utilized or "cubed" out so that we can fully 
utilize aircraft space instead of sending out pallets that are short in hieght or not maxing 
out a pallets capabilities. As of what I've seen, the cargo is being moved because of 
time restraints to get it downrange to the end user instead of building pallets to 
maximaze aircraft and airlift/transportation resources. 
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Case #: 2942 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-8 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   29.25 
Time at PPP (Months):   7.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
I have never heard of the pur pallet program. 
 
Case #: 2966 
Component:   Active 
Rank:   O-3 
AFSC:   21R 
TIS (Years):   8.67 
Time at PPP (Months):   4.00 
Time at APS (Months):   0.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   3.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   24.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   3.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 
Good concept that reduces cargo wait time at the SPOD...however; there is increased 
wait time at the POE ensuring that there is enough cargo to fill one pallet. The cargo 
prepping lanes prior to palletizing is very Similar to the break bulk warehouse 
operations at the end user locations. Many times cargo will sit in a warehouse waiting 
for enough to fill a container/pallet/truck. With the focus on getting the right supplies to 
the right customer at the right time...I would like to see a study done to analyze the 
PHT vs. customer wait time in both scenarios. In addition, I would recommend 
focussing a dore-to-door type process that would get the supplies to the warfighter 
without wait time for depalletization. In the pure pallet program we still have to add 
wait time involved with depalletizing and onward movement to the troops in the 
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field/foxholes that do not use 463L or have that capability. The Joint Modular 
Intermodal container concept is focused on similar goals as the Pure Pallet 
Program...reducing supply wait time. JMIDS are Joint multi-modal / service packages 
and platforms with integrated asset tracking that permit the efficient and seamless 
movement of supplies through the distribution system to include retrograde operations. 
However, if I remember correctly they have multiple consignee cargo within each 
container. If one was to advise using JMIDS under the "pure" concept...I would be 
interested to see the results of using air/sea/land movable containers that are addressed 
to a single consignee. Does not remove the PHT, but would be interesting to see what 
the results are. 
 
Case #: 2989 
Component:   Reserve 
Rank:   E-6 
AFSC:   2T2 
TIS (Years):   19.75 
Time at PPP (Months):   15.00 
Time at APS (Months):   117.00 
Time at AMS (Months):   0.00 
Time at HQ (Months):   0.00 
Time at AOC (Months):   0.00 
Time at CDDOC (Months): 0.00 
Time at Fwd Deployed (Months):   0.00 
Time at Other (Months):   0.00 
Recommended Improvements: 





These additional comments were sent directly to this researcher via email and were 
not recorded in the survey database: 
 
 
Since I came back from OEF deployment in July 02 and OIF deployment in July 03 the 
survey closed since I have no direct involvement with the pure pallet program in the time 
frame requested.  I do think it is a good initiative.  Below are two issues that I would like 
to share with you if you have the time.   
  
An example of Combat Support operations from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was 
the delivery of cargo to Karshi-Kanabad AB (K2 AB). 
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The Army controlled this site after SOF moved forward and this was the first LOG hub 
for OEF. There were many problems at this site where if I was in charge I would change 
things for the next time.  
1. One huge problem was when cargo was brought in, the Army would not keep 
track of where they would place the pallets of cargo so daily they would have to 
walk about the camp looking for critical items that we proved were delivered by 
GATES and GTN but had not yet reached the end user. End users would show up 
and the Army would not know their cargo had already arrived. There needs to be 
an exact joint tracking system brought in on the first SOF or TALCE team and if 
the Army is to operate the airfield without a TALCE then they need to bring in 
their own ground tracking system or use one from the AF.  This program should 
be exchanged to the next follow on unit and it should be something as simple of 
dividing the base in grid squares and to place where pallets are staged so they 
would not become lost. As pallets are retrieved or broken down then the database 
should reflect this also. 
2. Another issue is that cargo would arrive in C-17 pallet buildup configuration.  
This is great if this was the end stop but it wasn't in most occasions. Specified 
pallets that were to end there (in K2 AB) should have been built this way but the 
problem was all the pallets were done this way in CONUS or Ramstein AB and 
not reconfigured at Ramstein AB.  This showed great utilization rates for 
TRANSCOM but put a hurt on CENTCOM since now pallets had to be broken 
down and rebuilt and retagged, JI'd, etc... for C-130 movement to Bagram AB and 
Qandahar AB; all with a mandate of having a minimal footprint as possible 
forward in the AOR.  The Army did not plan on doing this mission and had to 
send additional personnel forward to break down C-17 configured pallets to C-
130 configured pallets in muddy conditions, no cover, etc... Perhaps in future 
crisis the DIRMOBFOR could had Ramstein AB build C-130 configured pallets 
for 15 days of sustainment of all classes of supply that had to go down range after 
K2 even if they were flown from Ramstein AB to K2 AB.  This would have saved 
time getting supplies to our forward forces. 
 
 
I’ve got some feedback for you that is a little more specific than the survey will convey I 
think.  While I was deployed at Camp Victory (HQ Multinational Corps, Iraq) we had 
issues with getting cargo on time to Tal Afar.   
 
The problem as I perceived it was: 
 
1. Pure pallets were being built for Tal Afar at KCHS.  Initially when I called the 
port (air freight) they had no idea that they had the channel for Tal Afar and when 
I asked them to look for the ICAO in their backlog report they did not see 
anything. 
2. When I could get them to identify that they were the owners of the channel, I was 
told by TACC/port that although there was a validated channel, airlift would only 
247 
be allocated if there was enough cargo to warrant a mission.  Given that Tal Afar 
was being built pure, pallets were slow to build and cargo velocity was at a snails 
pace for Tal Afar 
3. Hub and spoke concept was sending the Tal Afar cargo through Incirlik.  
However, Incirlik does not accept commodity code 2/3 cargo so those items 
would sit at the port and wait for enough cargo to build a pallet and move through 
Balad/other Iraq validated channels. 
 
 
1. When assigned to 3rd Army HQ’s I realized that from the apportionment of C-130 
A/C for different OPLANS that the 3rd Army HQ's (soon to be CFLCC HQ’s) 
had no concept of how to use tactical (intratheater) airlift support.  One doesn't get 
promoted it seems in the Army by saying "We need help of any kind from a sister 
service”, so for 12 years after the Gulf War the Army component of CENTCOM 
were not planning on using the C-130’s on the TPFDD.  CENTAF staff would tell 
me that they would use all of the C-130’s for the first 45 days just to move WRM 
assets.  When I challenged the Army they said they (the Army) were too heavy 
and would move all their class of supplies by surface from Kuwait to Iraq and 
didn’t need the USAF.  When I challenged the Air Force (9th Air Force) they said 
they would use all the C-130's initially before they would share.  This was largely 
due that since 3rd Army wasn’t speaking with their USAF counterpart on re-
supply requirements and rate of re-supply mainly because CENTCOM and 
component HQ’s had never practiced anything other then the defense of Kuwait 
up to that time.  This was in Aug 2000.  I spoke directly with CENTCOM J-4 
shop division about this and they agreed that the Logistics piece needed to be 
totally rewritten since they knew there would be a Joint Movement Center stood 
up to prioritize all intratheater movement  and allocate the assets working hand in 
hand with the DIRMOBFOR and the Air Mobility Division building the ATO’s. 
2. Convinced a small contingent of Army LTC's in G-5 and G-4 that if the Army 
could change where they planned to place their Logistics Supply Areas (LSA's) 
on the Major Supply Routes (MSR's) where there were Iraqi airfields that could 
land at least C-130's that I could get the Air Force to support the Army's logistics 
requirements upfront even though CENTAF said they would not release C-130's 
for this mission.  The Army made these changes to their OPLAN and submitted to 
CENTCOM.  The next hurdle was that the Air Force had not planned on 
operating Forward Operating Bases (FOB's) in Iraq as was witnessed in a war-
game before OEF and OIF.  During a wargame prior to OEF CENTCOM 
Strategic Movement Center (SMC) “requested”  that CENTAF create FOB’s in 
Iraq but they did so where they could not support the Army re-supply since the 
majority of the wargame was on the fighting and not re-supply issues.  CENTAF 
was concerned with Attack/Fighter/Bombers. CENTCOM directed CENTAF and 
TRANSCOM that ARCENT needed FOBs for C-130 and C-17 support and 
showed where these sites were to be.  This later allowed CENTAF to use one 
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FOB (Tallil AB now Ali AB) for A-10 rearming/refueling operations to provide 
more Close Air Support (CAS) for the Army during OIF.  
3. OEF occurred which proved yet again of AMC's crucial role to keep the Army 
alive on the ground in Afghanistan.  Some problems that we dealt with:  
3A).  Tried to use the new Aerial Bulk Fuel Delivery System (two fuel 
bladders that fit in pallet positions 1-2.5/2.5-5 w pumps and hoses on 
pallet position. This would allow 2,500 gals of POL/AVGAS/JP-8 to be 
brought forward per bag, being two bags per C-130 = 5K gals per sortie 
max.  If you could take off another 2K from wet-wing de-fueling than 
the total would be 7K gal.  It was quickly determined that there was a 
default in the new ABFDS due to some kind of venting issue and all 50 
ABFDSs had to be sent back to the manufacturer for an upgrade.  Most 
if not all of the ABFDS should be fully functional as I write this and the 
POC for this system is ACC for future OP Planning.  
3B).  C-17's would land, wet-wing de-fuel depart, then the next C-17 would 
land and request fuel that was just dropped off. This totally defeated the 
purpose of the prior C-17 dropping off fuel prior.  CFLCC C-4 asked the 
DIRMOBFOR to get with TACC and fix this which he and the Air 
Mobility Division (AMD) staff did.  CENTCOM also asked 
TRANSCOM to make sure the C-17's were topped off right before they 
landed and right after departure so the max amount of fuel could be 
delivered and not withdrawn again except for SOF C-130's and Army 
Helo's.  The learning curve went up again when it was discovered that 
on all Block 12 C-17's there was an extra fuel bladder installed between 
the wings in the cargo bay. At first TRANSCOM did not want to use 
these for this mission since this gave them longer range for the 
intertheater movement but CENTCOM kept the pressure on and 
TRANSCOM gave us the Block 12 C-17's as often as they could for 
POL delivery to Bagram and Qandahar AB's.  My lesson learned for 
future OPS is to request Block 12 or higher C-17's if I need fuel 
deliveries and make sure tankers top them off before they land and as 
soon as they depart. 
3C).  Karshi-Kanabad (K2): The Army controlled this site after SOF moved 
forward and this was the first LOG hub for OEF. There were many 
problems at this site where if I was in charge I would change things for 
the next time. 
3C1). One huge problem was when cargo was brought in the Army 
would not keep track of where they would place the pallets of 
cargo so daily they would have to walk about the camp looking for 
critical items that we proved were delivered by GATES and GTN 
but had not yet reached the end user.  End users would show up 
and the Army would not know their cargo had already arrived. 
There needs to be an exact tracking system brought in on the first 
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SOF or TALCE team and if the Army is to operate the airfield 
without a TALCE then they need to bring in their own ground 
tracking system.  This program should be exchanged to the next 
follow on unit and it should be something as simple of dividing the 
base in grid squares and to place where pallets are staged so they 
would not become lost.  As pallets are retrieved or broken down 
then the database should reflect this also. 
3C2). Cargo would arrive in C-17 pallet builds which is great if this was 
the end stop but it wasn't.  Specified pallets that were to end there 
should have been built this way but the problem was all the pallets 
were done this way in CONUS and not reconfigured at Ramstein 
AB which of course showed great utilization rates for 
TRANSCOM but put a world of hurt on CENTCOM since now 
pallets had to be broken down and rebuilt and retagged, JI'd, etc... 
for C-130 movement; all with a mandate of having a minimal 
footprint as possible forward in the AOR.  They Army did not plan 
on doing this mission and had to send additional personnel forward 
all the time pallets were being built in muddy conditions, no cover, 
etc... If I was the DIRMOBFOR I would have had Ramstein AB 
build those pallets that had to go down range after K2 to have them 
built in C-130 loads until the theater became more established as it 
later did with Qandahar and Bagram AB's when we could 
eventually land C-17's there.  
4. OIF ideas: 
4A).  Too many Congressmen were visiting the theater and for every one two 
C-130's (sometimes one C-17) would be used for this mission since they 
would need a back up A/C if something went wrong with the primary.  
The AF's VIP A/C do not have the countermeasures to fly where the 
congressmen were needing to go so cargo and troop delivery was 
shortchanged. I would suggest to the AF that a few of the VIP A/C be 
upgraded and give them the needed counter measure devices so if and 
when we have a future conflict then needed cargo A/C are not 
shortchanged to perform this mission.  
4B).  Retro-grade 463-L pallets:  After a few months AMC said they were 
critically low on pallets and needed them back.  The Army then had to 
ask and later direct pallets to be returned, directed again and again for 
the pallets to be returned, etc... I would solve this by having units have 
to report how many pallets they receive per week and how many they 
are sending back to the LSA's on empty trucks.  I am not concerned with 
having an exact count just to make sure the pallets are in the system and 
that the Army will worry about them more in the future.  
4C).  Some FOBs were run by the Army which sounds great but the Army 
does not have any 40Ks or 60Ks assigned to them, these belong to the 
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USAF.  In the JMC we would receive telephone and e-mail requests of 
Army officers pleading to get K-loaders loaned to them but when the 
JMC would ask CENTAF for these assets they would say no.  The Army 
FOBs would then have to unload C-747s of 42 pallets each with fork-
lifts which was not efficient.  In future OPLANS the AF needs to factor 
in that K-loaders will need to me transferred or loaned to non AF units 
and to maintenance them.  The Army was helping the USAF out by 
running these airfields but the AF was not helping the Army out by 
equipping them with K-loaders to efficiently run the airfields. 
 
 
1. Some of the pallets were built incorrectly.  One had 2 very large boxes on a pallet, 
and they were only a quarter full.  These boxes had laundry detergent on top.  
This made the pallet top heavy and we had a pallet tip over on its head as a result.  
It could have hurt someone.  We were lucky no damage came to AF assets or 
cargo.  What if it had been something fragile.  Also some of the boxes on the 
manifests did not have the correct weights on them which may have caused this 
problem.  (Recommend consolidated shipments be checked for proper 
documentation i.e. weight and packaging) 
2. Not all the restraints were provided.  At Manas my troops had to add restraints on 
almost all pallets requiring 2 sides and straps.  Sgt XXXXX found it was being 
taught wrong to APS students at the school house, could have been a contributor.   
3. Being able to drop the pallet of to a single user did save time by giving the 
transfer to TMF and to the user.  Overall good idea. 
 
 
Didn't find Manas AB, Kyrgyz Republic.  (in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Rep). 
  
Manas is the strat airlift hub for pax and cargo ISO OEF. 
 
 
The only comment I would have added is that while I like to concept, it can add 
additional time to the pipeline while a port or depot holds property until they have 
enough property for an economically feasible pallet-load, rather than shipping priority 
items as they are received. 
 
 
I was never assigned to the units you listed.  However, I was the CENTAF LNO from 
XXX 03 to XXX 04 and my duty station was Ali Al Salem.  I worked at KCIA, the Army 
Theater Distribution Center at Doha (Kuwait) and Ali Al Salem, and some at Arifjan.   
 
Here is what I find, use as you see fit.   
Pure pallet to AF means same final destination. 
Pure pallet to Army means same unit and same location. 
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If an AF pallet goes onto a vehicle, through the Army TDC, the army will break the pallet 
apart and sort the cargo so that the same unit’s stuff is on the same pallet.  The process 
may have changed in a the year or so I was gone, but I noticed in Kirkuk last year the 
program seemed to be the same. 
 
What we did to keep AF cargo moving was spray paint the name of the base onto the 
plastic covering.  That seemed to speed things up and then hand carried sized pieces we 
would put into triwalls.  The small MICAPs that were in there were pulled out and sent 
via FEDEX through the Ali Al Salem TMO.   
 
2 results from this:  First, three or four days were added to shipment due to break down 
and sorting.  Second, pallets do not return to the system.  The cargo will go all the way to 
the end of line, which generally doesn’t have anyone coming to collect them.  On the rare 
instance they would get them back, AMC units weren’t taking them back because they 
weren’t clean.  AMC units expected the Army to follow guidance getting the pallets 
back.  Ultimately the army doesn’t need them and the AMC is kind of worthless without 
them.   
 
 
The survey wouldn’t let me submit comments because I wasn’t at any base listed.  
Unfortunately I think that the people who really deal with the pure pallet problem are the 
receivers not the senders.  The major aerial ports are big enough to push the users around 
them, whereas the smaller bases are the ones experiencing longer supply lead times due 
to the hassles of the number of different people touching the cargo. 
For example, a part will go from the depot to a port then to somewhere in the AOR.  If it 
is not an AMC part, AMC isn’t tracking it.  If it isn’t a high class priority (like weapons, 
bullets, blood) then it probably goes onward by ground once in the AOR.  So that means 
it will stop somewhere in the aor, handled by an AMC person, probably given to a 
contractor to move to the consolidation point where it will wait for either an AF person or 
a contractor to move it onto a convoy.  The convoy will move it to the next distribution 
point, where the cargo will again be routed to another convoy, hopefully to its final 
destination.  When I was in Kuwait, I found there were 7 organizations that handled the 
cargo, before it even got into Iraq.  If the supplies came by boat, there were even more.   
 
Not to redirect your thesis, but I think you are only getting half of the right data with pure 
pallet, unless you talk cargo classification.  Higher priority works much differently than 
lower priority.  I had one base at 50% VIC and their cargo still wasn’t high enough 
priority to get on a plane.  And sometimes the planes take off empty because it is 
extremely difficult to move from plane to truck to plane again.  And lets not forget that 
sometimes cargo is unloaded from a plane that the load master will no longer take back 
unless the base fixes it.  But the base has no desire to fix it because it wasn’t their cargo, 
they don’t need it and if they let it sit then big deal.  Not many people are probably 
looking for cargo.   
 
I could go on, but I don’t want to bore you with details.   
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Appendix E:  Sample E-mails Sent to Population 
Sample of first initial email wave (Original Message): 
 
 





Example of reminder email wave: 
 
254 
Appendix F:  Exploratory Analysis Documentation 
Step 1.  Verified ‘SURVEYID’, ‘DTSTAMP’, and ‘TSTAMP’ fields.  The values of 
these fields within the spreadsheet did not match those displayed on the WebSIRS HTML 
page.  The HTML time signatures were disregarded as similarly titled fields were also 
recorded on the data sheet itself.  The time signatures recorded on the spreadsheet were 
used.  During this process, evidence of some sort of recording error occurred near the end 
of data collection (bottom ~50 cases).  ‘SURVEYID’ field, referred to as the case number 
from this point forward, no longer continued in a sequential manner.  The case numbers 
suddenly jumped from 2966 to 6000, 6001, 6002, and so on until 6035.  All cases were 
sorted by date and time stamp, and then renumbered from 1 to 3,005.     
 
Step 2.  Determine the number of valid cases.  This was accomplished by sorting the 
data by rank (E-1, E-2, etc.)  The data was visually scanned by comparing age, rank, 
AFSC, time in service (both years and months), and component to determine if any of the 
cases were not legitimate.  Justification for including component was that it is not 
uncommon to see an E-6 in the Reserves with 28 years TIS.    All 3,005 original cases 
were reviewed as described above, which resulted in deleting 15 cases for the following 
reasons: 
 
Case # 74:  Experienced? => No; Age => 48; Rank => E-1; AFSC => 21R; TIS => 23.6; 
Component => Active.   
 
Case #279:  Experienced? => No; Age => 18; Rank => E-1; AFSC => Unknown; TIS => 
0.0; Component => Active.   
 
Case #281:  Experienced? => No; Age => 18; Rank => E-1; AFSC => Unknown; TIS => 
0.0; Component => Active.   
 
Case #731:  Experienced? => No; Age => 23; Rank => O-2E; AFSC => 21R; TIS => 
1.5; Component => Active.   
 
Case #835:  Experienced? => No; Age => 20; Rank => E-6; AFSC => 2T231; TIS => 
1.3; Component => Active.   
 
Case #1256:  Experienced? => No; Age => 18; Rank => E-1; AFSC => Unknown; TIS 
=> 0.0; Component => Active.   
 
Case #1365:  Experienced? => No; Age => 43; Rank => E-7; AFSC => 2T271; TIS => 
1.9; Component => Active.   
 
Case #1588:  Experienced? => No; Age => 36; Rank => E-6; AFSC => 2T2; TIS => 0.0; 
Component => Active.   
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Case #1659:  Experienced? => Yes; Age => 18; Rank => E-1; AFSC =>Uknown; TIS => 
0.0; Component => Active.   
 
Case #1845:  Experienced? => No; Age => 48; Rank => E-6; AFSC =>Uknown; TIS => 
0.2; Component => Reserve.   
 
Case #1901:  Experienced? => No; Age => 18; Rank => E-1; AFSC =>Uknown; TIS => 
0.0; Component => Active. 
   
Case #1919:  Experienced? => No; Age => 39; Rank => O-8; AFSC =>21R3; TIS => 
0.0; Component => Active.   
 
Case #1979:  Experienced? => No; Age => 18; Rank => E-1; AFSC =>Uknown; TIS => 
0.0; Component =>Active.   
  
Case #2402:  Experienced? => Yes; Age => 57; Rank => O-3E; AFSC =>2T291; TIS => 
0.0; Component => Reserve.   
 
Case #2747:  Experienced? => No; Age => 18; Rank => E-1; AFSC =>Uknown; TIS => 
0.0; Component => Active.   
 
Deleting the 15 cases as noted above reduced the number of valid cases to 2,990. 
 
Step 3.  Scanned ‘AGE’ field.  All cases contained a value.  Not surprising as the default 
value in the drop-down menu is the value ‘18’.   
 
Step 4.  Scanned ‘GENDER’ field.  A total of 69 cases had the value ‘999’, an 
indication of non-response, however, no cases were deleted for any reason pertaining 
to this field.   
 
Step 5.  Scanned ‘RANK’ field.  All cases contained a value.  Not surprising as the 
default value in the drop-down menu is the value ‘E-1’.   
   
Step 6.  Scanned ‘COMPONENT’ field.  All cases contained a value.  Not surprising as 
the default value in the drop-down menu is the value ‘Active Duty’.   
 
Step 7.  Scanned ‘SPECIALTY_CODE’ field.  Since respondents were required to 
manually type in their AFSC, it was not surprising to see a very wide variation of 
reported values.  A new column was added to the spreadsheet and labeled ‘AFSC’.   
 
• Respondents who indicated anything that resembled the AFSC 2T2 or 21R 
received the value ‘2T2’ or ‘21R’ as appropriate in the newly created ‘AFSC’ 
column.  A total of 1,865 cases were assigned the value ‘2T2’ and 1,043 cases 
were assigned the value ‘21R’.   
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• Respondents who indicated an AFSC completely different from 2T2 or 21R 
received the value ‘Other’ in the newly created ‘AFSC’ column.  A total of 60 
cases were assigned the value ‘Other’.  There were two exceptions to this rule: 
o Cases in which the respondent indicated their AFSC to be that of a Group 
Commander or Deputy.  It is assumed that these respondents are serving 
as Mission Support Group Commanders or Deputy, and have the requisite 
career background for purposes of this study.  A total of 11 cases qualified 
for this exception, all of which were assigned the value of ‘21R’ in the 
‘AFSC’ column.   
o Cases in which the respondent indicated their AFSC to be that of a 
training manager within their unit.  It is assumed that these respondents 
have the requisite career background for purposes of this study.  A total of 
4 cases qualified for this exception, all of which were assigned the value 
‘2T2’ in the ‘AFSC’ column.   
• Respondents who left the ‘SPECIALTY_CODE’ field blank were assigned the 
value ‘Unknown’ in the ‘AFSC’ column.  A total of 22 cases were assigned the 
value ‘Unknown’.   
 
NOTE:  Cases assigned the value ‘Other’ or ‘Unknown’ in the newly created ‘AFSC’ 
column were not included in any portion of the data analysis.  The only exception to this 
rule was responses to the open-ended question, which were not used for quantitative 
analysis but for descriptive analysis.  It was determined that, even if not specifically 
assigned in the 2T2 or 21R career field, it is more than possible that a respondent may 
have first hand knowledge of and/or experience with the pure pallet program.  Examples 
of these situations might include traffic management specialists (AFSC 2T0) or 
maintenance officers (AFSC 21A), previously assigned to the 2T2 or 21R career field, 
serving in positions to where pure pallet program experience was gained 
 
Step 8.  Scanned ‘PROGRAM_ACTIVITIES’.  This field indicated which respondents 
reported having knowledge of and/or experience with pure pallet program activities (Item 
8, Part I-Demographics).  A total of 766 cases contained the value ‘1’, 228 of which 
included written comments to the open-ended item.  A total of 2,224 cases contained the 
value ‘2’.  By survey design, those respondents who reported no knowledge of the 
program were not afforded the opportunity to provide comments.   
 
Step 9.  Recalculated ‘TIS’.  The field ‘TIME_IN_SERVICE_YEARS’ and the field 
‘TIME_IN_SERVICE_MONTHS’ were combined into a new column labeled ‘TIS 
(Years)’, which represents the total number of years in service.   
 
The formula was =‘TIME_IN_SERVICE_YEARS’ + (‘TIME_IN_SERVICE_ 
MONTHS’ / 12).  The result was rounded to the nearest 2 decimals.   
 
Step 10.  ‘Recalculated Time at PPP Locations’.  In order to determine the total time a 
respondent spent at locations deemed to be involved in some way with the pure pallet 
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…the total of which was divided by 12.  This new value, rounded to two decimals,  
represents the total number of months each respondent reported having spent at these 




• DOVER_AERIAL_PORT_SQUADRON_ MONTHS 
• RAMSTEIN_AIR_MOBILITY_SQUADRON_ MONTHS 
• KUWAIT_INTERNATIONAL_AIRPORT_ MONTHS 
• AL UDEID_QATAR_ MONTHS 
• TIKRIT_IRAQ_ MONTHS 
• BAQUBAH_IRAQ_ MONTHS 
• BAGHDAD_INTERNATIONAL_AIRPORT_ MONTHS 
• BALAD_IRAQ_ MONTHS 
• MOSUL_IRAQ_ MONTHS 
• TALLIL_ALI_IRAQ_ MONTHS 
• AL_ASAD_IRAQ_ MONTHS 
• KARSHI_KHANABAD_UZBEKISTAN_ MONTHS 
• BAGRAM_AFGHANISTAN_ MONTHS 
• KANDAHAR_AFGHANISTAN_ MONTHS 
• DJIBOUTI_DJIBOUTI_ MONTHS 
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Step 11.  Recalculated ‘Time at APS Function (Months)’ field.  The field ‘AERIAL_ 
PORT_SQUADRON_YEARS’ and the field ‘AERIAL_PORT_SQUADRON_ 
MONTHS’ were combined into a new column labeled ‘Time at APS Function (Months)’, 
which represents the total number of months a respondent reported having spent working 
with the pure pallet program at an APS function.  
 
The formula was =(‘AERIAL_ PORT_SQUADRON_YEARS’ / 12) +  (‘AERIAL_ 
PORT_SQUADRON_ MONTHS’).  The result was rounded to the nearest 2 decimals.   
 
Step 12.  Recalculated ‘Time at AMS Function (Months)’ field.  The field ‘AIR_ 
MOBILITY_SQUADRON_YEARS’ and the field ‘AIR_MOBILITY_SQUADRON_ 
MONTHS’ were combined into a new column labeled ‘Time at AMS Function 
(Months)’, which represents the total number of months a respondent reported having 
spent working with the pure pallet program at an AMS function.   
 
The formula was =(‘AIR_ MOBILITY_SQUADRON_YEARS’ / 12) +  (‘AIR_ 
MOBILITY_SQUADRON_ MONTHS’).  The result was rounded to the nearest 2 
decimals.   
 
Step 13.  Recalculated ‘Time at HQ Function (Months)’ field.  The field 
‘HEADQUARTERS_YEARS’ and the field ‘HEADQUARTERS_ MONTHS’ were 
combined into a new column labeled ‘Time at HQ Function (Months)’, which represents 
the total number of months a respondent reported having spent working with the pure 
pallet program at a HQ function.   
 
The formula was =(‘HEADQUARTERS_YEARS’ / 12) +  (‘HEADQUARTERS_ 
MONTHS’).  The result was rounded to the nearest 2 decimals.   
 
Step 14.  Recalculated ‘Time at AOC Function (Months)’ field.  The field 
‘AIR_OPERATIONS_CENTER_YEARS’ and the field ‘AIR_OPERATIONS 
_CENTER_ MONTHS’ were combined into a new column labeled ‘Time at AOC 
Function (Months)’, which represents the total number of months a respondent reported 
having spent working with the pure pallet program at an AOC function.   
 
The formula was =(‘AIR_ OPERATIONS_CENTER_YEARS’ / 12) +  (‘AIR_ 
OPERATIONS_ CENTER_MONTHS’).  The result was rounded to the nearest 2 
decimals.   
 
Step 15.  Recalculated ‘Time at CDDOC Function (Months)’ field.  The field 
‘CDDOC_YEARS’ and the field ‘CDDOC_ MONTHS’ were combined into a new 
column labeled ‘Time at CDDOC Function (Months)’, which represents the total number 
of months a respondent reported having spent working with the pure pallet program at the 
CDDOC function.   
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The formula was =(‘CDDOC_YEARS’ / 12) +  (‘CDDOC_ MONTHS’).  The result was 
rounded to the nearest 2 decimals.   
 
Step 16.  Recalculated ‘Time at Fwd Deployed Function (Months)’ field.  The field 
‘FORWARD_ DEPLOYED_LOCATION_YEARS’ and the field ‘FORWARD_ 
DEPLOYED_LOCATION_MONTHS’ were combined into a new column labeled ‘Time 
at Fwd Deployed Function (Months)’, which represents the total number of months a 
respondent reported having spent working with the pure pallet program at a function at 
some other Forward Deployed Location.  
 
The formula was =(‘FORWARD_ DEPLOYED_LOCATION_YEARS’ / 12) +  
(‘FORWARD_ DEPLOYED_LOCATION_ MONTHS’).  The result was rounded to the 
nearest 2 decimals.   
 
Step 17.  Recalculated ‘Time at Other Function (Months)’ field.  The field ‘PPP_ 
OTHER_LOCATION_YEARS’ and the field ‘PPP_ OTHER _LOCATION_MONTHS’ 
were combined into a new column labeled ‘Time at Other Function (Months)’, which 
represents the total number of months a respondent reported having spent working with 
the pure pallet program at a function other than that previously listed.   
 
The formula was =(‘PPP_ OTHER_LOCATION_YEARS’ / 12) +  (‘PPP_OTHER_ 
LOCATION_ MONTHS’).  The result was rounded to the nearest 2 decimals.   
 
Step 18.  Scanned Survey Part II Items.  A quick scan of the values in the fields for the 
questions in Part II of the survey resulted in the identification of a problem with two 
items.  For some reason, the WebSIRS software did not properly record the responses for 
ANY respondent for Items 9 and 10.  Item 9 displayed the statement “More time is 
required to actually build pallet under the pure pallet program.”  Item 10 displayed the 
statement “The pure pallet program reduces the total time required to deliver cargo to the 
warfighter”.  Since the value ‘999’ was recorded into the database for these two items for 
100% of the respondents, these two items were completely deleted from the database as if 
they were never included in the survey.  Needless to say, these two items were not 
included in the statistical analysis.     
 
Other fields also contained the value ‘999’, but those occurrences were few in number 
and spread randomly throughout the database.  All cases with a value of ‘999’ for any of 
the 7-Point Likert scale items in Part II of the survey were deleted from the database and 
were not used for statistical analysis.  This process, known as listwise deletion, is 
considered more conservative despite the slight reduction in statistical power associated 
with reducing the number of cases.  A total of 62 cases were deleted as a result of this 
conservative approach, leaving a total of 704 usable cases.  Table 27 below displays the 
frequency of missing values by item number; Table 28 below displays the frequency of 
missing values by case number; Table 29 below displays the number of cases deleted; 
and Table 30 displays the demographics of the 62 deleted cases due to missing values.   
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Step 19.  Verified Remaining Fields of Usable Cases.  The next step was to determine 
if there were any other reasons why a particular case should be deleted.  Upon further 
examination, a total of 7 cases were deleted because the AFSC column value was either 
‘Other’ (4 cases) or ‘Unknown’ (3 cases).  These values were previously assigned by the 
researcher as indicated in Step 7 above.  This final verification step resulted in a final 
adjusted number of 697 usable cases, all of which were used for statistical analysis.  
Table 31 below displays the demographics of the seven deleted cases due to AFSC mis-
match.    
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Table 27.  Frequency of Missing Values by Item Number 
 
  Item #       Freq. Cases with ‘999’ values
1 1 2561 
2 4 1246, 2561, 2942, 2943 
3 3 2561, 2942, 2943 
4 4 482, 2561, 2942, 2943 
5 6 2193, 2375, 2550, 2561, 2942, 2943 
6 4 1566, 2561, 2942, 2943 
7 5 1196, 1983, 2561, 2942, 2943 
8 9 719, 1021, 1196, 1766, 1983, 2292, 2561, 2942, 2943 
9 41 All Cases—This Item Completely Deleted 
10 41 All Cases—This Item Completely Deleted 
11 11 117, 764, 888, 1021, 1196, 1766, 1983, 2292, 2506, 2561, 2942 
12 6 1196, 1766, 1983, 2561, 2680, 2942 
13 4 1196, 1328, 1766, 2561 
14 5 1196, 1328, 1437, 1766, 2561 
15 7 1196, 1328, 1437, 1766, 2561, 2942, 2943 
16 9 552, 1021, 1196, 1328, 1766, 2561, 2942, 2943, 2998 
17 7 1114, 1196, 1328, 1766, 2561, 2942, 2943 
18 6 1196, 1328, 1766, 2561, 2942, 2943 
19 8 1159, 1196, 1328, 1766, 2561, 2586, 2942, 2943 
20 8 1159, 1196, 1328, 1766, 1852, 2561, 2942, 2943 
21 9 1159, 1196, 1328, 1766, 1982, 2485, 2561, 2942, 2943 
22 9 150, 1159, 1196, 1328, 1766, 2212, 2561, 2942, 2943 
23 7 1159, 1196, 1766, 1830, 2561, 2942, 2943 
24 6 1159, 1196, 1766, 2561, 2942, 2943 
25 8 462, 1159, 1196, 1766, 2485, 2561, 2942, 2943 
26 8 1159, 1196, 1766, 2561, 2606, 2766, 2942, 2943 
27 11 334, 676, 1078, 1159, 1196, 1766, 2036, 2561, 2643, 2942, 2943 
28 7 771, 1159, 1196, 1766, 2561, 2942, 2943 
29 7 1159, 1196, 1569, 1766, 2561, 2942, 2943 
30 8 1159, 1196, 1377, 1477, 1766, 2561, 2942, 2943 
31 8 482, 668, 1159, 1196, 1766, 2561, 2942, 2943 
32 11 448, 462, 668, 764, 1159, 1196, 1766, 1922, 2561, 2942, 2943 
33 9 482, 668, 1159, 1196, 1766, 2059, 2561, 2942, 2943 
34 10 668, 718, 1159, 1196, 1328, 1766, 2212, 2561, 2942, 2943 
35 7 668, 1159, 1196, 1766, 2561, 2942, 2943 
36 9 668, 1159, 1196, 1724, 1766, 2426, 2561, 2942, 2943 
37 11 469, 532, 668, 700, 1159, 1196, 1862, 2561, 2680, 2942, 2943 
38 10 668, 697, 1159, 1196, 1862, 1982, 2561, 2835, 2942, 2943  
39 8 668, 1159, 1196, 1852, 2337, 2561, 2942, 2943 
40 7 329, 668, 1159, 1196, 1852, 2561, 2943 
41 10 552, 668, 1147, 1159, 1196, 1197, 1852, 2561, 2942, 2943 
        Total = 287 (Excludes Items 9 and 10) 
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Table 28.  Frequency of Missing Values by Case Number 
 
Case # # of '999' Values  Case # # of '999' Values 
117 1  1566 1 
150 1  1569 1 
329 1  1724 1 
334 1  1766 27 
448 1  1830 1 
462 2  1852 1 
469 1  1862 5 
482 3  1922 1 
532 1  1982 2 
552 2  1983 4 
668 11  2036 1 
676 1  2059 1 
697 1  2193 1 
700 1  2212 2 
718 1  2292 2 
719 1  2337 1 
764 2  2375 1 
771 1  2426 1 
888 1  2485 2 
1021 4  2506 1 
1078 1  2550 1 
1114 1  2561 39 
1147 1  2586 1 
1159 23  2606 1 
1196 33  2643 1 
1197 1  2680 2 
1246 1  2766 1 
1328 11  2835 1 
1377 1  2942 35 
1437 1  2943 34 
1477 1  2998 1 






Table 29.  Number of Cases Deleted Due to Missing Values 










































62 Total Cases 
Eligible for 
Listwise Deletion  
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Table 30.  Demographics of Deleted Cases Due to Missing Values 
Case # Rank Component AFSC 
117 E-5 Active 2T2 
150 O-4 Active Other 
329 O-3E Active 21R 
334 E-4 Reserve 2T2 
448 E-4 Active 2T2 
462 E-3 Active 2T2 
469 E-5 Active 2T2 
482 E-7 Guard 2T2 
532 E-4 Active 2T2 
552 E-5 Active 2T2 
668 O-3E Reserve 21R 
676 O-5 Reserve 21R 
697 E-5 Reserve 2T2 
700 E-5 Reserve 2T2 
718 O-1 Guard 21R 
719 E-5 Active 2T2 
764 E-5 Guard 2T2 
771 E-7 Reserve 2T2 
888 O-3E Guard 21R 
1021 E-5 Active 2T2 
1078 E-6 Active 2T2 
1114 E-5 Active 2T2 
1147 E-5 Active 2T2 
1159 O-5 Active 21R 
1196 E-4 Active 2T2 
1197 E-7 Reserve 2T2 
1246 E-3 Active 2T2 
1328 O-4 Active 21R 
1377 E-8 Reserve 2T2 
1437 E-5 Active 2T2 
1477 O-2 Active 21R 
1566 E-7 Reserve 2T2 
1569 E-3 Active 2T2 
1724 E-5 Reserve 2T2 
1766 E-6 Reserve 2T2 
1830 E-6 Active 2T2 
1852 E-3 Active 2T2 
1862 E-3 Active 2T2 
1922 O-4 Active 21R 
1982 E-8 Reserve 2T2 
1983 O-2 Active 21R 
2036 E-8 Guard 2T2 
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Table 30.  Demographics of Deleted Cases Due to Missing Values (continued) 
 
Case # Rank Component AFSC 
2059 E-5 Reserve 2T2 
2193 E-6 Active 2T2 
2212 E-6 Active 2T2 
2292 E-7 Reserve 2T2 
2337 E-5 Active 2T2 
2375 O-3 Active 21R 
2426 O-2 Active 21R 
2485 E-6 Guard 2T2 
2506 E-4 Active 2T2 
2550 E-4 Active 2T2 
2561 E-4 Active 2T2 
2586 E-6 Reserve 2T2 
2606 E-4 Active 2T2 
2643 E-5 Reserve 2T2 
2680 O-3E Active 21R 
2766 E-6 Active 2T2 
2835 E-6 Reserve 2T2 
2942 E-8 Reserve 2T2 
2943 E-6 Reserve 2T2 




Table 31.  Demographics of Deleted Cases Due to AFSC Mis-match 
 
Case # Rank Component AFSC 
210 E-5 Active Other 
1589 E-6 Reserve Unknown
1625 E-6 Reserve Other 
1916 E-7 Reserve Unknown
2420 E-5 Guard Other 
2700 E-8 Guard Other 
2832 E-6 Guard Unknown
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Appendix G:  Principal Components Analysis (PCA) Documentation  







Sig.      
(1-tailed)
1 -0.047 19 0.107 
1 -0.046 22 0.111 
1 -0.048 35 0.103 
2 0.038 5 0.158 
2 0.017 17 0.326 
2 0.014 18 0.356 
2 0.004 32 0.453 
3 -0.045 5 0.117 
3 0.019 17 0.304 
3 -0.006 18 0.436 
3 0.035 32 0.177 
3 -0.009 39 0.402 
4 0.035 19 0.179 
4 0.04 22 0.145 
4 -0.008 26 0.412 
4 0.041 34 0.139 
4 0.005 35 0.453 
4 0.004 37 0.456 
5 0.048 7 0.103 
5 -0.041 8 0.141 
5 -0.053 11 0.083 
5 -0.037 12 0.168 
5 0.009 13 0.407 
5 -0.034 14 0.182 
5 -0.049 16 0.097 
5 0.045 20 0.119 
5 -0.023 23 0.275 
5 -0.022 24 0.28 
5 -0.006 25 0.435 
5 -0.031 27 0.208 
5 -0.026 28 0.25 
5 0.032 29 0.202 
5 -0.016 30 0.333 
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Sig.      
(1-tailed)
5 -0.039 31 0.15 
5 -0.05 33 0.095 
5 0.041 36 0.14 
5 0.019 38 0.312 
6 0.046 19 0.112 
6 -0.008 26 0.417 
6 -0.051 32 0.091 
6 0.007 34 0.431 
6 0.033 35 0.192 
6 0.019 37 0.312 
6 -0.047 39 0.11 
7 0.041 17 0.141 
7 -0.011 39 0.388 
8 0.004 17 0.456 
8 0.024 18 0.265 
8 0.034 22 0.183 
8 0.004 32 0.454 
11 -0.061 19 0.055 
11 -0.031 22 0.206 
11 -0.027 26 0.241 
11 -0.051 32 0.089 
11 -0.033 34 0.19 
11 0.027 35 0.237 
11 -0.028 37 0.232 
12 -0.042 18 0.134 
12 -0.052 19 0.087 
12 -0.056 22 0.071 
12 -0.005 26 0.451 
12 -0.014 32 0.357 
12 -0.025 34 0.256 
12 0.04 35 0.143 
12 -0.006 37 0.442 
13 -0.048 18 0.104 
13 -0.024 19 0.26 
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Sig.     
(1-tailed)
13 -0.057 22 0.066 
13 0.005 26 0.447 
13 0.004 32 0.458 
13 -0.033 34 0.192 
13 0.033 35 0.191 
13 -0.008 37 0.419 
14 -0.051 18 0.09 
14 -0.036 19 0.169 
14 0.013 26 0.366 
14 -0.024 32 0.263 
14 -0.045 34 0.116 
14 0.005 35 0.449 
14 0.017 37 0.33 
15 -0.025 19 0.254 
15 -0.013 34 0.366 
15 -0.012 37 0.373 
16 -0.014 19 0.355 
16 -0.037 22 0.165 
16 -0.047 26 0.108 
16 -0.019 35 0.306 
16 -0.008 37 0.416 
16 -0.042 39 0.135 
17 0.039 20 0.154 
17 -0.033 24 0.194 
17 0.022 25 0.284 
17 -0.034 27 0.188 
17 0.042 29 0.134 
17 -0.014 36 0.359 
17 -0.011 38 0.387 
18 -0.058 21 0.062 
18 -0.017 24 0.327 
18 -0.006 25 0.441 
18 -0.002 27 0.474 
18 0.013 36 0.362 
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Sig.      
(1-tailed)
18 -0.051 38 0.091 
19 -0.009 23 0.407 
19 0.047 27 0.109 
19 -0.029 31 0.224 
20 -0.035 39 0.175 
21 0.007 26 0.43 
21 -0.001 34 0.487 
21 0.028 35 0.23 
21 0.058 37 0.063 
21 -0.041 39 0.141 
22 0.055 24 0.073 
22 0.035 25 0.176 
22 0.047 27 0.109 
22 0.012 38 0.379 
23 -0.014 26 0.36 
23 -0.061 32 0.055 
23 0.023 34 0.272 
23 -0.002 35 0.479 
23 -0.016 37 0.339 
24 -0.018 32 0.313 
25 -0.052 32 0.083 
25 0.043 34 0.126 
26 -0.06 30 0.057 
26 -0.032 33 0.197 
27 -0.05 32 0.095 
27 0.058 34 0.064 
28 -0.027 39 0.239 
29 -0.039 39 0.15 
30 -0.036 37 0.173 
31 -0.031 34 0.209 
31 -0.05 35 0.096 
31 -0.032 37 0.202 
32 -0.03 36 0.217 
32 -0.047 38 0.106 
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Sig.      
(1-tailed)
33 -0.04 37 0.145 
34 0.015 38 0.349 
34 -0.061 40 0.054 




Table 33.  PCA Total Variance Explained  
Component Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
  Total 
% of 
Variance Cum % Total 
% of 
Variance Cum % 
1 10.652 27.312 27.312 10.652 27.312 27.312
2 5.215 13.372 40.683 5.215 13.372 40.683
3 2.239 5.742 46.425 2.239 5.742 46.425
4 1.840 4.718 51.144 1.840 4.718 51.144
5 1.513 3.880 55.024 1.513 3.880 55.024
6 1.246 3.195 58.219 1.246 3.195 58.219
7 1.077 2.762 60.982 1.077 2.762 60.982
8 .959 2.458 63.440     
9 .883 2.264 65.704     
10 .826 2.117 67.822     
11 .824 2.113 69.935     
12 .778 1.994 71.928     
13 .718 1.841 73.769     
14 .663 1.700 75.469     
15 .648 1.661 77.130     
16 .607 1.557 78.688     
17 .592 1.517 80.205     
18 .575 1.474 81.679     
19 .534 1.370 83.048     
20 .507 1.299 84.347     
21 .471 1.208 85.555     
22 .456 1.168 86.723     
23 .436 1.119 87.842     
24 .431 1.104 88.946     
25 .402 1.030 89.976     
26 .389 .997 90.973     
27 .375 .960 91.934     
28 .363 .930 92.864     
29 .341 .874 93.738     
30 .299 .767 94.505     
31 .286 .733 95.238     
32 .282 .722 95.960     
33 .270 .691 96.651     
34 .266 .683 97.334     
35 .246 .632 97.966     
36 .221 .566 98.532     
37 .208 .532 99.064     
38 .196 .503 99.567     
39 .169 .433 100.000     
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 34.  Item Communalities 










































    Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 35.  Unrotated Component Matrix 
   Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FAM_1 .587             
EFFECT_2 .728             
EFFECT_3 .608             
POS_4 .703             
EFF_5             .432
PM_6 .682             
EFF_7 .595             
PM_8 .711             
OC_11 .475       -.441     
OC_12 .489   .679         
OC_13 .519   .670         
OC_14 .448   .716         
POS_15 .598             
POS_16 .558             
BEN_17   .520           
PM_18   .665           
PM_19   .585           
EFF_20 .623             
EFFECT_21 .484             
BEN_22   .584           
POS_23 .723             
PM_24 .798             
EFFECT_25 .741             
EFF_26   .692           
EFFECT_27 .600             
BEN_28 .475 .425   -.430       
BEN_29 .650             
POS_30 .435       .436     
FAM_31 .586             
PM_32   .541           
POS_33 .561             
BEN_34   .605           
BEN_35   .684           
EFFECT_36 .723             
EFF_37   .675           
EFFECT_38 .698             
EFFECT_39           .604   
FAM_40 .603             
EFFECT_41 .535             
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  7 components extracted. 
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Table 36.  Varimax Rotated (Orthogonal) Component Matrix 
   Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FAM_1 .683             
EFFECT_2 .734             
EFFECT_3 .585             
POS_4 .648             
EFF_5           .696   
PM_6 .672             
EFF_7 .494 .496           
PM_8 .704             
OC_11         .609     
OC_12         .864     
OC_13         .832     
OC_14         .840     
POS_15     .530         
POS_16 .435             
BEN_17       .621       
PM_18           .641   
PM_19           .521   
EFF_20   .676           
EFFECT_21   .549           
BEN_22       .597       
POS_23 .569   .435         
PM_24 .685             
EFFECT_25 .679             
EFF_26       .427   .631   
EFFECT_27 .476 .454           
BEN_28   .796           
BEN_29   .714           
POS_30     .732         
FAM_31     .674         
PM_32           .509   
POS_33     .798         
BEN_34       .799       
BEN_35       .610       
EFFECT_36 .708             
EFF_37       .658       
EFFECT_38 .641             
EFFECT_39             .693
FAM_40 .584             
EFFECT_41 .505     .439       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 11 iterations. 
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Table 37.  Direct Oblimin (Oblique) Rotated Component Matrix 
   Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FAM_1 .689             
EFFECT_2 .773     -.433       
EFFECT_3 .624     -.499       
POS_4 .679   .439   .436     
EFF_5             .685
PM_6 .686       .431     
EFF_7 .549     -.605       
PM_8 .736     -.437       
OC_11 .441   .673         
OC_12     .896         
OC_13     .879         
OC_14     .863         
POS_15 .449   .441   .636     
POS_16 .460       .498     
BEN_17   .627           
PM_18   .436         .728
PM_19   .469         .587
EFF_20       -.750       
EFFECT_21       -.578       
BEN_22   .627           
POS_23 .620   .447   .585     
PM_24 .739     -.501 .426     
EFFECT_25 .723     -.440 .436     
EFF_26   .526         .716
EFFECT_27 .548     -.542       
BEN_28       -.832       
BEN_29 .442     -.795       
POS_30         .758     
FAM_31 .450       .758     
PM_32             .574
POS_33         .853     
BEN_34   .805           
BEN_35   .656   -.424       
EFFECT_36 .756     -.438       
EFF_37   .699         .429
EFFECT_38 .683       .456     
EFFECT_39           .696   
FAM_40 .611       .567     
EFFECT_41 .552 .507           
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
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